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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS REPORTED

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 19 Dec 80 p 6

[Article: "Resolutions of the Arab Organization for Agricultural Development: Lebanon Becomes Member; Concern for Arab Food"]

[Text] The Arab Organization for Agricultural Development, subordinate to the League of Arab States, has agreed to consider Lebanon a participating member in the organization, after it had been an observer.

A series of decisions were also issued by the organization at the conclusion of its meetings, held recently in Damascus. They pertain to the project of strategic, Arab stocks of food, and the increase of loans required for agricultural growth purposes in the Arab countries. The decisions were as follows:

1. Established a center for technical, economic feasibility studies for projects of the food security program. Its organizational structure and administrative and financial regulations were also drawn up, along with the means of financing it, in coordination with the member states.
2. Authorized the organization's directorate general to contact Arab funds specializing in economic development purposes, in order to finance the agricultural projects.
3. Drew up a concept to create an organization for agricultural growth, including a division for developing livestock production and a division for developing vegetal production.
4. Transferred the project of strategic stock piles to the Economic and Social Council of the Arab League.
5. Asked the Arab Organization for Industrial Development to study the investments, requirements, materials and equipment, and the materials of agricultural industrialization, which the studies of the food security program dealt with. This is for the purpose of clarifying the maximum of needs in the Arab countries that can be industrialized, in agreement with the Arab Organization for Agricultural Development.
6. A study will be carried out jointly with the Arab League secretariat general, dealing with broad plans for joint agricultural policy to facilitate exchange of products and requirements, including Arab markets, on the basis of which Arab food security will be strengthened.

7. The organization will supervise the Arab Institute for Forestry in Latakia, and will set up a training center for fisheries in Iraq.

8. Periodic reports will be prepared about the course of the food economy, and especially about developments in the food gap and the efficiency of the food security program.

Lebanon was represented at the organization's meetings by a delegation headed by the minister of agriculture, Eng Mustafa Darniqah, and which included the acting director general, Dr Mustafa Zaydan, and an expert, Dr Khalil Shuayri.

Yesterday Darniqah said, regarding the conference's actions and results: "The conference has adopted decisions, the most prominent of which was the decision pertaining to Lebanon, since it has become a participating member, after having been a non-participatory member for the past 10 years. At the opening session, I requested that Lebanon be a participating and active member. A vote on my suggestion was taken, and the approval of the ministers and members of the Arab delegations was unanimous."

He added: "After that, a proposal was submitted exempting Lebanon from the financial obligations incumbent upon it, by virtue of its becoming a participating member. The members gave unanimous approval with respect to financial obligations, such as Lebanon's membership fees, for a period of 5 years. The Arab ministers considered that exempting Lebanon from paying the obligatory dues was tantamount to aid and support from the organization, in order to stimulate and strengthen the agricultural sector in Lebanon."

The minister felt that Lebanon had achieved positive results.

With respect to the nature of the secret discussions among the Arab ministers, regarding the Arab food strategy, Darniqah said: "The organization's council, in its ninth session held in Riyadh, recommended the need to carry out pan-Arab studies dealing with food security. In fact, the organization's directorate general has prepared the requested studies, which were submitted during the organization's tenth session held in Damascus between 13 and 15 December."

He added: "The purpose of setting up this food program was to achieve security in all its aspects, because food has become a political, economic and social commodity. It has become clear, through these studies, that the Arab states are the least secure countries in the world with respect to food."

Control over this food gap requires joint Arab action. During the organization's Rabat conference in 1978, a number of resolutions were adopted, requesting immediate action by the organization in two directions:

First, achievement of food security in the medium term. This involves building reserve stockpiles and giving impetus to agricultural growth.

Second, achievement of long-term food security. The goal of that is the growth of food production.

Accordingly, the studies which were submitted during the conference were discussed, and it was resolved to delay decision on them for 6 months, for the purpose of

carrying out more studies and examination, in view of their utmost importance, especially since the studies estimate that the initial amount to implement this program would be \$33 billion up to the year 2000. This amount includes investing in and financing 145 projects dealing with the principal food commodities, pertaining to food security, such as grain, dairy products, sugar, vegetable oil, red meat and fish.

7005

CSO: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

ISRAEL, EGYPT PLAN JOINT LAND RECLAMATION

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 16 Nov 80 p 5

[Article by Avraham Sahar, HA'ARETZ Economics Correspondent: "Consultation on Israel Participation in Reclaiming Egyptian Lands"]

[Text] "There are, to our knowledge, many matters in the agricultural sector which are worthy of cooperation between Egypt and Israel. A number of such matters are now under consideration, relative to which decisions will be taken immediately upon our return to Egypt," it was stated in an interview with the correspondent of HA'ARETZ by Mr Eli Abu Gaz'ia, Chairman of the Egyptian Agricultural Producers and Exporters Association (an organization parallel to our Tnuvah and Hamashbir-A.S.) who is currently in Israel as head of a commercial delegation.

Members of the delegation are guests of the Agriculture Ministry and met here with heads of supply organizations and various agricultural institutions.

According to Prof S. Fuhuriles, representing the minister of Agriculture on the matter of cooperation with Egypt, the burden of the consultations turned on the plans for reclamation of about 1 and one-half million dunam of desert lands east of Alexandria with Israeli help. Within the framework of this plan, a pioneer project over about 40,000 dunam will be established, where all of the input and the expertise will be supplied from Israel.

8090

CSO: 4805

CONCERN RISES OVER ARAB PURCHASE OF CHILD BRIDES IN INDIA

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 18 Dec 80 p 2

[Article by Bo Gunnarsson]

[Text] Many Arabs make regular trips to Hyderabad, India to purchase one or more brides whom they can treat in a manner forbidden by clergymen back home.

There has been a considerable flow of tourists from the oil-rich countries in the Persian Gulf to India in the last few years. Bombay has replaced Beirut as the playground for Arabs who have recently become rich and the hotel business is presently experiencing a renaissance.

Hyderabad, the city of more than a million inhabitants and a cultural center in the heart of India, has become a mecca for small businesses and low-paid workers.

While cosmopolitan Bombay, with 7 million inhabitants, remains quite unaffected by the invasion except for rising prices, Hyderabad is experiencing a sort of Arabian "hangover." The shortage of women on the Arabian Peninsula, strict religious bans and high costs have led to a bizarre trade involving women.

Jet planes arrive in Hyderabad filled with middle-aged or older men in white suits looking for young girls to marry or simply for a summer flirtation. They leave behind the dream of a land of honey and life without perpetual poverty. The child brides are driven into slavery and prostitution.

Oil dollars, dinners and rituals have a magnetic influence on Moslems in the old city of Hyderabad, and every other man in white is believed to be a shaykh and consequently rich.

Arrested for Rape

The girl trade has existed since the beginning of the oil crisis, but was not disclosed until recently when a 56-year-old man from Saudi Arabia was arrested for having raped his 14-year-old bride on their wedding night although he had promised not to have sexual relations with her until she became "an adult." It was revealed that Muhammad Salih, the man's name, had married three other young girls during his 4-week visit in Hyderabad and had already divorced one of them. The price per girl ranged from 600 to 1,000 kroner.

This is by no means a unique example: Many Arabs make regular trips to Hyderabad, where they can indulge in all the things that are forbidden by clergymen back home. The reason for this trade: Unemployment and poverty are great among Muslims in Hyderabad. The average income is about 1,000 kroner—per year. Girls are considered to be an economic burden already at birth because the family must pay a large dowry in order to give the girl status in her new family. Arabs, on the other hand, traditionally offer the bride's family money for the bride, and in Dubai, for instance, the cost of a wife ranges from 30,000 to 50,000 kroner.

Fatima, 15, cost a 67-year-old tile works owner from Oman 1,000 kroner. A 60-year-old guard from Bahrain paid about 700 kroner for Nasim, 14, and Sultana, 15, was given away in marriage for 1,200 kroner.

The Prince and Cinderella

Parents see in their new son-in-law a chance to escape poverty and the girls believe themselves to be Cinderella, while he is the prince with money. It is not at all difficult for marriage agents in the city to find girls, and Arabs, who give the impression of having money, can choose from between 10 to 20 girls displayed together on a stage. Some parents are so hard up for money that they send their daughters to a hotel to be "tried out" for one night.

The official number of Arab marriages in Hyderabad has been set at 5,000 this year.

A large number of the young brides never get to their new homelands. In some instances the shaykhs do not worry about getting permission for their brides to enter their native land and in other instances they lack permission from authorities back home to marry a foreigner. Most of the girls who do get to their new homeland soon discover they are just "second wives," obliged to scrub floors and do other housework. They are not allowed to go outside the house and the elderly husbands often leave them to their sons, trade them or sell them—like animals.

According to Islamic law, the husband only has to call out "talaq" (I divorce you) three times to dissolve the marriage. Some of the girls find their way back to Hyderabad, where they probably become an economic burden to their families or prostitutes.

These international marriages have become a social problem in Hyderabad, and authorities here are not able to control the activity, which is being handled by trained agents. Actually, both the girl and her parents are supposed to sign a document indicating they are aware of the special conditions in the Persian Gulf states. But most of them cannot read and their fingerprints, which serve as signatures, show they were not able to read the warnings.

It has now been decreed that all marriages involving an age differential of more than 15 years must be approved by the Ministry of the Interior in New Delhi. But recent disclosures show that this new rule is easily circumvented.

Marriage laws in a number of Arab countries forbid marriage to foreigners. In such instances, the girls are smuggled into the country as workers. Consequently, they are completely without legal rights.

Moslem leaders in Hyderabad have repeatedly warned the population they should scrutinize all details concerning a marriage-seeking Arab's former marriages, income and home before they approve of the "affair." Few listen to the advice since they desperately hope to have found a way out of poverty's iron grip.

"If we had enough work for everybody, nobody would sell their daughters," said Sultan Owaisi, a Moslem politician, who proposed that Arabs should be required to make an advance deposit of at least 12,000 kroner as a form of social security for the child bride.

8952

CSO: 3106

UNIVERSAL MILITARY SERVICE LAW ADOPTED

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 10 Jan 81 pp 1, 4

(Text)

KABUL, Jan. 10, (Bahar).— The presidium of the Revolutionary Council met at the RC headquarters on Thursday afternoon under the chairmanship of Babrak Karmal, General Secretary of PDPA CC, President of Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister.

In the meeting the Universal Military Service Law was approved in 90 articles and eight chapters. It has now entered into force as of the same date.

The law will be published in the Official Gazette, newspapers and other periodicals for public information.

Likewise, the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council reaffirmed and approved the declaration of the PDPA CC, RC Presidium Revolutionary Council and the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan issued to all the people on the enforcement of the Universal Military Service Law which had been approved by the PDPA CC Politburo and the government.

Following is the text of the declaration of the PDPA CC, RC Presidium and DRA government:

Dear compatriots,

The noble people of Afghanistan:

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in line with the will of epic-making people of Afghanistan and with the help of the heroic armed forces and other progressive and patriotic forces of our beloved country toppled down the bastion of despotism and paved the way towards progress and construction of the new society and social justice in our ancient land, the beloved Afghanistan.

We realise that we are standing at the start of the path of liberation and we know that the realisation of the aims and aspirations which lie ahead of us requires time and a lot of efforts. But most important of all is the fact that we have taken decisive steps on this way and we

are resolute to build the blossoming and prosperous Afghanistan.

The exploiters and traitors who were thrown in the dust bin of history have launched terroristic operations; destructive acts, theft, massacre and looting, conspiracies, against free, independent, heroic and revolutionary Afghanistan with the vast help of US imperialism, Peking Chauvinists, reactionary circles and some foreign states. They threaten the noble inhabitants of our country.

In this way they try to create obstacles against the realisation of revolutionary changes in our country and undermine the Democratic Regime and obstruct the building of the new society. But they should know that all their treacherous

designs for the reestablishment of the old despotic and reactionary regime of the past and foiling the national and democratic Saur Revolution are being doomed to failure.

Right now in the new and evolutionary phase of Saur Revolution the real banner of the revolution is hoisting proudly over our ancient and beloved country.

The people of Afghanistan under the banner of Saur Revolution are heroically fighting in a vast national fatherland front under the leadership of the single party the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, for real democracy and justice, respect for the sacred religion of Islam, respect for the family, national, tribal and clan traditions, for the sake of independence, peace and freedom, progress and welfare, equality and brotherhood.

The just ideas of Revolution are eternal. The protection and support of the toilers of Afghanistan and all the patriotic forces of the country for the entire current policy of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan towards the construction of new and blossoming life void of exploitation of individual by individual, the honesty and sacrifice of the armed heroic forces of Afghanistan for the aims and aspirations of revolution and their readiness for the defence of the gains of Saur Revolution guarantee this.

From the international point of view the support and vast fraternal and selfless help of all the progressive forces of the world, and prior to everyone else the powerful Soviet Union, guarantee the victory of our revolution.

For the sake of fulfilling all these sacred aspirations and wishes and for the purpose of consolidating the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan the new Universal Military Service Law has been approved. In this law it is stressed that the defence of the homeland and service to the people is the lofty and sacred duty of every individual of the country. Rendering service in our heroic armed forces is considered as the most prideful and patriotic obligation of the citizens.

For the purpose of maintaining general and complete peace and tranquility in the country and for satisfactory defence of freedom and independence of democratic Afghanistan the new Universal Military Service Law envisages the draft of male citizens of Afghanistan, who have completed 20 years of their age, to the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. In this law the period of military reserve service is fixed upto 40 years. This period is six years less than the period fixed in the previous military service law.

For those officers and cadets of the army units who serve the armed forces for more than the per-

iod set and consciously defend the honours of the homeland with all sacrifice shall be paid between 2000 and 3000 afghanis per month and at the same time their period of reserve service will be reduced two folds.

Our heroic and valorous armed forces are considered as the heroic army of the industrious people, the army of revolutionary patriotic of Afghanistan and the army of internationalists.

Citizens drafted in the army will be profoundly experienced in revolutionary struggle and trained with the spirit of patriotism and love for the homeland, honesty to the aims and aspirations of our revolution and solidarity with the toilers and other countries of the world.

But those who want to damage the prestige of our prideful armed forces and defy the military service and runaway from military service will be severely punished and hated by all the noble and muslim people of Afghanistan.

The defence of the gains of Saur Revolution, the defence of the homeland, national independence and national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country is the sacred duty of not only the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan but also all the muslim people of Afghanistan.

Friends and heroic comrades.

Soldiers, officers, workers, peasants, youth, intellectuals, religious pe-

ople, honourable muslims including the sunnies and shiites, craftsmen, traders and national capital holders, noble and brave tribes, sects and nationalities of Afghanistan, Pashtoons, Tajecks, Hazaras, Uzbecks, Turkmans, Baluchis, Nuristanis and our other compatriots,

Get united in the way of struggle for freedom, honour and prestige of the homeland against the internal and external enemies of revolutionary Afghanistan and struggle valorously and sacrificially. Defend your people's regime bravely and fearlessly.

The proud youth and the sons of the industrious people, heroic brothers and sons of the revolution, real patriots, you are the hope for the future of high-headed, free and independent Afghanistan. Stand on the lines of the heroic armed forces and valorously defend our dear homeland.

The brave and free youth of the valorous tribal people, get voluntarily on the line of the armed forces of our single homeland Afghanistan. Stand firm as an iron obstacle on the borders of our dear coun-

try and let no agents of the enemies of freedom and independence of our homeland, spies, highwaymen, traitors, murderers, usurpers, selfish people, previous despots and exploiters of the industrious people enter our sacred land.

The party, army and the people are one. The state of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan belongs to the heroic people of Afghanistan.

Pride to the heroic armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Forward towards the construction of a prosperous, high-headed free and independent Afghanistan under the banner of Saur Revolution;

We destroy all the blood thirsty enemies of freedom and independence of our homeland from our sacred land and bury them in the black graveyard.

Death to the reactionaries and traitors to Afghanistan's revolution,

Death to black reaction and world devouring imperialism,

The victory is with the free and honourable people of Afghanistan.

COMPUTER CENTER EXPANDS OPERATIONS

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 19 Jan 81 pp 3, 4

[Text]

A favourable climate has been created for progress and advancement in all walks of life in Afghanistan after the dawning of the second and evolutionary phase of the Saur victorious Revolution.

Due to this favourable environment many attempts have been made by various governmental organizations to improve their operations and management in the interest of providing speedier and better service to the populace.

Among the public agencies that have been striving to upgrade their activities is the Computer Centre currently under the jurisdiction of the Central Bureau of Census, a department of Governmental Committee for Planning. By purchasing new and more modern equipment and taking benefit of the most recent technological developments in the area of data-processing the Computer Centre intends to improve both the quality and quantity of the services rendered for its clients.

To acquaint the reader with the present activities of the Computer Centre, the difficulties that it is facing and the ways to overcome it, the Kabul New Times Reporter conducted an interview with Abdul Mateen Kakar, President of the Computer Centre. The facts that were revealed to the reporter by Kakar during the interview are described briefly in what follows:

The Computer Centre is presently equipped with a number of IBM machines. From the point of view of the organisational set-up and the kinds of computers being utilized the Computer Centre may be divided into two branches.

A. The first branch is engaged in processing population census figures population sample surveys and other applications related to census activities and findings of the first population census ever taken in Afghanistan.

This branch became active in 1358—when IBM-34 model was installed th-

rough the assistance of the United Nations.

The second branch which utilizes IBM-360 model computer processes different kinds of applications requested by various ministries and governmental institutions according to separate agreements for the payment of definite amounts of fees. The function of this branch started in 1951. The IBM 36 model being used in this branch was designed to process accounts and statistical figures of various governmental agencies and institutions. However at present the machinery and the component parts of the Computers of this branch are mostly deprecated, the necessary parts have been lacking for quite some time, and the supply of the necessary parts have been faced with considerable amount of difficulties.

As a result these computers ceased to function properly. This means that the processing of accounting figures and preparation of accounting and statistical reports of various ministries and other application of governmental institutions have either been slowed down considerably or virtually have come to standstill.

Furthermore the limited capacity of the existing computers even if active, does not allow provision of useful computer services for organizations with fairly large volume of business. The problem does not end there. The far distance existing between the Computer Centre and a variety of org-

anizations for which it undertakes to provide service after times prevents the documents to be processed to reach to the computers in time and thus causes considerable delay in the processing of documents and leaves the computers idle for some time.

To overcome all the Computer Centre difficulties it signed a long-term contract for supplying of Computer machines and equipments costing \$ 1½ million with ROBOTRON a supplying firm from the Democratic Republic of Germany in Kabul on Qaus 25, 1959.

On the basis of this contract a complete system of computers including different machines with proper maintenance and complementary parts will be supplied by ROBOTRON.

Also technical staff of the Computer Centre will be trained and consulting services shall be provided by the Democratic Republic of Germany covering proper maintenance and programming of the machines.

Delivery and installation services will also be rendered by the friendly country, the Democratic Republic of Germany.

According to Mr Kakar, the new system of computers is of the type EC-1055 made in GDR counting memory expandse of one million letters, a direct storage capacity of 600 million letters, disks and 4 magnetic tapes. The terminals are of the "display station" kind and incl-

ude various supplementary machinery and equipments.

The new machines compared with the existing ones will have a wider capacity and can be programmed for a wide range of applications. Therefore they will facilitate computerization of large-scale activities.

At present, because of the delays in the processing of documents from different organizations processed statements and data can not be presented to the management of the organizations enabling to take proper and timely decisions towards the improvement of their operations.

After the arrival and installation of the new machines not only will all of these obstacles be exterminated, but also, vast capacity of the machines will increase the scope of the activities and services to be performed for different ministries and other business concerns.

To keep pace with progressive demands of the time the computer intends to enlarge its spheres of activities in the interest of the development of Computer service in the country and for provision of better, broader and speedier services to its clients. In the future the Computer Centre utilizing its longstanding experience in dealing with computers will also be able to offer technical advice and render consulting services to various governmental and business organizations which want to have computers of their own.

On the variety of useful features of the new system of computers, the president of the Computer Centre said.

"Data can be fed into these computers not only through the medium of punch-cards but also directly by the display station, paper tapes, magnetic tapes and discs also the new system of computers will make possible processing of data from distant locations by way of telephone cables".

After describing the characteristics of the new system, Mr. Kaker explained the terms and conditions of the contract which appear to be very favourable.

The cost of the computer machinery equipment and services to be rendered under the aforementioned contracts is going to be paid from the Governmental development budget 20 per cent of the total cost of the new computer system which is to be paid through opening of a letter of credit is payable up to 90 days after the signing of the contract, another 70 per cent upon the arrival of the machine in Kabul and the remaining 10 percent after the machines have been installed and begun successful operation at the Computer Centre.

"The computer system machinery will be flown to Kabul from GDR by an aircraft until the 15th of August 1981 and within 2 months after the arrival of the equipment the installation work will be completed. The installation

of the computers will begin immediately afterwards", says Mr. Kaker.

It is beyond doubt that precise statistics accurate accounts reports and financial statements play a vital role in planning administrative organizations, effective implementation and evaluation of developmental projects leading to economic advancement of the country and rise in the living standards of its population.

Preparation of such reports and statistics can be prepared more speedily and more accurately by computers and computer technology. It stands to reason that computers, if used effectively and properly, will lead to better management of governmental and business organizations and expedition of overall economic development.

Having considered briefly the importance of computers in improving management of administrative organizations, and in view of the vast capacity and many useful features of the new computer system that is due to arrive in Kabul in the future, it follows that the new system of Computers will attribute extensively to the betterment of economic forecasting by planning authorities and taking of timely and effective decisions by the management of those organizations that will seek the services of the Computer Centre in the future.

Since it will be quite some time before the new computer system be installed

at the Computer Centre on the basis of the signed contract with ROBOTRON, the Computer Centre, based on Kaker's assertions has taken short term measures to surmount its present urgent problem, the repair of the defective computers.

Due to the breakdown of the existing computers of the second branch some of the works that ought to have been performed by the second branch have been transferred to the first branch which is mainly carrying the data processing operations related to the population census of Afghanistan.

However since the model-34 computers are already overloaded all the data processing works of different ministries for payment of fees can not be successfully taken over by the model 34 Computers. Therefore to alleviate this problem as a short term measure an agreement has been signed with the CMC Company, a government enterprise in India. On the basis of this agreement a specialist is soon due to arrive in Kabul to repair the defective and broken down computers and to train the technical staff.

As a result of this short-term measure it is hoped that the second branch computers will soon be activated and will resume operations until such time that new machines which have been purchased from the Democratic Republic of Germany arrive and are installed at the Computer Centre, in Kabul.

As mentioned earlier during the first nine and half months of 1359 the first branch has been mainly designing and implementing programs for the first population census that was ever taken in Afghanistan posting figures on appropriate cards preparing edit lists editing and correcting information and tabulating data on population samples.

Other services that have been performed by this branch of the Computer Centre during the first nine months of the current year include processing of data and preparation of statistical reports related to the country's foreign trade surveys and numbering of shops and stores in Kabul city for tax collection and other purposes.

In the year 1360, too, this division or branch will be mainly processing population census data. In addition other miscellaneous, and minor tasks will be performed for different government ministries. The second branch of the Computer Centre if active, accepts application from the governmental agencies and other institutions for definite amount of fees.

When in operation it will be carrying out certain specific functions for the following institutions:

(1) Agricultural Development Bank:

Processing of accounting book keeping documents and preparations of monthly, quarterly and annual financial statements and keeping records of all loans exceeding a hundred thousand Afghanis advance—to various Bank's clients for purchase of fertilisers and seeds.

(2) Bank Mellie Afghan:
Bank's day-to-day accounting and book keeping operations including preparation of balance sheets, keeping records of all current accounts exceeding Afs. 5000.

(3) Aryana Afghan Airline:

Processing of financial, documents and material accounting data, preparation of financial statements and passenger lists. This function normally takes about 40 hours in each month.

(4) Bakhtar Airlines:

Processing of approximately a thousand accounts per month.

(5) The Committee for International Assistance:

Performing of monthly financial operations related to 12000 accounts.

(6) Gulbahar Textile Mills:

Processing of material accounting documents (8900 accounts.)

(7) Government Employees Pension Fund:

Department:

Preparation of payments checks for pensioner, keeping records of monthly and annual payments of about 15 thousand civil and military employees pension advance payments, etc.

(8) Ministry of Education:

Processing of statistical figures and preparation of annual statistical reports of different schools and their students.

(9) Ministry of Public Health:

Processing of yearly statistical information about all of the diseases confronted with and the patients treated.

COMPUTER CENTER OFFERS REPAIR, MAINTENANCE COURSE

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 11 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

KABUUL, Jan. 11, (Bakhtar).— A course for repairing and maintenance of computers was opened at the Computer Centre of the Central Statistics Office, the State Planning Committee, by Mohaiyuddin Shahbaz the statistics deputy minister.

The course which is the first of its kind was opened to train technical personnel in repairing and maintaining computers. It will last for a period of three months.

The participants will be taught theoretically and practically by the Afghan and Indian experts.

A source of the Computer Center of CSO said: The course is conducted

on the basis of an agreement concluded between the Computer Center of CSO and the company of BMC of India on the training of Afghan technical personnel in repairment and maintenance of computers. After the completion of the course the Afghan technical personnel will take over the repairing and maintenance of computers from the Indian experts.

The source added: with the completion of the said course the Computer Center will become self-sufficient in repairment of computers on the one hand and will save a large amount of money which otherwise would be paid to foreign engineers and technicians for repairing computers.

BAKHTAR DOMESTIC AIRLINE REPORTS YEAR'S GAINS

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 3 Jan 81 p 3

[Text]

Bakhtar Afghan Airline has recently signed a contract with the concerned authorities of the Soviet Union. On the basis of this contract, the Bakhtar Airline will purchase two, AN 24, airplanes which have a total capacity of carrying 52 passengers in one flight. These airplanes will be delivered to Bakhtar Afghan Airline in the near future. On the arrival of these airlines, Bakhtar will be able to expand its services to our compatriots. In addition to that, Bakhtar has rented an airplane, AN 26, from the Airforce and Airdefence armed forces in order to provide further facilities for the compatriot passengers. Expressing the above statement in an interview with the reporter of Kabul New Times, Colonel Major Abdul Lateef "Lakanwal" president of Bakhtar Afghan Airline gave the following explanations on the working procedures and on the activity of Bakhtar Airline which is presented here:

Right now, the Bakhtar Airline possesses five airplanes:

Two of them are Russian Jet Yak-40 airplanes and the other three are Canadian Turbo-Prop Twin Otter airplanes. One of the Twin Otter Airplanes is not working due to the technical problems but will be repaired soon and will be used. Yak-40 airplanes possess nineteen seats. The number of passengers which can be carried in every flight by this type of airplanes are subject to a series of operational factors such as temperature. The maximum take-off capacities of airplanes Yak-40 and Twin Otter are 14700 kilograms and 12500 kgs. respectively. Lakanwal said: The airplanes of Bakhtar Afghan Airlines fly to the different parts of the country on a full-week schedule. Bakhtar airplanes fly from Kabul to Bamyan, Chighchiran, Herat, Qalai Naw Maimana, Mazari Shar-eef, Kunduz, Gardiz, Khost and Orzgon.

Similarly, in addition to regular flights, Bakhtar Afghan Airlines has conducted special flights in every route, especially in the routes where land transportation problems exist. Likewise, in order to provide further services to our passenger compatriots, the Bakhtar Airlines has temporarily borrowed an airplane, AN 26, with a capacity of 40 to 50 passengers from Airforce command to enable us provide further services for our passengers who travel from one province to another. Thus, in order to expand air transport services, the contract for purchasing two Antonov airplanes with a capacity for 52 passengers was signed with the concerned authorities of the Soviet Union, and the airplanes pertaining to this contract will be soon placed at our disposal.

He went on: The passengers who plan to travel by air from one province to another, first of all, register their names in the office agencies of Bakhtar Airlines which are open for the passengers in the center and provinces of the country. Afterwards, according to their turns, they receive their

tickets and become prepared for travel. As far as weight is concerned, a passenger of two to twelve years of age and an adult passenger over 12 years of age are entitled to carry ten kilogrammes and twenty kilogrammes of weight free of charge. In case of over-weight, they have to pay for their overweight on the basis of overweight regulations.

He added: As travel via land to certain provinces of the country was unfavourable due to certain factors and barriers, in the course of this year, therefore, Bakhtar accomplished valuable services to the compatriots residing in different parts of the country through the carriage of a considerable number of ordinary passengers, civil servants and a large quantity of needed commodities.

He stressed: From the start of March 19: 1980 up to now about 45000 passengers and a quantity of 18000 tons of different commodities such as clothes, foodstuff and others have been transferred by Bakhtar Airline. This figure compared to the same period of time in the last year witness a great achievement on the part of Bakhtar Afghan Airline.

Bakhtar Afghan Airline is a non-profit, public-utility enterprise. The sale price of the ticket charged on the compatriot passengers is much less than the cost price incurred. Thus, the Bakhtar Airline sustains a loss of forty million Afghanis which are subsidized by the state.

In addition to the other factors, the cheap price of the ticket has also been an encouraging factor which has resulted to increase the transport of passengers and merchandize several times in recent years especially after the April Revolution and its new and development stage.

As our data indicates, a number of 17000 passengers and an amount of 4.5 tons of merchandize have been carried and transported by Bakhtar Airline during 1980 whereas 62000 passengers and 1088 tons of merchandise were carried in 1979.

He concluded: During the first seven months in 1980, the revenues accrued to the Bakhtar Airline amounts to 268 53669 Afghanis including the fare of passengers, overweight, postal, charter and cargo charges.

ADOPTION OF YEARLY PLAN FOR 1981

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 17 Nov 80 p 1

[Text] The Council of Ministers met yesterday, Sunday 16 November 1980 at Presidential Headquarters, where Chadli Bendjedid, president of the Republic, secretary general of the FLN Party presided. Following the minister of planning and national development report, the Council of Ministers approved the draft of the yearly plan for 1981, whose total amounts to 83.8 billion dinars and which will create 200,000 new jobs. An examination of the draft plan led to an in-depth debate which allowed the Council of Ministers:

1. to establish the balance-sheet for 1980, whose main items are as follows:
 - a 9 percent increase on gross national product in real terms compared to 1979,
 - an increase in job-creating investments,
 - a higher level of effective realization of programmed investments.
2. to approve the guidelines of the draft plan to submit to the People's National Assembly for adoption.

The Council of Ministers insisted on the need to:

- increase national production by applying better management of the existing production apparatus, and improve the programming of stocks and imports,
- tie all salary increases to increased productivity in order to reduce inflation pressures,
- tie new entries to the maturation of the projects,
- observe greater discipline in the realization of investment programs, with a view toward suitably lowering the cost of projects,
- observe greater strictness in making investments, in management and in reliance on technical assistance,
- enable and encourage control in all stages of this realization.

9572

CSO: 4400

LONG TERM NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY PROPOSED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 16 Nov 80 p 5

[Text] The economic and social committee of the Party is pursuing its preparation of an energy dossier following a report by Abdelhamid Brahimi, Minister of Planning and National Development on the place of energy in national development in general.

First, Brahimi mentioned the growth of national energy consumption requirements to the year 2000 based on projections made by the ministry of planning.

Currently, national consumption--16 million tons petroleum equivalent--represents 21 percent of national production (estimated at 75 million tons petroleum equivalent). This percentage should increase to more than 30 percent in 1990 and to more than 77 percent in the year 2000. These estimates, the minister noted, are made on the basis of only proven or probable resources.

Breaking down the consumption, we find that hydrocarbons constitute more than 90 percent of it. In 1980, the proportion stands at 44 percent for gas and 48 percent for petroleum. This proportion should increase to 60 and 33 percent respectively for gas and petroleum in 1990 and around the year 2000, gas will account for 60 percent and petroleum for 25-30 percent of the nation's consumption.

This breakdown shows that up to the year 2000 national energy consumption will be almost exclusively met by hydrocarbons. Then, broaching the question of production and the growth of national financing requirements, Brahimi underlined the fact that because of uncertainties in crude oil prices, it is possible only to set production limits that may be revised depending on international economic developments in the energy sector.

Finish the Decade Without Major New Financial Obligations

As for the growth of financing requirements, Brahimi declared that the realization of large national objectives "should translate during the decade into sizable reduction in the degree of overseas exposure of our economy. The number of imports of goods and services, at 1979 prices, must diminish progressively to 27 percent of our total resources in 1990, as opposed to the present rate of 50 percent, which means, he added, that the rate of growth of imports must grow at a much slower pace than that of production."

"Beyond 1984, he emphasized, and up to 1990, we must be in a position to trim sufficient fat from our current balance both in order to ensure debt repayment, including that of the current plan, and also to end the decade without any major new financial obligations."

Speaking about hydrocarbon exports and the question of trimming exports, Brahimi remarked that "already in 1980 favorable oil prices have allowed a slight reduction in crude oil production and, in the future, trimming of exports will primarily involve this product."

General Program for Conserving Oil and Petroleum By-products

As for gas, currently both in relation to external price conditions and efficiency in the management of investments and production in this sector, Brahimi chiefly emphasized that "estimates of an increase in exports, in excess of those from presently installed or soon-to-be installed facilities, must be very prudent. New investments will only be tied up under positive guarantees of price increases, equipment control and exploitation of deposits."

In addition, after having described the growth of production, of consumption, and of external financial requirements, Brahimi urged movement towards development of a medium- and long-term energy policy.

These moves, which number four, involve a general program for conserving oil and petroleum by-products. These include an intense program of managing and conserving existing deposits, continued exploration efforts and a move in the direction of new alternative energy sources.

The general program for conserving oil and petroleum by-products should expand utilization of known reserves to their maximum limit. It should begin by a gradual, relative reduction in oil consumption, on a household level as well as on an industrial level.

To assure greater security in domestic supplies, Brahimi urged a second action, that of "a domestic program of control and conservation of existing gas and oil deposits, which should lead to a more reliable and precise understanding of our future extraction capacities."

Alternative Energy Sources in the Year 2000

As the third phase of the national energy policy, Brahimi proposed continuation, "but with greater equipment efficiency than in the past, of new deposits search and exploration efforts."

The fourth part of the plan proposed by Brahimi is in the direction of new alternative energy sources, "the necessity for exploration and mobilization of new sources which should progressively lessen the importance of oil, is becoming more and more important."

He added that "for the time being, it will be necessary to mobilize human research, design, and application potential which we already have in an institutional framework, which will permit better processing as well as frugal and

efficient use of the sizable financial means that this work will demand. Also necessary will be the timely assurance of training programs adapted to the staffing requirements that alternative energy production capacity in the year 2000 at a rate equivalent to current consumption will require."

Continuing along the line of new alternative energy sources, and beyond present potential (hydroelectric power) or possible/probable prospects (geothermal and wind energy), "we must engage ourselves resolutely in the mobilization of solar and nuclear energy resources," Brahimi said.

"The use of solar energy on a small scale, for small localities, seems to be well adapted for the small and medium sized outlying localities, that the growth and development of a territory as big as ours will make more and more numerous," he noted.

Finally, as for nuclear energy, the minister of planning and national development closed his speech by indicating that "taking known uranium reserves and further exploration possibilities into account, the mobilization of significant production capabilities is now becoming a definite prospect."

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CSO: 4400

NEW DEPARTMENTS SET UP IN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASHMIYAH [The Official Gazette] in Arabic No 46 13, Nov 80 p 1975

[Article: "Presidential Decree No 546 of 1980 Setting Up Public Departments at Ministry of Interior"]

[Text] The President of the Republic,

After perusing the constitution;

And law No 109 of 1971 concerning the police authority;

And Council of Ministers decree issued on 11 February 1953 and considering some agencies of the Ministry of Interior as general departments,

Has decided:

Article One

The following general departments shall be set up within the Ministry of Interior:

1. The Public Relations Department.
2. The General Supply and Domestic Trade Police Department.
3. The General Cairo Airport Police Department.
4. The General Alexandria Port Police Department.
5. The General Draftees' Affairs Department.

Article Two

The minister of interior shall issue the decrees necessary to organize these general departments.

Article Three

This decree shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall go into effect as of the date of publication.

Issued at the Presidential Office on 3 November 1980.

Anwar al-Sadat

EFFECTS OF CONSCRIPTION LAW DISCUSSED

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic 3 Dec 80 pp 10-11

[Interview With Vice Admiral Fu'ad Farghali, Director of Conscription Department [mintaqah], by Usamah 'Ajja; "What Is Status of Truants and of People on Scholarship in Wake of New Conscription Law; Conscription for Various Qualifications; Final and Temporary Exemption and Other Clarifications to Youth"]

[Text] The new conscription law aimed at developing the armed forces has gone into force. What are the characteristics distinguishing this law? What are the facilities it gives the conscripts? What is the transition period given to truants failing to report for the performance of their duty? What is the status of people on scholarships?

What are the penalties stipulated by this law in the case of truancy and evasion?

Regarding the characteristics of the new law and the new conscription dates, we have had this frank interview with Vice Admiral Fu'ad Farghali, the director of the conscription district [department].

[Question] The Ministry of Defense has drawn up a plan to develop work in the armed forces. Is there a connection between the ministry's plan and the promulgation of the new conscription law?

[Answer] Certainly. In accordance with the Ministry of Defense's plan to develop the armed forces, the Conscription Administration has had an important role in this plan. Development within the conscription agency has proceeded in three main directions:

First, enhancing the ability and capabilities of the conscription agency and bringing the conscription activity closer to the citizens.

Therefore, it has been decided to introduce three new conscription departments. The first is in Tanta and will be opened in the first half of 1981, the second is in Quina and will be opened in the same period and a third in al-Jizah and will be opened at the beginning of 1982.

Second, developing the system of work in the conscription departments. Therefore, scientific studies have been conducted in coordination between the Conscription

Administration and the Armed Forces Operations Research Center to develop the system of work in the conscription agency and to insure that the work is carried out rapidly and accurately.

Third, conduct studies on the law concerning military and flag service.

[Question] But what are the most important distinguishing characteristics of the new law?

[Answer] The new law has the following special characteristics:

1. Gives the armed forces priority in regard to supplying them with youth of educational and physical standards compatible with the big development in the equipment and weaponry of the armed forces.
2. Establishes bonds with the popular base, realizing numerous benefits and advantages for it and taking into account our customs and traditions.
3. Takes into account the youth demands, providing them with the opportunity of education and of completing their studies at the various levels and with the opportunity of work while preserving their seniority at the time of employment.

[Question] What about the status of people studying on scholarships abroad and how will they be dealt with in regard to conscription in light of the new facilities in the law?

[Answer] In fact, there have been facilities to make matters easier for conscripts. The minister of defense has issued a decree lifting the extra year's service imposed on current conscripts who were late in reporting for conscription, regardless of whether they were arrested or they reported voluntarily, so as to realize equality between those who are already in service in the armed forces and those who will report during the transition period.

This is in addition to the issuance of another decree concerning our sons who are studying for their doctorate abroad. It has been decided to postpone their conscription, provided that the student was enrolled for his doctorate studies before 10 July 1980, that he is under the supervision of the Scholarships Department and that his educational credentials are approved by this department. The Ministry of Defense will treat these scholarships the same way it treats students on state scholarships and will postpone their conscription up to the age of 34 years and 9 months or until they acquire their doctorate, whichever occurs first, regardless of the way the student (completes) his studies and even if this means his exceeding the maximum conscription age set by the new law, which is the age of 30, after which final exemption from the service becomes effective.

It has also been decided to postpone [conscription of] al-Azhar tutors and assistant instructors appointed after 1 October 1974 who enrolled for their studies before or after reaching the age of 29 or of 30, provided that their appointment and enrollment took place while they were in the period of temporary exemption and that they enrolled for the doctorate before 1 July 1980, thus putting them on an equal footing with students studying on scholarships abroad. It has also been decided to exempt resident physicians appointed after 1 October 1976.

This exemption has come as a result of the demand of the assistant instructors registered for their doctorate studies to be treated on an equal footing with students on scholarships abroad.

[Question] Numerous questions have been raised recently regarding the change in the duration of conscription for people with various qualifications. What is the truth regarding this issue?

[Answer] The new law stipulates that the conscription periods be set as follows:

Only one year for people with higher qualifications.

Two years for people with middle-level and higher middle-level qualifications, provided that the conscript be awarded in the last 6 months of his conscription a comprehensive recompense equal to the first year salary of the grade in which his colleagues are appointed in the civil service.

Three years for ordinary individuals who have no academic qualifications. A maximum of 6 months may be deducted from this period for craftsmen and people with skills needed by the armed forces. This will be done in accordance with conditions to be set by a decree from the minister of defense.

The law also stipulates that the conscription period for ordinary individuals who have memorized the Koran in its entirety and who have no other special qualifications shall be one year.

Position of Truants

[Question] But what are the controls that have been prepared to eliminate the phenomenon of truancy insofar as conscription is concerned?

[Answer] After conducting studies on dealing with truancy among individuals with higher qualifications and establishing distinctions between truancy due to emergency circumstances and for a short period and prolonged truancy, the following has been decided in order to curtail truancy and to insure abidance by the set conscription dates:

Any truant failing to report for conscription within 3 months after disappearance of the cause for his exemption or postponement will be conscripted for an extra year which may be lifted for good conduct during his [regular] military service.

Any truant failing to report for conscription in more than 3 months after the scheduled date for his conscription will be conscripted for an extra year which may not be lifted.

As of 1 December 1980, men who exceeded the age of 30 by this date will not be subject to conscription in accordance with article 36 of the [new] law. Any truant who may not be conscripted will be fined in accordance with the provisions of article 49, namely a prison term of no less than 2 years and a fine of 500-1,000 pounds or one of the two penalties. This means that the prison term and the fine or one of them will be imposed on any truant who has exceeded the conscription age and who may not be conscripted.

It is well known that whoever has already been exempted finally from military service in accordance with the old conscription law will be subject to the provisions of the new law and will continue to enjoy his final exemption.

As for those exempted temporarily or those whose service has been postponed, they will not be subject to the provisions of the new law before the date of disappearance of the cause for exemption or for postponement.

If the causes for temporary exemption continue to exist after 1 December 1980 and if the individual concerned exceeds the age of 30 by that date, then he will be exempted from the military service finally due to the fact that he may not be conscripted as a result of having reached the age of 30 by 1 December 1980 and of having a valid cause for exemption on that date. This is in application of the provisions of article 57 of the law.

[Question] Has the form of cooperation between the students affairs [department], the workers affairs [department] and the conscription departments been determined?

[Answer] There must be cooperation between the Conscription Administration on the one hand and the departments concerned with students affairs and the affairs of government employees on the other hand. The new law spells out this cooperation in detail and we issued detailed instructions in the conscription law underlining the duties of the officials in charge of the affairs of students and of workers. These officials have to prepare files for the students, especially those in their final years of schooling, containing the names and conscription data pertaining to the individuals concerned, namely the number of their military or national service identity cards or their personal identity cards and the postponement or exemption applications and documents concerning these individuals.

As for the officials in charge of the affairs of government workers and workers in the public and private sector companies, establishments and associations, they have to prepare special conscription files containing the names of such workers of ages 19-30 and the conscription data and documents pertaining to their conscription status, namely exemption certificates, certificates of exclusion from service, certificates of performance of the military service or the forms putting the citizen on standby.

The law also stipulates that the agencies concerned in the Ministry of Interior supply the information needed to implement this law to the authorities concerned in the Ministry of Defense, to summon the individuals wanted for conscription or mobilization and to apprehend truants in order to strengthen cooperation between the agencies of the Ministries of the Interior and of Defense. The law also permits the formation of reserve civil police forces which can be summoned by the conscription and mobilization departments within the framework of the plans set for this purpose.

Final and Temporary Exemption

[Question] What are the benefits that the new law has given our youth at home and abroad?

[Answer] The new law includes a number of benefits, namely:

Reduces the maximum conscription age to 30. As for students of al-Azhar University colleges who exceed the age of 30 while still in their final year of schooling, the latest postponement affecting them is the of 30.5 years. At age 31, these students are no longer subject to conscription.

Even though the [maximum] conscription age has been reduced by 5 years, the maximum postponement period for the various educational levels has been maintained.

All the final exemption cases and most of the temporary exemption cases have been retained.

The conscription period set at 3 years for ordinary craftsmen and people with other skills needed by the armed forces can be reduced by a maximum of 6 months.

Conscription for people who have memorized the entire Koran and who have no other qualifications has been reduced to one year.

The law stipulates that the reserve period may be reduced from the set period of 9 years, depending on the size of the armed forces and provided that the reduction is made by a decree from the minister of defense.

Individuals exceeding the need of the armed forces will be put on standby for a period of 3 years only and may not be conscripted afterward. This means that they are exempted finally after this period whereas the old law permitted putting them on standby from the age of 20 to the age of 35 years, i.e. for 15 years.

The law permits students whose conscription is postponed to work during the summer vacation, thus excluding them from the condition of full-time studies. The law also permits students to work when the nature of their studies requires them to do so, such as the students in tourism, hotel, cinema and music institutes, provided that their work be regulated by a decree issued by the minister of defense.

The law permits postponement until the end of the academic year for students who have reached the maximum postponement age while still in the final year of their educational level.

The law stipulates that the period of military service, including the discharge [al-istifa'] period, be calculated for seniority purposes and a period of service and experience for state and public sector workers.

The law gives the state consuls abroad the power to decide on academic postponement for the various educational levels insofar as our sons who are living abroad are concerned, provided that the conscription department concerned is notified. The law also permits our sons who are studying abroad to return to the homeland when the causes for postponement disappear and to report to the conscription districts within 60 days of the disappearance of the cause.

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CSO: 480?

COUNTRY SAID TO BE IN DIRE NEED OF SKILLED LABOR

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 24 Nov 80 pp 20-21

[Article: "Crisis of Technical Education in 40 years; From School of Arts and Crafts to 14 Engineering Colleges... Technical Education Has Been Lost"]

[Text] The issue preoccupying the attention of the state agencies at present is that of reexamining decisively and fundamentally the [college] graduates appointment policy to guarantee that this policy is linked to implementing the development plan and to another aspect of the educational policy. It is certain that the Egyptian educational system is facing flagrant contradictions in the sphere of the labor force. These contradictions can be defined in basic facts over which all studies conducted by the universities and the educational agencies agree. Foremost among these facts are the fact that the institutions training skilled manpower have not had the resources necessary to enable them to perform their role, the fact that large numbers of students are trained in spheres of work which the work and production sectors do not need and the fact that this training is provided at the expense of other spheres that are still experiencing severe labor shortage.

Dr 'Adil 'Izz, head of the Administrative Development Institute, says: We, like many developing countries, are still facing the problem of the constant rise in the rate of acceptance [enrollment] in the universities, especially in the sphere of certain theoretical disciplines that cost a little and that are not linked to the fundamental needs of development, thus creating an imbalance in the required equilibrium among the various specializations. This policy has led to a severe shortage in the most important element in the manpower structure, namely the [low] standard of the skilled labor. This shortage has created an evident imbalance in the labor pyramid. The broad base, comprised in all societies of skilled workers and craftsmen, has turned into a feeble base incompatible with the large top of the pyramid which is comprised of university graduates and other with equal academic qualifications. At the same time, the middle of this pyramid, namely the supervisory level comprised of technicians who perform a role of major importance in the production operations, has shrunk by a large degree.

Dr Muhammad Tulbah 'Uwaydah, president of al-Zaqaziq University and chairman of the People's Assembly Education Committee, says: Very frankly, we can define a number of reasons that have led to the current condition of the manpower policy in Egypt. Foremost among these reasons is the view, prevalent among large sectors of the masses, that considers university education the only means for realizing their

social and economic aspirations and considers technical and vocational education as a second-class education behind academic education at a time when vocational and technical education has become in all countries of the world the only means for technological progress and comprehensive development. Moreover, some misguided concepts concerning manual and vocational labor still, regrettably, find their way to the minds of the majority of students, thus causing the overwhelming majority of these students to steer away from vocational and technical training.

It is also fair to say, adds al-Zaqazig University president, that the educational plans and systems have not developed in a manner compatible with the reality of the country's conditions and needs. This reality has required a major change in the types and standards of the labor actually required whereas educational training itself has lagged behind in giving students a sound technical training compatible with the scientific and technological progress.

Dr Muhammad Kamil Laylah, president of 'Ayn Shams University, demands that planning be subjected to the training of technicians for several fundamental considerations, most important being that progress in the implementation of projects and raising the standard of production and of services depends primarily on preparing technicians and providing them with technical and technological skills. Moreover, the industrial activity cannot be enhanced without a cadre of technical workforces. The constant population growth in the city has also increased the need for new building and construction industries and for the maintenance and management of service facilities. Furthermore, the development of agriculture and of the production connected with it, such as livestock and water resources, continues to require further attention due to its direct relationship with food security. Raising the production level in this sector depends on the extent of the introduction of modern methods and of mechanization to raise production both vertically and horizontally. Such enhancement is tied to graduating [training] skilled manpower. Is it reasonable, for example, that despite the richness of our coastal waters, the vastness of our lakes and the enormous fish wealth potentials, there is only one vocational school for fishery sciences and is it reasonable that fish and livestock breeding is left without scientific intervention?

Fawzi 'Abd-al-Zahir, the first undersecretary of higher education, says: The history of technical education in Egypt is strange. In the first half of the 19th century, it started correctly at the outset with the establishment of the engineering school for the graduation of leaderships and the arts and crafts school for the graduation of craftsmen. Meanwhile, the Bulaq (Vocational) School complemented the labor ladder by training skilled and semi-skilled workers. This manpower training ladder continued to be present until there emerged, under the pressure of social aspirations, the inclination to qualify graduates of the School of Arts and Crafts to get their B.S. in engineering. This was the first flaw in the manpower ladder and its first deviation from the principles of sound planning. The training of technicians [skilled workers] ended with the end of the School of Arts and Crafts in 1940 and with its transformation into a school of applied engineering. With the onset of the revolution and the formulation of the policy to industrialize the country, the educational institutions became aware of the gap existing in the ladder of training executive engineers and in the schools for training skilled engineering labor. The higher industrial institutes were set up in 1956 (to train such labor). In 1961, the Ministry of Education started training

technicians by introducing the two-phase system into these institutes, making the first phase a 3-year phase for the graduation of technicians and the second phase a 2-year phase for the graduation of engineers in applied sciences. But once again, and under pressure, the first phase disappeared and those accepted for enrollment in the institutes turned toward the second phase. Technical education thus faced its death for the second time.

To put it very briefly, the situation and figures concerning this type of education reached the point where this education can no longer meet the state needs, considering that its capacity does not exceed graduating 20,000 skilled workers annually whereas the average that can meet the country's needs amounts to nearly half a million such workers.

Dr Tulbah 'Uwaydah proposes the establishment of a higher council for the preparation of technicians which includes the education, scientific research, production and service sectors and which takes charge of drawing up the policy to train skilled labor, drawing up a long-range policy to train the technicians required to meet the state needs, as well as the needs of the industrial, business and agricultural sectors, and preparing a plan to set up model specialized institutes and to encourage and give priority to the establishment of institutions attached to the production and service sectors to train skilled labor.

Al-Zaqaziq University president has added that an agreement has been reached with the (Wentworth) Institute in Boston to set up a technical institute in al-Zaqaziq University to graduate the technical cadres in the spheres needed by the state sectors, especially in the spheres of explosive detonation, construction, transportation, communications, agricultural mechanization, modern agriculture, computers and advanced secretarial work.

It is also necessary that the general education plan and programs at all levels include a degree of technical education so as to create awareness of the importance of this type of studies, to curtail the onrush for theoretical and academic education, to draw up a plan for preparing the teaching faculties and instructors needed for technical institutes and centers, to encourage enrollment in the institutes for the preparation of technicians by providing incentives for students, including the incentive of providing excelling students with the opportunity to join university colleges for applied sciences in similar fields of specialization on the condition that the graduates work for a certain period in their field of specialization after graduation, that they be employed in their field of specialization, that the salaries of graduates of the technical schools be raised, that promotion be opened to them and that they be treated like university graduates insofar as application of the military service law is concerned.

8494

CSO: 4E02

NEW MARITIME TRANSPORT COMPANY TO BE ESTABLISHED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 23 Nov 80 p 8

[Article by Ahmad 'Isamat: "Setting Up of New Maritime Transport Company to Insure Transportation of Our Strategic Commodity Imports From Abroad"]

[Text] Engineer Sulayman Mutawalli, the minister of transportation, communications and maritime transport, has announced that it has been decided to set up a new maritime company to purchase and operate ships under the canopy of the investment law. The Egyptian Maritime Transport Company, the other maritime transport companies, private sector supply companies and banks and some foreign firms will participate in financing the new company's capital which will amount to \$50 million initially. The maritime transport companies will contribute nearly 60 percent to this capital.

The minister also stated that it has been decided to initiate the executive measures for this project which seeks to deal with the inadequacy of the Egyptian commercial fleet in transporting our increasing foreign trade, considering that this fleet's contribution to transporting our grain imports does not exceed four percent whereas the new company will be able to transport 3 million tons of all of Egypt's grain imports which represent 30 percent of our total annual imports and will be able to save millions of pounds in hard currencies paid by the state to foreign ship owners as costs for transporting our imports.

The minister added that another goal behind setting up the company is to guarantee the transportation of our imports on Egyptian ships, especially our imports of strategic commodities, to insure a new transport capacity so as to develop the national fleet, to make use of the advanced foreign expertise in the sphere of maritime transportation and, to bolster cooperation with the big maritime transport companies to make it possible [facilitate] the operation of our fleet's units on the return trip.

It is decided that the new company's fleet will be comprised of 6 ships, each with a capacity of 40,000 tons, in addition to leasing 6 more ships. The company's capital will amount to \$50 million initially.

On the other hand, the minister of transportation has announced that the maritime transport companies realized an increase in production in the first 6 months of this year in comparison to the parallel period of last year. They also realized in the same period a surplus of 51 million pounds compared to a surplus of 41 million pounds in the parallel period of last year, i.e. an increase of 25 percent.

THREAT OF COASTAL EROSION IN DELTA DISCUSSED

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic 1 Dec 80 pp 31-32

[Article by Asma'Rashid: "In Few Years, Rashid, Ra's al-Barr and Baltim Will Disappear"]

[Text] In few years, Ra's al-Barr, Rashid, Baltim and numerous other coastal towns will disappear. They will be lost to the sea as the result of erosion.

The figures say that in the past 10 years alone, the sea has eroded a larger part of the western tongue of Rashid than it had eroded in the previous 70 years.

The sea has swallowed the Rashid lighthouse and tower and has turned them into islands. Rashid is only one area. There are 12 other locations, all of them important, in the area between Abu Air and al-Mu'addiyah. This area contains major projects, including the urea fertilizer plants, the paper mill, the thermal power plant, the Maritime Transport Academy and the Abu Qir gas fields. Nearly 200 years ago, Muhammad 'Ali built the sea wall [wavebreaker] in this area. Water is eroding this wall from below and it will inevitably collapse.

Despite the imminent danger, we are still discussing the matter on paper while time goes by, the sea devours and our coasts get eroded. It is as if 15 years of research and studies are not enough to find the means of rescue!

But what is the cause of this imminent catastrophe?

The High Dam is the cause!

Since the construction of the dam, the natural balance between the Nile River water and the Mediterranean Sea has collapsed and the river has stopped carrying its silt to the sea. The silt was tantamount to a natural barrier protecting the shores, according to Dr Ahmad Bayyumi, the director of the Institute of Marine and Fishery Sciences.

In 1971, the coastal preservation project started through cooperation between the Scientific Research Academy and the UN Program and the necessary studies were carried out at a cost of 4 million pounds. There are sufficient studies and the academy's role has ended at this limit, namely studies.

Studies Are Inadequate

Dr 'Ali Khalifah, the head of the Coastal Protection Agency, has said: Regrettably, after all this period of research, the studies we have are not fit for immediate implementation.

Enough Studies

Dr Muhammad Abu-Su'dah, the professor of hydraulics at the Cairo Engineering College, has said: We have been conducting studies and research for 15 years. However, these studies must be translated and turned into realities.

More Specialized Agency Needed

Dr Ahmad Bayyumi adds: The only authority in charge of implementation is the Coastal Protection Agency which is controlled by the Ministry of Irrigation. Despite its capability, this agency's resources to protect our coasts is limited.

This is why the academy has stressed the need for setting up a national agency with executive capabilities and powers and including people with experience in coastal engineering.

Delegation From Netherlands

Dr 'Ali Khalifah says in response that a Dutch government delegation will come to Cairo this month to conduct a study and to prepare a complete plan for developing and protecting the delta coast.

Dr Khalifah adds that the root of the problem lies in the division of the efforts and the overlapping of the powers of the authorities concerned. The academy is an agency concerned, the governorates are agencies concerned and several ministries and other authorities are also involved.

This is why we have demanded that all these authorities be unified in a single specialized agency with the power to implement. In fact, the [People's Assembly] Plan and Production Committee has issued a resolution to set up such an agency which, God willing, will be established in the near future.

Experts say that the town of Rashid has only a few more years to live because the town's erosion rate is rising steadily. Doesn't this require more attention?

Rashid's problem is that its soil is fine. Therefore, one of the ideas projected for dealing with this problem is to stabilize the sand dunes, to plant trees and shrubs with long roots and to use the (cultured) aquatic plants which have proven to be a success in other parts of the world. Studies are currently underway to select what is most suitable.

But what has the agency done, other than conduct studies, to protect the shores?

Naturally, there are areas that require fast action and other areas that require long-range projects. Protection works have started in four areas, namely:

Al-Burullus where a protective wall is being built, Ra's al-Barr, Damietta and the coastal highway between Ra's al-Barr and Port Said where the Ministry of Transport and Communications is carrying out the preservation work.

In Abu Qir alone, we have spent more than one quarter million pounds on preservation and yet the protective wall in the area is in danger of collapsing?

This is true. But the wall needs an enormous budget of 5 million pounds and we have actually asked that the appropriations made for this purpose be increased.

What is the entire sum of the appropriations?

At present, the appropriations amount to 2.5 million pounds and we are demanding that they be raised to 5 millions.

Would this sum be enough?

Of course it will. I am very optimistic with the agency's new start.

Finally, though Dr 'Ali Khalifah is very optimistic, we still warn that the rate of soil erosion by the sea is still rising and that only a few years remain to save what can be saved.

8494

CSO: 4802

PRESS COMMENTS ON ASPECTS OF HOSTAGE RELEASE

Financial Disputes

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 21 Jan 81 p 2

[Text]

THE FINANCIAL DAILY BOURSE in its leading article Monday said: "The bill which was recently approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) concerning the solving of legal and financial disputes between Iran and the United States through arbitration will pave the way for lifting the sanctions which were imposed on Iran by the U.S. and its European allies after the occupation of the former American Embassy some fourteen months ago.

No need to say that the economic sanctions imposed on Iran were not absolute and the doors of Iran were not completely closed to foreign trade, in other words, Iran was importing necessary goods from those countries which were not involved in the economic sanctions.

In addition to this, some of these goods were being imported through a third party from those countries who had imposed economic sanctions on Iran.

Those who in the past had left the country open for importation of any foreign goods by doing so had pushed the economy of the country towards bankruptcy. Under the deposed regime, as a result of implementation of incorrect economic policies, the amount of imported goods, most of which were unnecessary, was about twenty times greater than its non-oil exports.

The imperialist countries had turned Iran into a dumping ground for their surplus production and this was how large amounts of the oil revenues were recycled into the imperialist countries. With respect to this reality, the imposition of sanctions on Iran was a blessing in disguise which made the public understand the dangers created by the balance of trade resulting from excessive imports...

If the deposed regime had cared about the economy of the country, it would not have left the doors of the country open to uncontrolled importation of goods. If it was not a puppet regime and was thinking of creating a sound and independent economic system, it would have prevented the importation of luxury goods... Imports should be carefully checked and only vital and necessary items should be allowed to be imported.

This is the only way the exploitative ties of dependence on foreign countries can be eliminated. This is to say that even when the economic sanctions on Iran are lifted, those who are involved in the import business should realize that now it is our turn to impose sanctions on the exploitative countries and to strongly block the way for the import of unnecessary goods.

Creation of a balance between imports and exports should be one of the objectives of our economic policies. Only then will the dependence of our country on foreign countries be minimized and eliminated."

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 22 Jan 81 pp 1, 4

[Text]

TEHRAN -- The official organ of the ruling Islamic Republican Party carried an editorial captioned as above Tuesday morning which incidentally preceded a rush exit of the 52 U.S. hostages and the swearing in of Ronald Reagan as the 40th U.S. President, both ceremonies falling on Tuesday night.

The Persian daily, Jomhuri-e-Eslami, also detailed an analysis of Iran's crisis along with different aspects of the revolutionary motivations,

aims, causes, and advantages of the former U.S. Embassy takeover in Tehran on November 4, 1979 by Muslim Students following the Line of Imam

Human Values defeat Materialism:

Capturing the Spy Nest should be considered as an unforeseen incident in which spiritualism triumphed over materialistic values and disrupted the balance of international power politics in the 20th century.

Scientific Miscalculations:

The International leaders, or those determining the political fate of the nations in the world, rely more on their computers and sophisticated analytic equipment for making decisions than on "the present realities in the lives of the people themselves".

Materialists' Dilemma:

These materialists solely lean on scientific means for "everything".

In their calculations, they only think of the loss and benefit of their machine in which they are imprisoned so that the machine takes them to whatever destination.

The materialists forget everything, even themselves, in their craze for machinations.

A Sick Brain:

When such persons confront a reality, born not of machines but from within an awakened conscience such as Islamic Revolution, they are at a loss.

Necessity by the very same sick brain and line of thinking affiliated to their machines, they imagined the revolution as one of other episodes: such as what the Iraqi Ba'athists did in Iraq, Sadat did in Egypt, and the forces overriding the Maoists in China.

Failure of Science:

Despite scientific implementations, human characteristics prevail on worldly conspiracies.

The scientific line of thought does not have the capacity to understand something that is beyond the machines to understand.

Just as the present materialistic thoughts attached themselves to the power-balance of the world, it is now important to fly towards the pinnacle of non-reliance on materialistic calculations and worldly formulas.

CIA, KGB, Pentagon, MOSSAD Helpless:

The writers of the devilish policies were then made to understand that what goes on in Iran cannot be contained in scientific formulas and calculations of the sociologists and policy makers of the CIA, Pentagon, KGB, and MOSSAD.

A More Insulting CIA Prescription:

As part of the formula, a more insulting prescription came out of the CIA computer, requiring all world-ester radios, especially the British Broadcasting Corporation, to politically groom and magnify the National Front in importance as much as possible.

Nationalists, Liberals Lead People:

The BBC propaganda (the so-called BBC opposition) was to infiltrate into the public mind that the leaders of the nationalist and liberal forces had organized the nation against the shah's regime.

The propaganda was to make the people accept that the leadership of the movement is in the hands of this faction and, if any progress is observed in the talks for the shah's downfall, it is cooked with the hands of these gentlemen!

Oppressors have 2 Aims:

The oppressors pursued two aims with this clever, though shattered, formula.

Primarily, the aim was to strengthen the National Front to essentially divide the leadership between the nationalist liberal faction on one side and the militant clergy faction, reflected in Imam Khomeini's personality, on the other.

The plot was built on a hope that these two factions could not compromise with each other: to drag the movement to a standstill and preserve the regime of the shah.

Secondarily, the plotters thought if they could not defeat the movement with this plan, at least they could groom and magnify the National Front and build up a face from out of the Nationalist leaders

to make the revolution deviate from its path.

They then wanted to profit by the deviation, once the deviating plan became a success.

They also knew that the militant clergy and Imam Khomeini could easily take the country towards whatever direction was desired.

Therefore, with 'their' help, the plotters wanted to block the clergy and Imam to take the nation to the required direction.

Policies of Devils:

Based on this mechanistic logic, the wheels of the U.S. sophisticated analytic machines and computers purred into motion when confronted with the Modern Sacred Movement in Iran against the culprit shah.

What to do next?

The sheets of statistics, knowledge, and pertinent criteria prepared in advance were then fed into the computers to receive answers on what to do next to diffuse the uprisings.

Mixed efforts:

The American and European Islamic experts, brains of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, sociologists and Iran's experts on Eastern culture mobilized together but the very same materialistic formulas were formulated.

Each sheet of the computer data was in turn passed on

to the shah for taking the scientific actions to mar the sacred revolt.

In Comes Muharram of 1399:

The planners then became contented that the plans would be carried out and uprisings could be crushed, after they implemented the computed data one by one.

But in came the month of Muharram of 1399 which changed the nation's fate with the historic message of Imam Khomeini showing that, "blood is really victorious over the sword".

O.K., Israel, U.S. back CIA:

The Central Intelligence Agency spared no efforts to attain these two aims and the publicity horns of the United States, Israel, and England backed up the CIA plot.

BBC creates doubts:

The cunning BBC campaign to magnify National Front was so cleverly broadcasted that it created doubts in the Iranian nation, which used to listen to BBC at that time.

Shah brings Bakhtiari:

On order of his master, the shah nominated Shapour Bakhtiari - who was one of the leaders of the National Front - as the Prime Minister of Iran to practically restore the power in their hands.

Political Victory

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 22 Jan 81 p 2

[Text]

The agreement reached between Iran and the United States over the conditions for the release of the hostages had become one of the subjects receiving extensive coverage by the newspapers. The announcement of the signing of an agreement between the two governments through the mediation of the Algerian government made the release of the American hostages imminent and this became one of the most important issues, not only in Iran, but in the whole world.

The importance of this event is that after fourteen months and some seventy days of negotiations, finally the Islamic government of Iran forced the U.S. government to its knees and made it bow to the demands of Iran. This is

something without precedent, a case in which a superpower was forced to accept the righteous demands of a country which was under domination of the same superpower for many years.

Commenting on this subject the morning daily Jomhuri-e-Kalame in a front page article under the headline of "Shameful Defeat of the U.S. and the Trend of the Revolution" said, "By taking the American spies hostages, in fact the U.S. government became a hostage of its own anti-human activities. The surrender of the U.S. to the demands of Iran concerning the return of the wealth of the deposed Shah and his relatives to the Iranian nation shows that the U.S. does not have the power to support and protect its lackies and therefore, other mercenary dictators of the U.S., such as Saddam (Hussein) and Sadat, cannot count on the support of the U.S.

"The U.S., in order to offset its defeats and to protect its so called 'prestige' in the world, is trying to pretend that the victory of Iran is not that important and that it has not given great concessions to Iran.

The revolutionary occupation of the American Embassy in Tehran by the Moslem Students following the Line of the Imam marked a new chapter in the history of the U.S., a chapter in which the U.S. is declining as a superpower.

"The astonishing victory of Iran over international imperialism in addition to being a victory for the united and revolutionary masses of Iran is also a victory of the oppressed of the world. This victory in an unprecedented manner showed the way to struggle against world imperialism to the oppressed nations and Third World countries.

The revolutionary occupation of the Embassy has shown that the oppressed nations of the region and the world must rise up, occupy the nests of espionage of the U.S. and, by taking spies hostage, win their rights back from the U.S.

"In this achievement no one could deny the political efficiency and scientific views of Prime Minister Mohammad Rajai in this connection.

Rajai, with his miraculous resistance, attracted the attention of all political circles of the world and undoubtedly history will regard him as an efficient revolutionary figure who was able to give the revolution its necessary momentum in its most sensitive period.

However, overall, this victory belongs to the Iranian Revolution and ultimately to the oppressed of the world over the oppressors.

The evening daily Kayhan in an editorial Tuesday said: "There is no doubt that the main reason for the political downfall of former United States President, Jimmy Carter, was the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran as a result of which one of the most important bases of the U.S. in the region was lost.

Iran, which under the rule of the deposed Shah was a base for the aggression of the U.S., because of the Revolution has turned into a center for the liberation movements and thus has stung the heart of the U.S. like an arrow.

At first sight it seems that the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran has resulted only in the defeat of Carter in the presidential elections, however, the greater fact is that it has resulted in the defeat of the expansionist and aggressive policies of the U.S.

Masterminds of American politics in fact, in replacing Carter by Reagan, are trying to cover up their shameful defeats in Iran and other parts of the world and the American public have become victims of this sort of politics.

"History has proved this fact that the period of unquestioned domination of the superpowers in the world has come to its end and the situation has changed to such

an extent that an oppressed nation under a wise leader reached such a power that effected the presidential elections of the U.S.

The impossible became something possible under the Islamic ideology. The people of the world have not forgotten that four years ago Carter came to the White House under the slogan of human rights and politics on a moral basis and now the world sees how Reagan is taking over the office while talking about strengthening the military power of the U.S.

The fact is that there is no difference between Carter or Reagan and they both are protectors of the interests of the West".

Third World Gain

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 25 Jan 81 p 2

[Text]

U.S. plan was to create division between these two factions, i.e. the Nationalists and the Clergy, to have done away with the 'headaches'.

Impotency prevails amid miracle:

But the headaches could not be removed and 'they' felt their own impotency and the miracle of the Islamic Revolution.

They could not, and still cannot find the jewel of this revolution and the movement of God.

First idea dropped:

The U.S. and its supporters soon averted their eyes and dropped the first idea "since they saw that their bullet hit more" and that they cannot do anything in this direction of playing the Nationalists and the Liberals against the clergy faction to stagnate the revolution and maintain the shah's regime.

Pursuing second plan:

The plotters then switched their hopes to a second aim to pursue the philosophy of grooming the Nationalists and the Liberals against the clergy to deviate the revolution from its original course.

Fight should continue:

When conspirators saw that a self-reliant nation set the revolutionary wheels in motion without foreign assistance, the enemies saw that there was no plate to eat from and decided to continue the fight against the Islamic movement.

A testing smell:

Also, from some quarters "a testing smell" was also reaching their noses" and they were feeling that this unrecognized force would gradually transform into a great power.

Third World a third power?

The planners also felt this force could spread to other countries under domination and do something so that the political term "Third World" would soon give way to "Third Power".

Fear of Third Power:

They speculated that the accomplishments of the Third Power could go so far that the Third Power would "capture in its hands the bridle of the two other powers and would suffocate their throats".

Review stand:

The world did not pay the attention they should have to the inner revolutionary tumults and the "world-eaters" themselves could not believe that, though they had become surprised and giddy, the foundation of their oppressive Palace could so shake up one day that "even their own satellites and puppets would also fall into thinking about reviewing the continuance of their servitude" and the world would come to understand the oppressors are not anything more than empty vessels.

Use Nationalists, Liberals:

Therefore, the heretics still believed "they could change the direction of the revolution the way they themselves wanted with an old formula like using Liberals and Nationalists" and repair the damages.

NF, Liberals gain:

The capture of power in Iran by the Liberals and the National Front and even the leftist Americans (like Younesi in Kurdistan) was a relief for the sickened heart of the White House dwellers and their supporters in Europe, Israel and elsewhere in the world.

DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PLANNED FOR ESFAHAN

School Construction

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 8 Jan 81 p 4

[Text] Isfahan Jan. 6 (PARS)--The Education Department of Isfahan Province announced that 1,029 educational units have been established throughout the province since the victory of the Islamic Revolution. These units include 73 kindergartens, 433 primary schools, 261 educational guidance schools, 78 high schools, 73 sports and scouting centers, and 11 technical schools as well as the Teachers' Training Center of Isfahan.

In addition to the above mentioned units, another project to be established are 30 rural schools in each of the 24 educational zones of the province is under construction.

Medical Self-Sufficiency

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 7 Jan 81 p 4

[Text] Isfahan, Jan. 7 (PARS)--The Health and Treatment committee of the Construction Crusade of Isfahan Province announced that pursuing the objective of medical self-sufficiency, the committee has succeeded in producing 18 medical substances. Also a project called "Rural Medicine" has been implemented in the province with the cooperation of the Health Department and the University of Isfahan. The project covers 27 villages with a total population of 53 thousand under medical services in the districts of Chadgan, Jorqooyeh, Semirom and Dashtkooh.

The other activities of the committee include the setting up of 100 medical centers in villages and distribution of a remarkable amount of rice, shortening and cereals among the oppressed villagers of Chadgan.

Electricity Production

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 11 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

TEHRAN, Jan. 10 (Pars) -- Iranian Minister of Energy Abhaspour, announced that a 220 MGW power station will begin operations in Isfahan by the end of March this year.

Additional power stations, among them one that will generate 300 MGW, will allow distribution of electricity to several hundred villages presently without power services.

Credit for Factories

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 15 Jan 81 p 4

[Text] Isfahan, Jan. 15 (PARS)--The spokesperson for the Department of Industry and Mines in Isfahan announced that during the month of Azar, 3.3 billion rials was paid for the customs clearance of a variety of industry machinery. Meanwhile 1.3 billion rials of credit has been allocated for the extension and renovation of factories in Isfahan. This department has drawn up 22 plans for industrial units with the objective of freeing the country from economic dependence.

Development Projects Completed

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 17 Jan 81 p 4

[Text] Isfahan, Jan. 16 (PARS)--The development office of the Imam in Isfahan announced that in less than a year, with the cooperation of the people, revolutionary organs and government institutions, more than 740 development projects in 180 different rural areas have been completed. The budget for these projects was provided from Isfahan's allocation of one day's oil revenue.

Development Projects

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 20 Jan 81 p 4

[Text] Isfahan, Jan. 9 PARS--The Construction Jihad in Shah-Reza, during the first nine months of the current year, constructed nine public baths, 4 schools, two health centers and eight water supply projects in the villages of Eslam Abad, Sadegh Abad, Sabz Abad, Nazar Abad and Ali Abad.

The budget for the above projects was 30 million rials.

CSO: 4920

VARIOUS ROAD CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS REPORTED

Khorasan Roads Completed

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 7 Jan 81 p 4

[Text] Mashad, Jan. 6 (PARS)--With the budget of 8.5 billion rials, 432 kilometers of roads around Heydarieh, Shadmehr, Birjand and Bedasanlo in Khorasan have been completed. Another 320 kilometers of roads are under construction and will soon be completed.

Roads, Transportation Ministry Activities

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 12 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

TEHRAN, Jan. 11 (Pars) — The public relations office of the Ministry of Roads and Transportation announced that during the previous year, 1,987 kilometers of roads were constructed. The statement added that the construction of another 23.47 kilometers is nearing completion.

The construction of roads that has been started during the current year, amounts to 9,249 kilometers. The budget for the construction of these roads is 232 billion rials.

Imam's Development Bureau

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 13 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

KORDE KUYE, Jan. 12 (Pars) — According to the Governor of Korde Kuye, the following projects have been implemented by the Imam's Development Bureau out of one day's oil revenue allocated for this purpose: Building of mountainous roads in Kandab, Korde Kuye, at the cost of Rls. 2.5 million, the pavement of Laghooz-Korde Kuye road at the cost of Rls. 6.8 million. Both the above projects are now ready to be used.

Sar Kalateh - Khababar - Korde-Kuye mountainous road at the cost of Rls. 3.3. million, is 70% completed.

Alikandeh-Korde Kuye rural road at the cost of one million rials.

Doraboli-Korde Kuye rural road at the cost of .5 million rials; dredging and completion of Laghooz river dam at the cost of .7 million Rials. Other development activities are also being completed in the district.

Construction of Rural Roads

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 15 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

TEHRAN, Jan. 15 (Pars) — The Department of Road and Transportation in Fars Province announced that with a 995 million rials budget, 40 rural roads have nearly been completed. The roads are in total 1,000 kilometers long. The announcement added that another 370 kilometers of rural roads have already been constructed with a total budget of 205 million rials.

Ghouchan-Mashhad Road

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 17 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

MASHAD, Jan. 17 (Pars) — The Department of Roads and Transportation in the Province of Khorasan announced that the highway between Ghouchan and Mashhad, 130 kilometers long, has been completed. The announcement added that 3,063 kilometers of rural roads have been constructed and another 60 kilometers is nearing completion.

Rural Roads in Brujerd

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 19 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

KHORRAM ABAD, Jan. 17 (Pars) — The crusade for construction announced 86 kilometers of rural roads have been constructed in Brujerd as well as 18 public baths, 14 schools and 9 mosques.

Out of other activities of the crusade for construction carried out in Brujerd, the following can be mentioned.

The setting up of 9 bridges, 2 sewage canals, installation of water pumps, ground and aerial reservoirs, and laying pipes in 21 villages.

West Azarbayjan Roads

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 20 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

URUMIEH, Jan. 9, Pars — The Director of the Department of Road and Transportation of West Azarbaijan announced that from the 590 million rials credit allocated for subsidiary roads, 207 kilometers of roads, with a budget of 370 million rials have been constructed.

Also, 403 million rials in credits have been allocated for the construction of roads. With this budget, 310 kilometers of rural roads have been constructed and another 160 kilometers are nearly completed.

AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS PROLIFERATE

Kheirabad Confiscated Land

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 7 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

ZANJAN, Jan. 6 (Pars) — The Agricultural Committee of the Construction Jihad announced that 750 thousand hectares of barren and confiscated land plots in Kheirabad have been put under cultivation. The cooperation of the University Jihad and local farmers' made the project a success.

Farmer Loans

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 7 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

TABRIZ, Jan. 6 (Pars) — The director of the branches of the agricultural bank in East Azarbaijan province announced that during the month of Azar, 209 million rials in loan were extended to 5,313 applicant farmers. This figure represents a 40% increase in amount, in comparison with the amount of loans extended during the same period of time last year.

Activities in East Azerbaijan

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 8 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

TABRIZ, Jan. 7 (Pars) — The construction Crusade in the northeastern Province of East Azarbaijan, announced the activities of the agricultural branch of this organization carried out in the summer as follows: The digging and dredging of 158 subterranean canals, and repairing 15 dams and also the digging of deep wells in Ahar, reaping 100 hectares of land and distributing 150 tons of fertilizer among farmers, extending pesticide, water pumps, and other agricultural tools among villagers at low prices and also distributing fertilizer free of charge in some villages.

Distribution in Hormuzgan

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 12 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

TEHRAN, Jan. 9, Pars — The use of lands in 71 villages in the region of Rodan, Haji Abed, Minab and Sein have been reviewed and utilized in the following ways:

1,300 hectares of barren land and other plots belonging to big land-owners not intending to cultivate them, have been distributed among farmers and put into cultivation.

Also, 245 hectares of land in Rodan have been put under permanent control of the region's farmers. Another 1,650 hectares of high quality arable land have been distributed among 110 families who possessed no land.

Rural Cooperatives in Yazd

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 12 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

YAZD, Jan. 10 (Pars) — The rural cooperative stores in the Province of Yazd, during the last nine months, have extended 250 million rials in loans to 5,200 members. During this same period, 7.9 million liters of heating fuel and other goods needed by farmers worth 270 million rials, 8 million kilograms of fertilizer, 5,029 bags of insecticides and 60 thousand kilograms of wheat seeds have been distributed among the farmers.

The rural cooperative department of Yazd, with 28 stores, provides for the needs of 528 villages and employs 48 thousand workers.

Extension of Agricultural Loans

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 12 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

MARAGHEH, Jan. 10 (Pars) — The Agricultural Bank in the township of Maragheh announced that during the last month, 200 million rials in loans were extended to the farmers of Banab. The loans are to be used for agricultural projects already approved.

Distribution of Machinery

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 12 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

URUMIEH, Jan. 10 (Pars) — The agency for the distribution of agricultural machinery announced that during last month, 55 tractors and 34 sophisticated plows, worth an estimated 20 million rials, have been distributed among the farmers of the region.

During the same period, 200 tractors were serviced and 20 million rials worth of spare parts were made available to farmers.

Hashroud Loans

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 12 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

TABRIZ, Jan. 11 (Pars) — The rural cooperative department of Hashroud announced that during the first eight months of the current year, 358 million rials in loans were extended to 3,546 farmers of the region. During this same time, 61 thousand kilograms of sugar, 477 thousand kilograms of rice, 190 thousand kilograms of cooking oil, 48 thousand kilograms of dates and 4.4 million liters of heating fuel was distributed among the same farmers.

Semnan Distributions

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 12 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

SEMNAN, Jan. 11 (Pars) — The committee responsible for the entrustment of land in Semnan stated that 9,961 hectares of barren land have been distributed among people who wish to farm or breed animals. Also, a number of loans have been extended to mostazaf people so as to enable them to succeed in their projects.

Agricultural Loans

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 12 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

BUSHEHR, Jan. 11 (Pars) — The Director of the Agricultural Bank in Bushehr announced that during the past nine months of the current year, 430 million rials in loans have been extended to the farmers in the region. These loans were forwarded to 1,252 farmers and in comparison to the amount of loans extended during the same period of time last year, there has been a 100 percent increase.

The Director added that during this same time, 114 million rials in loans have been paid back to the Bank.

Agricultural Bank in Khorasan

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 12 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

MASHAD, Jan. 12 (Pars) — Khorasan Agricultural Bank announced that it has paid over one billion rials in loans to 8,374 farmers during Azar (Nov. 22 - Dec. 21, 1980). The amount of loan shows an increase of 11.16% compared with the corresponding period last year. Two billion of the above loan has been advanced within the framework of controlled projects totalling 158 and utilized by 1,399 farmers in 212 villages. Out of the 2 billion rials, 547 million was allocated for current agricultural expenditures, 88 for irrigation, 43 for gardening, 175 for animal husbandry and poultry farming, 102 for agricultural machinery and implements and lastly, 51 million rials for rural construction and installations, rural industries and for vocational and technical services.

During the same period, 978 million rials of the Bank's claims have been collected.

Complexes Established in Sistan

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 18 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

ZAHEDAN, Jan. 17 (Pars) — An official of the crusade of construction in Zabol (southeastern Iran) in a contact with Pars correspondent said.

So far 4 agricultural complexes have been established in the Sistan region which are: Borj-e Afghan Agricultural complex, Ebrahim Abad complex, Dolat Abad complex and Shandoon.

These agricultural complexes have brought 400 hectares of land under cultivation and presently barren tracts of land are being reclaimed to increase the cultivation.

In addition 100 hectares of land will be allocated to orchard growing and there are plans to set up orchards with areas of one to two hectares in the districts of Shahraki, Naroo'z, Poshtab, Shibab and Miankangi, with a budget of rials 50 million (\$ 700,000).

Gorgan, Gonbad Cultivation

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 18 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

SARIN, Jan. 18 (Pars) — The Director of the Agricultural Department of Gorgan and Gonbad announced that during the current year, 360 thousand hectares of land have been cultivated with wheat. During this same time, 20 thousand tons of wheat seeds and 20 tons of fertilizers were distributed among the farmers.

The Director added that during the current year, 3 billion Rials in loans were extended to farmers for different agricultural expenses. He also stated that 70 thousand tons of barley have been distributed among poultry farmers and animal breeders.

Training Classes in Gilan

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 19 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

RASHT, Jan. 18 (Pars) — The Public Relations Office of the Agriculture Department in the Province of Gilan announced that during the current year, 3,200 agricultural training classes have been formed in the province.

Also, during the same period, 8,230 kilograms of insecticides have been distributed among the farmers. During the past three months, 860 kilograms of fertilizer have been made available to farmers.

Wheat Under Cultivation

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 19 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

TEHRAN, Jan. 18 (Pars) — The public relations office of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development announced that in striving for self-sufficiency and freeing the country from the import of cereal, the Agricultural Department of Meghan has put 12 thousand hectares of irrigated land under wheat cultivation and another 4 thousand hectares of dry farming land have been cultivated, during the past month. Efforts for a 3 ton per acre yield are showing positive signs.

Barren Land Cultivated

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 20 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

TABRIZ, Jan. 18 (Pars) — Twenty thousand hectares of barren land in the Sar Eshand region has been cultivated during the current year by the Committee of Entrustment of Land, reported the spokesman of the said committee.

The spokesman further said that about 1,000 hectares of barren land have been developed and about 7,000 hectares have been distributed among landless people.

The committee has also paid a 12 million rials' loan to the farmers in the region for the development of agriculture.

Distribution of Wheat Seeds

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 20 Jan 81 p 4

[Text]

TEHRAN, Jan. 20 (Pars) — The public relations office of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development announced that during months of Mehr, Aban and Azar, 1359 (1980), 1,032,400 kilograms of wheat seeds has been supplied to the farmers for dry farming and irrigated land.

The report further says that 7,400 kilograms of insecticide has also been provided to the farmers of Islamabad and western regions of the country.

According to the same report, 2,605,826 kilograms of barley has been supplied to 1,774 cattle breeders in the war-stricken areas of western Islamabad.

CAPTURED TERRORIST WEAPONS DESCRIBED

Tel Aviv DAMAHANEH in Hebrew 5 Nov 80 pp 52-53

[Column Awareness of the Enemy: "The Weaponry of the Terrorists"]

[Text] Palestinian terrorist organizations are operating diligently to improve the equipment of the groups which are dispatched to carry out strikes in Israel. This, with stress on increasing the fire power of these groups and strengthening their ability to confront the forces of the IDF. Evidence of this is in the equipment captured following encounters by our forces with the strike groups that have penetrated Israeli territory, (photograph no 1). This equipment includes a broad variety of battle materiel of various types, of Eastern as well as Western manufacture.

Within this framework we shall attempt to classify the materiel in use by the strike groups from the standpoint of their types, designations and the implications flowing therefrom. It should be borne in mind, that the multiplicity of types and models of the weaponry in use by the terrorists, makes the task of classification exceedingly difficult. In every instance the equipment of each group is conditioned upon its size and upon the organization supporting it.

Materiel captured from the strike groups included the following types:

Hand-held Weapons, Anti-tank Weaponry, Explosives, Munitions, Other Support Equipment

Hand-held Weapons

The hand-held weapons in possession of the terrorist groups include rifles, light and medium machine guns, hand grenades, sub-machine guns and pistols:

Rifles: In strike attempts which were made in the past, 2 types of rifles stood out mainly: the Kalashnikov and the M-16. The rifle serves as the personal weapon of the terrorist (Photograph No 2).

Anti-Personnel and anti-tank grenade launchers could also be attached to the rifles. Use of a launcher makes possible firing at armored targets at a range of up to 200 meters. A launcher of the M-203 model attached to an M-16 rifle makes possible the firing of grenades of 40 mm to a range of about 400 meters. Similarly, the launcher makes it possible to fire from within a building without endangering the operator.

Light and Medium Machine Guns: In general a strike group is equipped with one machine gun which serves as cover weapon for the group and as a weapon for ranges of about 500 meters. The light machine gun is in general of the RPK or the

RPD. The RPD is loaded by a chain of 100 bullets packaged in a drum. This packaging method makes assault firing possible.

The medium machine gun is of the PKS type. It excels in its light weight, ease of operation and great precision. In large groups (six persons or above) there may be a number of machine guns for the group.

Hand Grenades: The strike groups are equipped with a large quantity of hand grenades--grenades of various manufacture and types, but they are for the most part small-shot grenades. These grenades can serve, aside from for throwing, also to seize rooms. Some of the grenades arranged in waist belts, ready for immediate use, and others were stored in knapsacks. Pistols and Sub-Machine Guns: In most strike attempts, the weaponry which was captured included pistols and sub-machine guns. In general, the commander of the group and his deputy are armed with a pistol. On one or more of the pistols in the group, silencers are attached, to give the group silent control of the target. Because of these weapons, situations are possible in which the members of the group do not dare approach to within the effective ranges in order to operate the silenced weapon. They prefer to open fire from regular weapons in their possession, while risking the alerting of security forces in the area.

Anti-Tank Weaponry

Rifles can be used also for anti-tank purposes when pyramids of anti-tank grenades are attached to them. And indeed the principal anti-tank weapon of the strike groups is the RPG-7 anti-tank projectile. This equipment makes possible firing at armored targets and at buildings, at ranges of up to 350 meters.

In the past 2 years we have found among the strike groups increased use of the Western Lau anti-tank projectile. It is possible to carry a large quantity of such projectiles and to return fire at armored targets and at buildings with greater power, at a range of 200 meters. One of the significant shortcomings in the use of these anti-tank weapons: firing of them from within a closed structure endangers the operator and those in his vicinity.

Among the war materiel of the terrorist groups, French ground-to-air rockets of the SNEB type have also been found recently, of 68 millimeter calibre, also used as an anti-personnel rocket. The estimated maximum range of the rocket, which is fired from a bomb-rack, is about 6 kilometers.

Explosives

In the past explosive material was made up principally from resources brought with them by the attack groups. Today, the quantity of explosive material in the hands of the attack groups is smaller, but they use plastic explosive material of greater power which is adaptable and can be prepared in a number of charges for the seizing of rooms and of buildings. Over the past year, almost all of the strike groups brought with them filled explosives belts to which had been attached electric detonators. These belts are activated by a switch and are used for suicide.

Munitions

The strike groups are generally equipped with a large amount of ammunition that is intended to give them an extended battle capability facing the IDF. The ammunition is placed in many magazines which are arranged on belts for immediate and convenient

use. There is, in general, an additional bulk quantity of ammunition in the knapsack. Packaging of the ammunition in bandoliers and in girdles makes operating while moving possible and contributes to the mobility of the group.

Other Support Equipment (Photograph No 3)

Aside from the regular battle equipment, the strike groups usually carry with them, in addition, other support equipment designed to aid them in accomplishing the mission for which they have infiltrated. This equipment may include the following items:

A bullhorn--for conducting negotiations.

Communications instrument

An axe--for breaking down doors and similar barriers.

Medical Equipment

A transistor radio--for receiving reports through radio stations in Arab countries.

Nails--for scattering on roads for the purpose of causing punctures.

Binoculars.

Water flasks.

Food for 1 or 2 days.

Cleansing kits for weapons.

Proclamations.

A roll of wire to serve as trip-wire.

Electrical conductors.

Batteries for actuating sabotage charges.

Detonator belts.

Most strike groups of the FATAH organization will be equipped as described above, but there is no discounting the possibility of use of other battle materiel, such as mortars. (The Coastal Road group was equipped with a 60 mm. mortar.)

In summary, the strike groups, particularly those who belong to the FATAH organization are today better equipped than in the past. The terrorist organizations have been learning lessons, correcting mistakes that were made in the past, and improving the quality of the weaponry and equipment in their possession. This has been seen both in the weaponry held by the groups which were captured as well as in the manner in which it was carried.

There is an abundance of personal armament at the disposal of the personnel of the strike groups, including rifles, pulverization grenades, pistols/submachine guns, and a large amount of ammunition.

Members of the group carry with them support weapons (1-2 machine gunners) which makes possible firing at a range of up to approximately 500 meters on the average.

The terrorist groups are capable of anti-tank warfare. The anti-tank capability makes it possible for them to fire at armored targets, at buildings, and even at naval vessels. It should be borne in mind that it is possible to attach pyramids of anti-personnel and anti-tank grenades to the rifles which makes it possible to fire even from within a building without endangering the operator.


The attack groups can carry out silent control by means of the silenced weaponry in their possession.

The groups have with them large quantities of plastic explosive material, which serve for the seizing of a building in which hostages may be taken.

All items of the armament and equipment are packaged in cartridge cases, bandoliers and knapsacks, convenient for personal carrying. Members of the group can activate their weaponry with freedom during movement. This fact contributes, of course, to the mobility of the strike groups.



A group of terrorists--on its way to a strike



Terrorist with Kalashnikov storm-rifle



Weaponry and equipment captured from the Coastal Road (Country Club) group

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YOUTH SURVEY SHOWS IMPROVED EGYPTIAN IMAGE

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 25 Nov 80 p 4

[Article by Gabi Zahar: "Egyptian Now Has More Positive Image"]

[Text] The Yom Kippur War effected a substantial improvement in the image of the Arab in the opinion of Israeli youth from grades 8 to 12. This is the outcome of a survey by Dr Kalman Binyamini of the Hebrew University. In comparison to the year 1968, changes took place in 18 aspects of the Arab image, and he is once again perceived as masculine and not as inebrate, he is less negative, he is less evil, he is less ugly, less devious, less meek and lethargic.

In the survey which began in the year 1965 it was found that the Arab image in that year tended toward the negative, and in the year 1968, after the Six-Day War, the negative stereotype sharpened even more, up to the year 1974. The conception held by the Israeli also returned in 1974 to its previous state, and is similar today to the conception of the year 1965, after the conception, in the opinion of Israeli youth, had been at its peak in the year 1968. Dr Binyamini maintains in his study that the Yom Kippur War effected a psychological disillusionment with the convincing results of the Six-Day War, as expressed in the conceptualization of the Arab by Israeli youth; however, thought modes regarding the Arab remained in effect.

Peace Treaty Improved Image

In the last phase of the survey, which was conducted after the peace agreement with Egypt in the spring of 1979, students were requested to assess possible differences in the image of the Arab according to their various national origins. In comparison with the general image of the Arab, the Israeli Arab was perceived as less negative, while a resident of the Occupied Territories and the Syrian Arab are perceived as more negative. The least negative of all of the images is that of the Egyptian, where only six of the items--all of them "appearance" items--are assessed negatively. In contrast to the Egyptian, all the images of the Arab are characterized by a single positive item, "masculine," and the Israeli Arab is also perceived as being in good health.

Dr Binyamini explains that as a result of this perception the stand of youth vis-a-vis the Egyptian is on the border of neutrality, and further notes that a neutral stand prevailed according to a survey conducted a decade ago among youth with respect to the Israeli Arab as well. The only explanation for the deviant perception of the Egyptian with regard to other Arab images is, according to Dr Binyamini, the fact of the existence of the peace treaty with Egypt.

Girls More Extreme Than Boys

In a survey recently published in the pamphlet Education Studies, issued by the School of Education of Haifa University, differences of images of Arabs by boys and girls were also examined. Both in the year 1968 as well as in the year 1974 girls demonstrated a tendency for more extreme assessments of the Arab than did boys, whereas in the year 1979 the trend reversed itself and girls now tend to more moderation in the assessment of the Arab. It was further found, that employed youth are more extreme in perceiving the Arab negatively and in perceiving the Israeli positively than are students in secondary schools. It was also found that with the advance from grade 8 to 12, the negative judgment of the Arab person moderates and the assessment of him improves with the advance in age.

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BRIEFS

BUYING W. BANK LAND--Prime Minister Menahem Begin yesterday announced from the Knesset rostrum that there was no impediment to buying land in Judaea and Samaria. He said that the cabinet had decided not to expropriate private land in Judaea and Samaria. Mr Begin was replying to an interpellation submitted by MK Ge'ula Kohen of Hatehiya who had wanted to know whether there is room to change the cabinet decision banning the expropriation of land in the territories. By revoking the law the massive purchase of land for settlement purposes would be possible. The prime minister replied that the decision not to expropriate private land except for public purposes was a just decision and there was no need or justification to change it. Mr Begin added that this decision had not precluded Jewish settlement on vacant state-owned land in these areas. In another interpellation MK Ge'ula Kohen wanted to know whether the decision also applied to the purchase of land by private people. The prime minister replied that there was no impediment whatsoever to purchasing land. The prime minister did not explicitly state whether Israeli citizens can buy land in Judaea and Samaria. However, the answer appeared to be affirmative. [Excerpts] [Yosef Wachsman] [TA051534 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 5 Feb 81 p 3]

QARNE SHOMRON TOWN --Housing and Construction Minister David Levi yesterday confirmed from the Knesset rostrum that a group of 10 contractors were establishing a town at Qarne Shomron, about 15 km east of Kefar Sava. Replying to an interpellation submitted by Alignment MK 'Adi Amoray, Minister David Levi confirmed that his ministry had begun constructing a residential neighborhood for IDF regular personnel and others at Qarne Shomron. Levi noted that this was a private enterprise within the "build your own home" plan aimed at cutting the government's expenses and making the contractors share in the financing as is customary in contracts between the Housing Ministry and construction companies throughout Israel. Minister Levi noted that 10 contractors had formed a special corporation to build new settlements in Judaea and Samaria and that negotiations with it had almost ended. The housing minister stated the clauses of the contract: the corporation will be responsible for and will finance the construction and development of the site; the initial infrastructure (sewage, electricity, water and access roads) will be financed and carried out by the government; and the corporation will be granted a loan according to the Housing Ministry's criteria for public and municipal building projects. [TA051516 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 5 Feb 81 p 3]

YAQIR SETTLEMENT--A settlement called Yaqir, north of Qalqilyah, on the Trans-Samaria Road, was established. Our correspondent Avraham Ben-Melekh reports that a group of families of a Gush Emunim nucleus settled the site slated for Yaqir. Another group of families will join it in a few weeks. [Text] [TA041915 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 4 Feb 81]

WEST BANK TERRORIST SQUAD--Five Fatah terrorists who planned to carry out terror acts in the Hebron Hills region have recently been uncovered. This was reported today by the IDF spokesman and our correspondent Moti 'Eden. Several members of the squad are residents of Hebron and others live in the village of Yattah. They were found in possession of many arms, including automatic guns, brick-shaped explosives, detonators, hand grenades and a 130-mm Katyusha missile. The investigation is still underway and more arrests are expected. [Text] [TA051754 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 5 Feb 81]

RELIGIOUS REVIVAL AMONG MUSLIMS IN NORTH--A trend toward return to Islam has recently become apparent in the Arab villages in the Galilee and in the Triangle and among the Bedouin tent camps. The director of the office of the Prime Minister's advisory bureau in the north, Yoram Katz, said that one of the manifestations of the religious trend is the increase in the construction of mosques in the villages. Since the beginning of the year, construction has begun on 8 mosques at an investment of millions of shekels. The ministries of Religions and Interior will share in the outlay with 1.8 million shekels. In many villages, groups have been formed for religious study, and hundreds are streaming to them. Many among those returning to the fold were not religiously oriented or were indifferent to the topic of the faith until recently. The center of the new movement is in 'Um 'al Fahm in the Triangle, and in the village of Shfar'am in the Galilee. Many residents of the villages are sporting beards, eschewing modern dress and returning to traditional dress. In the past 3 years, almost 13,000 Muslims from Israel made pilgrimage to Mecca. In the Bedouin settlements to the north a religious revival is also evident. Many of the Bedouins have begun to worship 5 times daily, and they donate their time and their resources to the construction of mosques in their settlements. Moshe ben Hayim of the Muslim Division in the Ministry of Religions, maintains that the religious revival has not damaged relations among the various communities, and leaders of the new movement do not participate at all in political events. Recently, leaders of Muslims, Christians and Druzes met in the village of Shfar'am and pledged to continue to preserve good relations among the communities. [Text] [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 24 Nov 80 p 5] 8090

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BRIEFS

ISLAMIC BANK TRIPLES PROFITS--The Kuwait Finance House, the state's only Islamic bank, more than tripled its profits last year and doubled the number of depositors, Chairman and Managing Director Ahmed Bazei al-Yassin reported. He said profits had risen from \$13 million in 1979 to \$44 million last year and that the number of depositors had increased from 20,000 to 40,000. The Kuwait Finance House was founded in 1977; 49 per cent of its shares are held by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Awqaf (religious endowments) and Islamic Affairs, the Minors' Affairs Department of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Finance. Kuwaiti citizens hold the remaining shares. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 12 Jan 81 p 11]

METALLGESELLSCHAFT STAKE DOUBLED--Kuwait last week doubled its investment in the West German metallurgy, manufacturing and transport group Metallgesellschaft by buying a further 10 per cent stake worth an estimated DM 150 million (\$75 million). The holding was sold to the state-owned Kuwait Petroleum Corporation by the Dresdner Bank, which now owns about one-third of Metallgesellschaft. Kuwait acquired its first 10 per cent stake in the German group last spring, when it bought a \$63.5 million holding (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, May 19, 1980). Kuwait is considered as an attractive partner among oil-rich states for German commercial enterprises because of its political stability and its investment policies. It has already diversified its investment significantly in West Germany, with a 14 per cent stake in Daimler-Benz and a 25 per cent holding in Korf Stahl. According to reports from Frankfurt, Metallgesellschaft can expect to profit commercially from the latest deal, because of the consequent increased scope for further transactions of the kind with Kuwait. Metallgesellschaft sources are quoted as saying that there have been "lively contacts" with the Kuwaitis since Kuwait bought its initial 10 per cent in the firm. As last May, the latest Kuwait acquisition in the German group is considered to herald orders from Lurgi, Metallgesellschaft's process plant engineering concern, for oil industry-related equipment in Kuwait. Around half of Metallgesellschaft's annual turnover of DM 9 billion is provided by overseas markets. It is thought that more operations of the Kuwaiti type will occur in coming months as major German banks seek to sell their shareholdings, because of possible legal enactments from Bonn requiring banks substantially to reduce their holdings in German companies. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 26 Jan 81 p 7]

OIL CONTRACT WITH ROK--Kuwait, Feb 2--Kuwait will renew an annual contract for a daily oil supply of 100,000 barrels to South Korea, official sources said Monday. The renewal followed today's meeting between Kuwait Oil Minister Shaykh 'Ali al-Khalifah and his Korean counterpart Pak Pong-hwan. The new contract will take effect as from April 1. According to the contract, which will be signed Tuesday, half the oil will be carried on Kuwaiti tankers, those sources said. The declared price of the Kuwaiti oil to Korea will be 35.5 dollars a barrel. [Text] [LD030415 Kuwait KUNA in English 1115 GMT 2 Feb 81 LD]

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OPTIONS OF PHALANGE IN 1980'S EXPLORED

Beirut AL-'AMAL in Arabic 23 Nov 80 pp 5-6

[Article by Karim Pagraduni: 'Lebanese Unity With International Approval; A Federal System With Arab Approval']

[Text] Why has the Phalange lasted for the past 40 years?

The reason is that the Phalange [Party] is a natural expression of Lebanon's destiny. As long as that destiny remains in question, the existence of the Phalange will remain a necessity. The Phalange Party neither seeks problems to create a cause for itself, nor looks for dogmas to interpret. It simply ties its existence to the destiny of Lebanon. The Phalange Party is the embodiment of a continuing problem. The party did not create the Lebanese problem; the problem itself led to the establishment of the party. The Phalange Party knew how to adopt the issue and how to create a leadership to deal with it. Pierre al-Jumayyil represented the most natural leadership. Just as the Lebanese problem led naturally to the creation of the Phalange Party, the creation of the party led naturally to a leadership by Pierre al-Jumayyil. The strength of the Phalangists comes from a natural bond between the party and the problem on the one hand, and the bond between the party and its leader on the other. Pierre al-Jumayyil summed up the problem in one simple question which he has repeated for the past 40 years: "What kind of Lebanon do we want?" This question remains unanswered. The question was put to the Arabs in the 1940's; it is now being put to the world in the 1980's. The question in the 1940's was: "What kind of Lebanon do the Arabs want?" The question in the 1980's is: "What kind of Lebanon does the world want?"

There were three options in the 1940's: A separate part [of a larger state], a partitioned [autonomous, but federated] Lebanon, or a unified Lebanon.

"A separate part [of a large state] meant that Lebanon would never be independent. It would always be a part of a larger political entity, one that the Syrian nationalists have traditionally referred to as 'Greater Syria,' and which the Arab nationalists have called the 'Arab Nation.' Here lies the essence of the Christian problem. A solution based on this option means

the Christian presence [state] will be viewed as a weakness or an aberration. According to this plan, Lebanon would have to become a Muslim state eventually, by force or by persuasion to be carried out immediately or in stages. The ultimate result would be the Islamization of the Christian community. This plan would have forced the Christians to surrender.

A partitioned Lebanon meant that Lebanon was a geographical mistake to begin with. It should have been created somewhere else, in Europe or America. Some have been referring to such a Lebanon as "Little Lebanon." Others dealt with it as another Israel. Here lies the problem of the [Lebanese] Moslems. From the perspective of a partitioned Lebanon, Muslim presence in Lebanon would be viewed as a burden. For Moslems, a partitioned Lebanon would always be seen as a Christian Lebanon, a Lebanon that will inevitably lead to a separation from the "Islamic Nation." The result would be a Lebanon in a constant state of turmoil with its neighbors. Such a solution would be a blueprint for war with the Moslems.

A unified Lebanon was the choice of the Phalangists in the 1940's. A unified Lebanon meant there would be no Arabization to the point of Islamization, nor Westernization to the point of Zionization. In the framework of such an understanding, being a Christian would no longer be viewed as a problem but as an asset. Being a Moslem would be viewed not as a complication but as a solution. From the outset, the Phalangists have rejected the solution based on the ultimate capitulation by the Christians, but neither did they become involved in a constant state of war with the Moslems. A solution based on a unified Lebanon was seen as a peaceful solution. The Phalangists, with Arab consent, have selected that option.

The more the Phalangists adhered to their position [on a unified Lebanon], the more the Arabs changed their position. While the Phalangists were committed to a unified Lebanon, the Arabs, or at least some of them, began to gravitate toward a Lebanon which is a part of a larger state. The more the Arabs called for such a state, the more the Phalangists began to lean in the direction of a partitioned Lebanon. This has been the story of Lebanon since the 1940's. Pierre al-Jumayyil's original question remains unanswered in the 1980's. The difference now is that the Arab answer is no longer sufficient. The question must be answered by the world community.

There are three possible options in the 1980's: the absence of Lebanon as a state, the emergence of a Lebanon without [clearly defined geographical] boundaries, or the emergence of a unified Lebanon.

Should Lebanon continue to serve as a battleground for the Palestinians and the Israelis, it could cease to exist as a state. This would continue until the Middle East problem is settled. According to this option, the Israeli presence in all of Palestine would be condoned and the Palestinian presence in all of Lebanon would be legitimized. This is the solution that would give security to Israel, guarantee the flow of oil to the United States, and place Lebanon in the hands of the Arabs. This is the solution once envisioned by Henry Kissinger during the Nixon administration. But the Phalange succeeded

in foiling that prospect during the 2-year war. Not even Kissinger is ready to resurrect that idea in the Reagan administration. The Kissinger strategy has changed dramatically as a result of the new realities created by the Phalangists. It is no longer possible to contemplate a solution that ignores the Lebanese Resistance.

The second possibility is a Lebanon without boundaries. While the first option represents a political solution for the entire region's problem at the expense of Lebanon's territory, the second option represents a geographical solution for the entire region. A Lebanon without boundaries means changing the boundaries of the entire region, or at least six principal entities in the area: Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Iran. Such a solution would require a revision not only of the map of Lebanon, but of the entire Middle East, more or less. In the framework of this option, the recent, sudden talk of a "Jordanian solution" to the Palestinian problem takes on added significance. Such talk is emanating from the new U.S. administration, Israel's opposition [Labor] Party, and some Arab governments opposed to the Camp David accords as well as to the Steadfastness Front. The Iraq-Iran war is also entering the picture. The war is producing internal developments in both countries which could reach beyond their boundaries. A solution based on a Lebanon without boundaries is likely to bring about a fifth regional war or a third world war.

That leaves the third option: a solution based on a united Lebanon. The Phalange Party since the 1940's has opted for a united Lebanon based on the National Charter. It left the task of forming a government to others. Only recently--in the late 1960's--did the party get involved off and on in the process of forming a government. The peaceful plan proposed in the 1970's by the Phalange Party began to go through phases. Sometimes it was changed to a capitulationist plan, other times it was a plan for gradual fighting because of the absence of an effective, supportive government. Since the 1940's, Lebanon has not had a government capable of preserving peaceful coexistence, or an army capable of defending its boundaries and independence. Those who are trying to build the state in general, and presidents have consistently committed two contradictory errors. A few presidents, such as Charles Hilu and Sulayman Franjiyyah, attempted to build a state without an army. Charles Hilu nearly dismantled the army to spite the Shihabis. Sulayman Franjiyyah brought the government to a standstill to take revenge on the army. Others, including Fuad Shihab and Ilyas Sarkis have attempted to create a cohesive army without a government. Fuad Shihab managed to create a cohesive army in the midst of a fragmented country. When the country collapsed, so did the army. Sarkis on the other hand attempted to create one country with several armies. The armies did not unite and many mini states emerged.

What is needed is one army, one government and one state. Just as the Phalange Party opted for united Lebanon in the 1940's, it is likely that in the 1980's it will opt for a Lebanon under one government. The party will not disavow its past commitment to a united Lebanon even though the Arabs, or some of them, reject this option. What the party will not accept, however, is a return to a type of government that existed in the 1940's, one that has been discredited by political experiments and war.

Just as the Phalange Party insisted on a particular type of homeland in the 1940's, it will demand a particular type of government in the 1980's, one closer to its political philosophy and orientation, specifically a united Lebanon under a federal government. A united Lebanon means that its present boundaries must be preserved. Lebanon cannot remain without boundaries and continue to wait for an unknown solution. A federal system means the creation of a new government, one capable of insuring a special status for the Christian population and free coexistence for all the Lebanese people. Otherwise, the absence of Lebanon as a state cannot be ruled out as a possible solution.

It is risky to try to define what is required for a solution to the Lebanese problem, but I will venture to say that a solution this time, once again, will originate with the Phalangists. Just as the solution of the 1940's originated with the Phalange with Arab consent, the solution of the 1980's will originate with the Phalange but with Arab and international consent. The Phalange solution of the 1980's will seek a united Lebanon with international consent and a federal system of government with Arab consent.

9063

CSO: 4802

FORMER PREMIER GIVES HIS SIDE OF ARMY CRISES, ARAB RELATIONS

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 6 Dec 80 p 27

[Article by Khazin 'Abbud: "The Former Premier of Lebanon, Dr Salim al-Huss, to AL-MUSTAQBAL: Prepared To Debate Chamoun and al-Jumayyil on Television"]

[Text] "We welcome all dialogue between Moslems and Christians, but such a dialogue will not lead to the desired results in view of the multiplicity of leaders and their aims. Any dialogue of any kind must occur through the government, which represents the legitimate authority, if it is to yield benefit."

This is what the former Lebanese premier, Dr Salim al-Huss, told AL-MUSTAQBAL at a ceremonial meeting between Premier al-Huss and a number of members of the Lebanese community in Cyprus arranged by the charge d'affaires of the Lebanese Embassy on the island, Iskandar 'Amun, in the chancery of the embassy. He was thereby referring to the television dialogue between Premier Sa'ib Salam and Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil. al-Huss and his wife had suddenly arrived in the capital of Cyprus the past week on a private visit which lasted 2 days.

The ceremonial meeting was suffused by an atmosphere of affection and warmth. It was a good opportunity for the exchange of views on a number of current Lebanese issues and the crisis raging about the Middle East region.

AL-MUSTAQBAL asked Premier al-Huss what his position would be if President Camille Chamoun or Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil asked him to hold a dialogue with him on television. He replied, "I would agree to hold such a dialogue on any occasion. However, I still hold to my position that any dialogue must occur through the government, since there is no justification for ignoring the regime, which represents legitimate authority."

I asked Premier al-Huss:

"In a press statement, you said that you have parted ways politically with President Ilyas Sarkis but that you agree with him in the context of freindship. Are you still politically at odds with him and in agreement with him in the context of friendship?"

He said,

"That is true. My friendship for His Excellency President Sarkis has not been affected. It goes back many years. I remained in the position of responsibility as

premier for 4 years. It is natural that there should be a difference in views between President Sarkis and me as far as some issues go. That sort of thing is natural. However, as I have mentioned, these disputes have not affected our friendship, concerning viewpoints," he added jokingly, "which even arise between a man and his wife, which however do not mean a breakup between the two of them. The same thing goes with regard to the rumors being bruited about on the existence of a dispute between me and President Sarkis."

[Question] However, it is observed that you have not visited the presidential palace recently.

[Answer] Since the formation of the new cabinet, that is, more than a month ago, I have not visited the presidential palace, because I was in urgent need of a rest. Before it was formed, though, I met President Sarkis many times in the palace by virtue of his responsibilities as president.

[Question] However, rumors stress the existence of a dispute between you and the president.

[Answer] It is a difference in views on the Army Law. We have a new law for the army which is much preferable to the old one. There was a period of 4 months for applying a number of decrees bearing on the army. A year, indeed more than a year, elapsed and no decree was applied, as the law stipulated. However, this is natural as far as the current situation in Lebanon goes. The former army laws grants the army commander powers which the commander of no other army in the world enjoys, even in countries governed by the military. Meanwhile, the new law came about in order to correct this situation and put matters in their place without infringing its leadership position. There are administrative matters which are not part of its powers.

[Question] It is observed that the position of the premier specifically is a matter which is always in a climate of crisis. What are the hidden reasons for the existence of such a crisis? It is being said that there is a power center which is rebelling against the cabinet and rumors point to the minister of foreign affairs, Fu'ad Butrus. What is the extent of truth in that?

[Answer] The position of the premier is not in a climate of crisis and the rumors being circulated on this subject regarding the power center have no validity. Rumors circulated that there was a dispute between me and minister Butrus. What existed between us was merely a difference in views, and that, as I said, is natural, and is not a dispute in the sense contained in the rumors.

As regards the APAL movement and its escalation of the government situation by demanding that the Shiite ministers resign, and whether this escalation will lead to the resignation of Premier Shafiq al-Qazzan's cabinet, he said,

"Since the new cabinet was formed, I have conducted no political activity, and I have not followed this issue. In any case there is no problem without a solution.

[Question] Will Syria facilitate the task of Premier al-Wazzan's cabinet?

[Answer] As I told you, I have not been following events.

On the Lebanese crisis, he said,

"Lebanon is still in good shape, in spite of the crisis which has raged and still is raging over it. Government institutions are functioning, we have a parliament, and in spite of the harsh trials we are still adhering to the unity of Lebanon in terms of people, territory and institutions. In addition, the economic situation is still powerful, construction activity is proceeding full steam, the banks are functioning actively, and new foreign banks have opened branches in Lebanon. These are all things which are considered proof of vigor."

Regarding the Middle East crisis, he said,

"It is a double-edged crisis; the first is the Palestinian cause and the second is oil. The Palestinian crisis is in reality the 'decor' of the Middle East crisis. Resolving these two edges means solving the entire Middle East crisis."

Regarding the insurance company established in Lebanon whose activity is confined to insuring immovable properties against damages wrought upon them by war or insurrection, though what is known as "war insurance," he said,

"I have encouraged and helped, within the law, the establishment of such accompany, which will perform activities not provided by other insurance firms. This company will take charge of insuring any building damaged by war and will also take charge of insuring any building under construction, including building materials. However, its activities do not include the insuring of old buildings which have not been damaged. The company takes two-tenths of a percent of the value of the properties being insured."

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CSO: 4802

LEBANON

JUNBLAT COMMENTS ON RELATIONS WITH NATIONAL MOVEMENT

Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 16 Nov 80 p 3

[Report on interview with Walid Junblat by AL-SIYASAH in Kuwait; date not given]

[Text] In an interview given to AL-SIYASAH in Kuwait, Walid Junblat disclosed that dialog was no longer permitted in Lebanon, and that his relations with the National Movement have been damaged. When asked whether Ilyas Sarkis would be the last president of Lebanon, he responded that such a development was possible. Excerpts of the Junblat interview, which was published by AL-SIYASAH, are reported here.

[Question] Are there any initiatives to settle Lebanon's internal problem?

[Answer] No.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Because all parties to the dispute, the Leftists and the Rightists, are hampered by the Palestinian problem.

[Question] But it is reported that you are having a direct or indirect dialog with the other side.

[Answer] There is no direct dialog. The indirect dialog has been going on for the past 4 years. In fact, even during the civil war there was an indirect dialog.

[Question] Is there a possibility of moving to direct negotiations at this stage?

[Answer] The circumstances are not suitable at this time.

[Question] It is rumored that you are having discussions with [former] President Sham'un.

[Answer] At the present time dialog is not permitted in Lebanon.

[Question] By whose orders?

[Answer] [Smiling]...By those who do not permit it.

[Question] Some have demanded the removal of President Ilyas Sarkis. Is the Progressive Socialist Party supportive of this demand?

[Answer] No one can remove the president of the republic. Throughout Lebanon's history no president was ever removed from office because an international agreement exists. The only exception was the removal of Bishara al-Khuri. But that was the result of an international agreement with unanimous support.

[Question] Do you share any of President Sarkis' views?

[Answer] I have not met with President Sarkis for a while. The last time I visited him I was accompanied by Shaykh 'Aqi of the Druze community. We talked about a lot of things but not about politics.

[Question] Let us discuss your relations with the side which opposes the government, i.e., the National Movement.

[Answer] Our relations with the National Movement are ruined.

[Question] With all factions or with only certain factions of the movement?

[Answer] Unfortunately, no one is presently working for the welfare of Lebanon. There are several, not one, national movements within the National Movement. Many currents and countries are involved in the National Movement. So far we have not been able to agree on a common cause.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Because there are parties within the National Movement opposed to that.

[Question] Are things that complicated?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Do the disputes center on the Lebanese situation?

[Answer] There are disputes about Lebanon's internal problems, the situation in the Arab world and in the world at large.

[Question] Does the basic dispute center on Lebanon's internal problems or on relations with the Arab world?

[Answer] There are significant disputes on internal issues as well as on Arab issues. The Iraq-Iran war and the Soviet-Syrian treaty are two examples.

[Question] Can these disputes be settled?

[Answer] No.

[Question] You have recently made some remarks about security in areas controlled by the National Movement which have created quite a stir in Lebanon. You did this despite the fact that your group is prominently represented on the Security Committee which was created to deal with the problem?

[Answer] What is needed is implementation of the measures adopted by the committee. Frankly, certain groups do what they can to impede the work of the committee.

[Question] The Progressive Socialist Party plays a prominent role in Lebanese affairs. Why does it not exert pressure on other powerful elements to implement the committee's decisions?

[Answer] We always speak openly and direct our remarks to public opinion.

[Question] Are all the factions of the National Movement unable to carry out the committee's decisions?

[Answer] Most of them are. Our party did all it could to comply with the committee's decision. Take, for example, the question of wall posters. We have removed all posters, including pictures of my martyred father. We regret that certain factions are not committed to implementing the resolutions.

[Question] Could the present situation lead to new alliances?

[Answer] No. The present situation would only make things worse. It will lead to further fragmentation.

[Question] Does fragmentation also exist in other parts of the country?

[Answer] On the contrary, the other parts of the country are well controlled. They have a clear political direction. They also have a security program of their own.

[Question] But things have reached the liquidation stage on the other side, have they not?

[Answer] Apparently such a step is condoned on the other side.

[Question] And is not such a step permitted in the areas controlled by the Nationalist?

[Answer] No. In our area no faction can liquidate another.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Because we have a balance of forces and no one can ignore that.

[Question] How about the army?

[Answer] No one wants the army.

[Question] Nevertheless, the army continues to grow.

[Answer] Only to break up again.

[Question] But there is unanimous agreement that the army is under the control of a particular group and is not likely to break up.

[Answer] That view is not accurate, and I do not wish to discuss the army.

[Question] Do you support the expansion of army control into Nationalist territory?

[Answer] One of the political conditions we had accepted was to let the army expand its control. There must be cooperation between the army and the [Arab] Deterrent Forces to ensure security.

[Question] It is rumored that the security plan has been hampered by attempts to prevent the expansion of army control to all regions.

[Answer] The army is one topic not permitted for discussion. There are some topics that are off limits. (With obvious sarcasm, Mr Junblat invited this reporter to discuss other things: sanitation, security, general matters.)

[Question] Are you pessimistic Mr Walid?

[Answer] Pessimism and optimism are psychological states.

[Question] Is it possible that President Sarkis might be the last president.

[Answer] Anything is possible.

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CSO: 4802

MANY CHALLENGES FACED BY NEW PRIME MINISTER

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 21 Nov 80 p 13

[Article: "Lebanon Is Federal State; New Serious Development at Level of Isolationist Movement; State Charter Ready for Declaration When Translated Into Several Languages; Al-Wazzan's Government Lost Between 'Injustice' of Sunnis and 'Pressure' of Shi'ites"]

[Text] AL-QUDS PRESS--A new problem has confronted Prime Minister al-Wazzan's cabinet, namely the emergence of a new grouping in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies. This is the Sunni deputy grouping which includes Sulayman al-'Ali, 'Uthman al-Dana, Nazim al-Qadir, Hasan al-Rifa'i, Zaki Mazbudi, Salih al-Khayr, Amin al-Hafiz, Talal Mur'ibi, Jamil Kibbi and Rashid al-Sulh.

At the first plenary session held by this new grouping, the position toward the al-Wazzan cabinet, especially the issue of giving this cabinet a vote of confidence, was discussed, and it was decided to withhold this confidence from the cabinet because, with its structure and with the manner in which it was formed, this cabinet has created a flaw in the political situation and has undermined "the national leadership role" performed by the Sunni sect among the other Lebanese sects.

Reaction!

What is important in this issue is that the Sunni Deputy Grouping includes in its ranks a number of members of the Islamic Grouping of which Prime Minister al-Wazzan is considered a member. The other members of the new grouping are members of the Independent Parliamentary Bloc which is considered the most important bloc in the Chamber of Deputies and which includes nearly one-third of the 99 chamber members. In the view of some observers, this may lead to affecting the cohesion of both the Islamic Grouping and the Independent Parliamentary Bloc. The question raised is: Has this grouping emerged to settle the accounts with the Islamic Grouping and the Independent Bloc? If so, then who stands behind this new grouping?

In reply to these two questions, it can be said that the Sunni Deputy Grouping has emerged as a reaction on the part of a number of members of the Chamber of Deputies to the designation of lawyer Shafiq al-Wazzan to form the new cabinet and to the ministerial appointments that followed this designation.

In other words, deputies Rashid al-Sulh, Amin al-Hafiz and Zaki al-Mazbudi consider themselves more entitled to the premiership than al-Wazzan. The first two actually occupied the post under conditions similar to the conditions encountered by Lebanon at present. On the other hand, the other members of the Sunni Deputy Grouping consider themselves entitled to the ministerial portfolios, especially since the structure of al-Wazzan's cabinet has been enlarged to include 22 ministers. One minister resigned as soon as the cabinet was announced, thus leaving it with 21 ministers. Another minister has threatened to resign or has tendered his resignation to the president of the republic and the cabinet has thus come to be comprised of 20 and one-half ministers!

Injustice and Pressure

The above indicates that the "feeling of being wronged" is what dictated the resolution to form this new grouping. But according to what party sources in Beirut say, it seems that high-level political circles that are extremely significant in directing policy in Lebanon have quickly embraced the new grouping and have started coordinating with it in the hope of expanding its base to include an additional number of Sunni deputies initially and of Muslim deputies generally at a later stage with the purpose of exerting pressure on al-Wazzan's cabinet and of imposing some political tests on it or subjecting it to the risk of downfall in the Chamber of Deputies when the time for a vote of confidence comes.

Appeasing Amal

The fact is that al-Wazzan's cabinet has not yet solved several problems that confronted it as of the moment of its formation, including the problem of the so-called "Shi'ite knot." This problem is that of the Amal movement's and the Supreme Shi'ite Council's [refusal to] approve the nomination of the four Shi'ite ministers, namely Mahmud 'Ammar, Anwar al-Sabah, 'Ali al-Khalil and Muhammad Yusuf Baydun, to the new cabinet unless this cabinet includes a minister representing the Amal movement or the Supreme Shi'ite Council. President Sarkis has been trying to find a solution for this problem for 2 weeks, but without any results so far. There is, it seems, one of two solutions: Either the four Shi'ite ministers resign from the cabinet and new ministers are appointed to replace them, thus appeasing Amal, the Shi'ite Front for the Preservation of the South and Kamil al-As'ad, the Chamber of Deputies speaker, or a fifth minister can be added to appease Amal alone. We thus find that al-Wazzan's cabinet faces the dilemma of the "Shi'ite knot" as it has begun to face the dilemma of the "Sunni knot." This situation is capable of greatly reducing the credibility of the Islamic political and parliamentary cover which the cabinet must secure for itself in order to demand the Chamber of Deputies' vote of confidence.

Unimplemented Resolutions

We must add to this that al-Wazzan is convinced that President Ilyas Sarkis can play a major role in surmounting the problems facing the cabinet and that reluctance on his part could be tantamount to the straw that may break the camel's back. Those close to the prime minister cite an example of

this [reluctance] by saying that the Higher Defense Council, which met in the wake of the 'Ayn al-Rummanah incidents in which the Phalange settled the situation in this area in their favor after a violent struggle against Sham'un's militias and after a dramatic battle with the Lebanese army, adopted confidential resolutions to deal with the "negligence" displayed by the army officers or by some of them. However, more than a week has passed since the meeting while the resolutions continue to be mere ink on paper. This has led to increased resentment against the cabinet and to accusing its chairman of weakness, vacillation, inability to represent the Muslims, and so forth.

Federal State

The question raised now is: Will these resolutions be implemented, thus giving al-Wazzan relative protection from the arrows of the strong opposition inside and outside the Chamber of Deputies?

The fact is that the answer is not in the hands of the president of the republic or of Victor Khuri, the army commander. The Phalange Party and the isolationist Lebanese Front generally have a fundamental role in formulating the answer in view of the strong isolationist infiltration of both the executive and military authorities. If what we say is true, then more attention may have to be devoted to a new and serious development at the level of the isolationist Maronite movement in Lebanon. This development lies in the fact that the Lebanese Front has completed formulating its position vis-a-vis the "Lebanese formula" in the document recently approved by this front--a document which the front has begun to translate into foreign languages prior to declaring it. This document, according to informed circles, contains a declaration of the wish of the Maronites in politics to turn Lebanon into a federal state in which the Christians will have the right to autonomy. If the said information is true, then the issue of the cabinet becomes a trivial matter in comparison to this serious development. Perhaps it is due to this reason that al-Wazzan's cabinet has come at the wrong time and why this cabinet is accepted and rejected at the same time.

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CSO: 4802

LEBANON

SHI'ITES DEMAND EQUAL REPRESENTATION IN GOVERNMENT

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 12 Dec 80 pp 14-17

[Article: "The War of Quotas in al-Wazzan's Government; Amal Calls for Amending the 1943 Pact To Give Shi'ites Equality with Sunnis and Maronites; Prime Minister Considers Lebanon's Boycott of Amman Summit Clear Expression of Policies of Former Prime Ministers"]

[Text] The unremitting cabinet crisis in Lebanon has placed the government and the remaining activists in front of fundamental claims that must be confronted so they can be paid off one after the other.

The government was mistaken when it tried to run away from facing these claims by making some decisions and assuming some positions in the course of which the decision to boycott the Arab Summit Conference in Amman was reached.

The source of the error in the government's position was in its belief--or at least in the belief of some of the government's political advisers--that the decision to boycott the Amman Summit could persuade Syria and the Palestinian Resistance to [assume] domestic positions such as those that turned out to be obstacles for the government and led to those interactions and consequences which ensued.

Some officials who are playing the role of coordinating relations between the two countries conveyed Syria's opinions on this point clearly. What they said signified that the cooperation between the two countries on fundamental questions on the Arab and international scenes was one thing, and their cooperation to control security inside Lebanon along with the difficulties of organizing governments and looking for ways that would lead to an understanding with those opposing the authority was another. This is because Syria which is interested in having the authority in Lebanon overcome the difficulties [it is facing] according to nationally balanced principles, cannot take away from this authority the responsibility of confronting these details because such a confrontation would be extremely harmful to Syria and extremely harmful to the principles of power that are in effect in Lebanon.

It was stated in this regard that some of those who had tried to get the government of Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan out of the tight spot which it was in stated in official meetings that preceded the resignation of the four Shi'ite ministers last Friday that the secrets of the government crisis focused the limelight on significant facts among which was that of emphasizing to all the forces that using tranquillizers to treat all ailments was no longer useful. [They said] that the solution lay in advancing the dates for disclosure and speaking out and calling for a comprehensive or a partial dialogue on the necessity for establishing an agreement among all the Lebanese on an alternative formula to that of the National Pact. This formula would define the rights and obligations of each sect, and it would settle the various draft formulas that vary from a formula for administrative decentralization to one for a federal government and cantons.

In addition, there is a definite need for setting up an agreement that would outline for the government the limits of the army's role and duties and would reconsider besides the rules of foreign policy, especially on the Arab scene.

Some officials who have faced these facts which were produced by the political and the partisan practices stated that the authority could not keep the country without a government until the Lebanese should come to an agreement about a new government formula and different principles for organizing governments. They said that it was the duty of the authority to work towards the formation or the creation of at least a caretaker government so that [Lebanon] would not fall into a vacuum. They said that as of next year the authority must cooperate with the government in an attempt to advance the dates for steering the Lebanese towards the formulas that would provide the authority with the capabilities for organizing governments in a calm and clear manner.

Those officials also said that several months have gone by, with the country waiting for a government to be organized to replace that of Prime Minister Salim al-Huss. The obstacles continued despite all the efforts that were made. The state knows that the loss of a formula has produced what may be called chaotic positions and demands. But the state also knows that the time has not yet come for separating the Lebanese problem from the Middle East problem and that, accordingly, neither the time for inviting the activists to select a new formula nor the time for forcing the activists to give up their positions has drawn near. The evidence for this lies in the fact that there is a faction that is still preparing itself to wage what is called the war to liberate Lebanon. This faction is countered by other factions who are also preparing themselves to liberate Lebanon from the opposite direction. This proves that it would be impossible now to tie the question of the government and its stability to that of the agreement of activists on a formula for mutual cooperation.

The people in power said that the fact that every faction was holding on

to its difficult demands spoiled the meal. They said that those who were ill had to be treated with medication until it was time for surgery.

Some intermediaries responded to this logic by saying that the problem which the government faced was merely one of the branches of the basic crisis that is actually threatening the coexistence formula--or whatever is left of it--for all the Lebanese factions.

Those people also said that many errors were made when the cabinet was organized and that some of them led to the fact that difficult choices had to be made. Following up on the details of the Shi'ite position on the government has proven that the error and the poor conduct filled [people's] hearts with resentment against the government on the one hand and against some of the rigid forces on the other. Old demands were presented last week along with formulas for plans that call for setting up a balanced joint government system for all the sects; establishing the rights of those sects in the various fields; and abandoning once and for all the 1943 formula which was considered to be a partnership agreement between two parties such as the Christian leaders of the Maronite sect and the leaders of the Sunni sect as the second partner. Today it has been established that those who were included in the partnership began calling for changing the coexistence agreement to grant the other parties an equal role in the new formula. Otherwise they would dissociate themselves from the framework of mutual cooperation and adopt a course that would lead them to their goals even if they had to use force.

This disconcerting fact has presumed that the psychological tension which had accompanied the efforts to save the government may turn into an unexpected explosion that would further complicate the Lebanese crisis.

A Shi'ite source said in a private interview that the errors of the government are evident and that its internal and foreign floundering have led it and led the country to the situation from which it is suffering today. [He said] that the method that was used to organize the cabinet and select the ministers has shown that the government does not have the ability to grasp the features of the new reality that has come into existence. Instead of trying to remedy and correct the errors in sound and accurate ways, officials began to play the game of wasting time: they asked for mediation; they twisted arms [to get] a settlement; and they ignored the realities of the situation. Some officials tried to object to the fact that the new cabinet had a sectarian appearance, and they tried to force the crisis to take sectarian directions so that people would become convinced that the action the Shi'ite sect was taking to remove oppression and achieve demands was no more than an action directed against the Sunni sect and, consequently, against the Druzes. [The Shi'ites wanted to impress upon the people the fact] that these sects had to take action to maintain their positions in front of this expansion.

The aforementioned source said, "The attempt to portray the situation

in this manner complicated the crisis and placed Lebanon at the entrance to a region filled with negative currents all of which ultimately served no one but Israel. At the same time these currents did not express the realities of the situation which may be summarized by saying that the just demands that were presented to the government were demands that could have come not just from one sect, but from all the Lebanese regardless of their sects."

The fact that the file on the difficult questions was opened along with the increasingly intense fears of sectarian developments forced many political and party leaders from the various regions to take action to avoid the worst possibilities.

The president of the republic may receive a group of suggestions that would help contain the domestic struggle that has been renewing itself in Lebanon before it is too late.

In this regard officials have been notified that the vehemence of the crisis requires numerous sacrifices, the least of which may be the reconsideration of the government's situation and opening the door for the creation of a new cabinet which would correct errors and provide the government with an opportunity to renew its attempts to form a cabinet of activists or of ordinary civil servants.

Details, which may not be dealt with in this context, have been revealed. The facts of these details prove that the interactions of the dispute over the government were and still are raging behind the scenes. Those interactions that have been hidden cannot be compared with some of the public expressions [that were made] and the positions that have been taken vis a vis al-Wazzan's cabinet.

One of the ministers said that [former] president Camille Sham'un was one of those who realized the danger of the struggle that took place around the government. He was the one who anticipated its proportions and what it may lead to. He was prompt in giving advice to the legitimate authority in which he said that inflexibility or avoiding meeting the demands [that were made] would only lead to further vehemence. [He said that] it was in the interests of the government to leave the cabinet to its destiny within the democratic framework. If its fall or resignation is a step that would keep sectarian and political dangers away from Lebanon, that in itself would be an accomplishment and not a loss or a retreat.

Although President Sham'un has many reservations about the cabinet organization--these are reservations that forced him and his party to make a decision to withhold their confidence from the government--he did late last week, in the light of information he had received, come around to the view that the game was no longer confined within the traditional controls, but that it had taken on privileges whose continuation and escalation will lead to the premature anticipation of matters and to the creation of a serious state of internecine fighting among the sects.

President Sham'un has been expecting this to happen since last March. At that time he had warned some friends of the (presidential) palace against the dangers of chaos [that exist] in the process of forming a new cabinet. He said that the resignation of the cabinet of Prime Minister al-Huss will open the door for a prolonged and difficult cabinet crisis that would not be solved unless everybody agreed to avoid the disaster that would result from the struggle of opponents which would come about with the creation of a cabinet of civil servants to complete with President Sarkis whatever is left of his term.

Ever since the resignation of Prime Minister al-Huss the attempts that have been made to form a cabinet have run into obstacles that last week led all the parties opposing the dangers of the bloody struggle to the nature and the form of the new formula. On the other hand, these attempts forced suggestions that a scapegoat be used to postpone or to abolish such a struggle over replacing the cabinet with a new one that would provide an opportunity for correcting the mistakes that were made in front of the government or give the government to a team of civil servants while the activist leaders who are fighting remain in waiting positions until the plans for settling the crisis in the area and in Lebanon take shape.

This opinion was reinforced before the resignation of the Shi'ite ministers as a result of the position that was assumed by the government vis a vis the summit conference in Amman. Some people found the boycott decision to be a loophole which could be used to force the government to resign, to sacrifice the government and [thereby] to turn to a new page of different relations with all the Arab nations.

Those people said that by boycotting the Amman summit the government had departed from the foreign policy that Lebanon had been pursuing since 1943. This policy was articulated by former minister of defense, Mr Philip Taqla when he said that Lebanon supports the Arab countries when they are in agreement and is neutral when they disagree. The departure from those principles hurts Lebanon and forces it to strive for a new position to establish the appropriate policy of neutrality on the Arab scene. This departure would only be completed with the establishment of a new government. In addition, the cabinet change will enable President Sarkis to rectify his dealings with the Sunni sect which has reproached him for selecting Prime Minister al-Wazzan without parliamentary consultations. The cabinet change would correct his relations with the Shi'ite sect which has reproached him for selecting the Shi'ite ministers without prior consultations with the Shi'ite Islamic Council and with the [representative of the] Amal Movement, Mr Nabih Barri.

And here an opposing opinion emerged: it stated that Prime Minister al-Wazzan went along with President Sarkis in boycotting the Amman summit and that he proceeded on the correct course that is consistent with the interests of Lebanon. The replacement of that course with another is rejected in Lebanon and is unacceptable to Syria.

It was stated in that regard that the unwritten National Pact upon which the Lebanese formula has been based since 1943 stipulated the necessity of taking official positions in the area of foreign policy that are consistent with those of Syria. This was an alternative to the fact that some Lebanese lean towards unity with Syria. But for reasons that pertain to the circumstances of government, presidents that followed each other to power in Lebanon did not abide by this principle in most of their foreign [policy] positions. Therefore, President Ilyas Sarkis and Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan did no more than correct an error and restore effectiveness to an important term of this pact. For this reason al-Wazzan should not have to pay an exorbitant price for cabinet complications that are the result of the realities of the sectarian and political changes that have emerged in Lebanon as a result of the civil war.

No matter how far the question of the government and the regime will go, it is inevitable, as more than one veteran politician says, that the interest in the file that has been opened [will abate]. It will be difficult to close this file unless there is an agreement among all the sects. Such an agreement can be a changed formula or an alternative formula to the 1943 Pact.

Awaiting the realization of this basic goal, the executive government, the Chamber of Deputies, the activists and all the forces on the Lebanese scene remain captives of the daily tug-of-war that will only undermine the constitutional institutions further.

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LEBANON

DEPUTY COMMENTS ON FEDERATION, PROPOSED THREE-PARTY SYSTEM

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 12 Dec 80 pp 18, 19

[Interview with Fu'ad al-Tahini by Amin al-Siba'i: "AL-HAWADITH Discusses the Lebanese Formula with Fu'ad al-Tahini; Three Party System Is Better than Federation"]

[Text] The Civil Strife of 1860 and the 1975 War
Preclude a Federation because It Would Deny the Druzes,
the Orthodox and the Armenians a Special Entity.
The Clergy Reject Secularization and the Abolition
of Sects;
the Politicians Disagree about the Alternative Formula.

The political expectations that arose around the possibility that the Lebanese Front may propose a new political formula to replace the National pact with a formula that has the nature of a federation have recently led to the spontaneous discussion of the question by various parties and activists, despite the fact that the discussion about a federation as a formula remained confined within the framework of slogans and general ascriptions and was not linked to any specific detailed text.

The discussion about a federation as an alternative formula to the National Pact was considered a serious discussion despite the fact that al-Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil was careful not to go into its details until the Lebanese reach an agreement. His concern was based on a set of indicators among which is the fact that Attorney Karim Baqradi had touched upon this subject in his television interview with Mr Shafiq al-Hut, the director of the PLO office in Beirut. Attorney Baqradi, member of the Phalangist Political Bureau, then reaffirmed that the Phalangists were considering the idea and that they regarded it as the formula for the eighties which had to be implemented with a Lebanese will and with Arab consent. This assertion was made in an article Baqradi wrote which the newspaper, AL-'AMAL published one week ago last Monday.

This investigation assumed special significance when Mr Walid Junblat, chairman of the Central Political Council of the National Movement said when asked about his opinion on this proposal, "The subject may be investigated on the basis of the details it contains. If this investigation leads to persuade [people], so be it."

During the last 2 weeks a question emerged in the political environment about whether or not the counterpart to the Lebanese Front had a formula that could face the federal plan in case it is proposed, or whether there would be nothing else on the scene except the text of the federal plan which will be presented some time by the Lebanese Front when it will be countered by nothing but different opinions that are the result of unconsidered or uncoordinated reactions.

In the midst of this continuous investigation Mr Fu'ad al-Tahini, the secretary general of the National Struggle Front and the deputy for the al-Shuf area, was putting in the last details of a study he had completed last week. He included in that study a detailed program that advocates maintaining the spirit of the National Pact in Lebanon and developing the pact to open the doors of the Lebanese formula to political organization on the basis of eliminating [from consideration] plans for a federation and for political decentralization and adopting a new formula that is based on organizing national political action in Lebanon in the context of three parties: one representing the right; one representing the left; and the third representing the center. All existing parties and organizations are to be dissolved, and after parliamentary elections are held on the basis of the new formula, the government is to be placed in the hands of the party that wins a majority of the seats in parliament.

Al-HAWADITH interviewed Deputy al-Tahini about the aforementioned formula. The interview began with a question about his point of view on the various discussions about changing the Lebanese system to a federal system that would replace the National Pact which has been in use since 1943.

Deputy al-Tahini said, "We have recently heard numerous proposals about adopting a federation as a system of government in Lebanon. What is the constitutional significance of a federation, and does it really constitute a solution to the problem of Lebanon?"

"The federal state is a state that is made up of several states or provinces that have their own internal sovereignty. Each one of them has its own constitution, its government, its parliament and its judiciary. Similarly, the federal state too has a constitution, a government and a legislative authority. The latter state carries out the functions of foreign policy. Some countries have adopted a federal system to enable groups that are ethnically or religiously not heterogeneous to live together within the same state. Switzerland, for example, adopted the federal solution because it is made up of different peoples and sects, each one of them living in a specific geographic location. Swiss subjects who speak French and who are Catholics can be found in the area that is adjacent to the French borders. Swiss subjects who speak Italian and who are also Catholics live in the area adjacent to the Italian borders. The case is the same for the Swiss subjects who speak German and who are Protestants; they can be found in the area that is adjacent to the German borders. The United States too has adopted the federal solution

because it is a continent in itself, and a central authority cannot practice its sovereign power effectively throughout the country. [Therefore], it adopted the federal solution which ensures that the central authority will pursue the process of governing [the country] through the local authorities.

"The federal solution in some countries thus grew out of geographic, ethnic and sectarian factors. Are these factors available in Lebanon so that the aforementioned solution can be adopted?"

[Question] This is the question for which an answer is being sought in the discussions of various Lebanese groups.

[Answer] The answer to that question depends on defining the problem from which Lebanon is suffering.

In our view this problem is confined to the sectarian race to control the government. There are those who say that Lebanon must have a Christian appearance, and there are those who say that democracy would be meaningless if we do not put into use the established principle of the number of people in each sect. There are various other proposals that reflect international trends and Arab trends in particular. The sectarian complex in our country is a chronic one. When the Ottoman state approved the system of two administrative districts in 1842--a Druze administrative district located south of the Beirut Road and a Christian district north of that road--a dispute arose immediately between the two administrative districts about the jurisdictions of each. Prince Haydar Abu al-Lama', the district president of the Christians asked for jurisdiction over the Christians who lived in the Druze administrative district. The civil strife of 1844 and the major civil strife of 1860 were the result of this. The European countries took action to establish a new system of government in Lebanon. The system of two administrative districts was abolished; Lebanon was turned into a province [under the jurisdiction of a provincial governor]; its terrain was shrunk; and Beirut, al-Biqā', Sidon, Tripoli and Wādī al-Yatām were detached from it.

Referring to our history would shed light on our course to adopt the proposals that favor the application of a federation or other proposals in Lebanon. Lebanon, which is a geographically small country, where the sects mingle throughout its territories from 'Akkar to Tripoli, Beirut, al-Biqā', al-Shuf, 'Alayh and the south, should not adopt the federal solution to solve its crisis. Christians cannot be found in specific geographic areas, nor can Muhammadans. In 'Akkar and Tripoli there is a Christian minority and a Muhammadan majority; in Beirut there is a Muhammadan minority and a Christian majority; in the South there is a Christian minority and a Muhammadan majority; and the situation is the same throughout the Lebanese regions. If a federal system is adopted, the matter of one sect controlling another will be looked into, and the citizens of the same sect in the various states will call upon each other to rescue each other, just as was the case during the days of the administrative districts. By adopting a federal system we would thereby have

shifted the sectarian problem from the Lebanese scene as a whole to that of the states or the provinces which make up the federal state. That problem may then become more intense because the sectarian differences that would occur in provinces and villages would be much more violent than those that would occur in the country in general. In addition, the adoption of a federal system in Lebanon will preclude the establishment of any state for the Druzes, the orthodox and the Armenians. The Druzes can be found in areas that have a Christian majority; the Orthodox are scattered throughout Lebanon and cannot establish their own state or province; and the Armenians will vanish in the Maronite state.

[Question] You are making your judgment here on the basis of establishing sectarian states or provinces. The answer to that may state that the Orthodox and the Armenians will be affiliated with the Christian province, and the Druzes will be affiliated with the Muhammadan province. How would you respond to that?

[Answer] What are the intentions of those who are thinking of a federal system? Are they hoping to turn Lebanon into a group of independent sectarian states? If not, why would they be thinking of a federal system?

[Question] The basic reason for this is that they want to live in areas which they [themselves] rule. They believe that the establishment of those areas is necessary because they believe that the balance between them and the other sects was upset during the years that preceded the war. But this does not prevent them from saying that their independent areas would include Maronite as well as non-Maronite Christians.

[Answer] If this appraisal is correct and all Christian sects accept this logic, what would you do with the Christians of the other areas? For your information, let me say that the Christians who live outside the area of the Lebanese Front make up 62 percent of all the Christians in Lebanon. The Christians who live in the areas of the Lebanese Front make up only 38 percent of all the Christians. How then can the other areas be divided? What would be the future of the Christians who are outside the areas of the front? The experience of the two administrative districts has proven [its failure], and the impossibility of separating one area from another has also been proven. This is because the son of his excellency who lives in al-Shuf, for example, has roots in Kasrawan, and if he is subjected to harm, his relatives in Kasrawan will rush to his assistance. The opposite is true with regard to the remaining members of the sects who are scattered throughout Lebanon. As a result, this means that the atmosphere of tension and instability will continue, and the spheres of conflict will expand even within the narrow individual framework. The federal formula then does not constitute a solution to the sectarian problem.

[Question] This rationale with which you respond to the logic of the advocates of a federal system requires that you counter their formula with an alternative formula. Do you have a specific view of the formula that is required?

[Answer] A feasible solution stems from the conviction that a suitable formula would not come about unless the Lebanese people are fused into a national rather than a sectarian melting pot. In order for such a fusion to be achieved our political life must be based on rules that emanate from abolishing the parties that are based on sectarianism and enacting a new law for parties according to which only three parties would be licensed: they would represent the right, the left and the center. New legislation is also to be enacted for parliamentary elections according to which no one would be allowed to become a candidate for the Chamber of Deputies unless he is a member of one of the three parties. The Shi'ite candidate in Ba'labakk, for example, would become the representative of the rightist party to which he belongs along with the candidate of the same party for the Catholic seat in Zahlah and the Maronite seat in al-Shuf. The Shi'ite candidate, representing the leftist party in Ba'labakk would get together with the Sunni in Beirut who would ally himself with the candidates of the same left in Zahlah, a Maronite in al-Shuf and a Sunni in Beirut. The case would be the same regarding the candidates of the central party. It is through such partisan practice that the existing problem would be eliminated; the national fusion would take place; and what is called today the problem of participation in government and the jurisdictions of the three presidencies would be eliminated because the condition of the principles of making government work would be subject to the principles of the party that gets a majority of seats in parliament. Such a party would naturally have representatives of all the Lebanese sects.

[Question] Does this version [of the formula] require that all of Lebanon become one electoral district?

[Answer] The version [of the formula] that I am proposing has no bearing on the division of electoral districts. It may be put into practice even under the existing electoral division which is based as we know on sectarian principles. I am one of those who believes that present opposition to the approval of the secularization projects and abolishing political sectarianism mean that we would be entering into mazes. We know where these mazes begin, but we do not know where, when and how they will end. I believe that achieving secularization is an impossible step and that it is irrelevant for numerous reasons, among which is the fact that the Muslim clergy object to it. The Christians are brandishing it just for the sake of brandishing it and not to put it into practice. I know this well; I had discussed this matter at length with Abbot Sharbil Qassis when I met with him in the presence of the late Kamal Junblat and we discussed this matter in particular.

Some people may say that adopting a three-party system is anti-democratic because it is a system that will be imposed by legislation enacted by the state and approved by the Chamber of Deputies. A similar party system that was adopted in Britain came into existence with the will of the people and not by means of legislation imposed by the state. This may be true, but my response to that would be that if we are facing the

necessary task of rebuilding the state with all its components, the success requirements of the building operations allow us to impose the appropriate system through legislation that would be endorsed by the Chamber of Deputies according to democratic parliamentary procedures. Quite frankly and unfortunately this is the only way that would lead us to our goal of fusing all the Lebanese into the national melting pot and abolishing sectarian parties. This alone would constitute an accomplishment that would get us out of the maelstrom in which we are floundering and in whose atmosphere we are going around in circles.

[Question] It seems that adopting this formula would lead to a reconsideration of the jurisdictions of the three presidencies and of the constitutional institutions. What would be the future of the jurisdictions of the president and the jurisdictions of the prime minister under the three-party system?

[Answer] The proposed formula does not affect the jurisdictions of the president nor does it deal with his constitutional role. According to the constitution, the president is not held responsible. After the elections he only has to hand over the government to the party that wins a majority of seats in the Chamber of Deputies--whether that victorious party represents the right, the left or the center. As it is known, custom today requires the president to charge the person who is nominated by a parliamentary majority with forming the cabinet. The president's mission would be easier when he assigns that task to the person who represents the party that won a majority of parliamentary seats under the three-party system that I am proposing. The president would reserve the right under this system and in accordance with the constitution to dissolve parliament and to hold new elections if he does not approve of that candidate.

[Question] The formula that you are proposing then does not necessarily require amending the articles of the constitution.

[Answer] The constitution would remain as it is without any amendments, and the jurisdictions of the three presidencies would remain as they are defined now. The matter requires precision in correct practice; it does not require an amendment of the texts. Lebanon almost tried this method during the days of the parliamentary elections that took place in the wake of the competition between the Constitutional Party and the National Bloc: the rosters of these two parties included representative of all sects. One felt that the son of al-Khazin in Kasrawan was allied with the son of Junblat in al-Shuf and that the son of al-Husayni in Jubayl was allied with the Maronite candidate of the National Bloc in Beirut. This means that there was a partisan mix that was founded on partisan, national bases and not on closed, sectarian bases. If this experience is universalized throughout Lebanon, as I am proposing, I believe that it will be best if it is applied according to a well-considered partisan system that is remote from sectarian considerations.

[Question] The advocates of a federal system have assumptions that differ from yours. They want to protect their areas from the demographic imbalance that is sweeping other areas. They want to preserve their presence and their privileges in front of the expansion that is advancing towards them from these areas. Therefore, the three-party system in their opinion is not an alternative formula to the federal system.

[Answer] If this is their view, then allow me to say that by holding such a view, they are abandoning more than 60 percent of the Christians who can be found outside the areas which they now control. In addition, this is not the ideal solution that would preserve for them the areas which they control. In the long run they cannot remain secluded in those areas.

[Question] I recall that one of the parties of the Lebanese Front had presented a plan in the past that called for giving the Lebanese citizens, after Lebanon is turned into two provinces, the right to select residence in one of the two provinces within one year of approving the plan of their establishment. The discussion about cultural pluralism and federation may authorize such a choice.

[Answer] It is impossible even to think about such a formula because the areas of Kasrawan, Jubayl and North al-Matn are overcrowded and labor is unavailable. In addition, it is not easy for any citizen who resides outside the area where the Lebanese Front exercises its influence to give up his property and to sell his homes so he can join the area of the front. It is impossible to "ship" citizens [like cargo] according to their sectarian affiliations from one area to another by means of a political party decision. I have noticed recently that Mr Bashir al-Jumayyil has been saying in all his speeches that he is striving for a single Lebanon. This logic contradicts the adoption of a federal division which some are advocating. I believe that the story of proposing a federation as a new formula was a kind of speculative exercise on the part of some speculators. If some politicians have adopted this idea, that was not the result of studying [the matter], but rather the result of a desire on their part to adhere to any slogan that would enable them to have the appearance in front of public opinion of looking for a formula that would deliver Lebanon [from its crisis]. It is an in-depth study that would assure any politician that a federal system is not the system that would be suitable for Lebanon.

[Question] In his interview with Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil said that everyone had agreed with the state on the indisputable factors of the conciliation, but that they had disagreed afterwards about the details. How can the state remove this obstacle?

[Answer] The problem does not lie here. The basic reason lies in the fact that the debater in the western region did not try to go into details, thinking that there was no unity over a specific formula. I am here giving al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil credit for what he is saying.

Unfortunately, the western region is suffering from a multitude of debaters and from not being able to agree about charging one debater with [the task of] confronting the other party with a unified formula.

[Question] Can your plan constitute the nucleus for the unified formula that would represent the opinion to counter the federal formula?

[Answer] I do not represent anyone. I am rather presenting my own personal point of view. But this should not preclude [the effort] to look into the possibility of adopting what I am proposing as the nucleus of what may be the basis for dialogue with the other party. All that I can say about this plan is that it represents the correct way out--even if it is undemocratic--under the exceptional circumstances we are experiencing to rebuild Lebanon. We must adopt this solution, even for a certain period of time; it would be an introduction to the national fusion of the various Lebanese sects.

[Question] Your plan appears to be an attempt to develop and not to abolish the National Pact that was adopted in 1943.

[Answer] This is a fact. My plan is an evolutionary step for the 1943 Pact. This solution may be adopted with the presence of the existing sectarian political system.

[Question] Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam has again proposed a formula for a presidential government that consists of a presidential council [whose members] would represent all the sects. What is the difference between his proposal and yours?

[Answer] It seems to me that proposing such formulas under the present circumstances is useless because the Maronites will never give up the presidency when they have fought for all these years to preserve that privilege. Altering the sectarian formula--and I am opposed to that formula--under the present circumstances will lead to the fragmentation of Lebanon. You heard that al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil objects to the possibility of amending any article of the constitution, and it is known that the constitution does not in fact contain a text that practically serves or ensures the safety of those who insist on its stipulations. The war has proven that.

[Question] It has been said that Mr Walid Junblat has expressed opinions in which, it was said, he supported investigating the plan for a federal formula. Would you comment on that?

[Answer] Mr Walid Junblat has not taken a final position on the subject of a federation. He did say, however, that the proposal of this idea may be investigated and scrutinized when its detailed text is presented. This does not mean that he approved or rejected the idea. Some agencies of the media that were quick to state that Mr Walid Junblat had adopted the federal formula made a mistake. The fact of the matter is that every

formula may be investigated, but it may not be adopted unless the investigation establishes the feasibility of putting it to use. Let me repeat here that I believe that the federal formula does not represent the suitable objective solution to the Lebanese problem.

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LEBANON

VARIOUS DOMESTIC FORCES DISCUSS CONCEPT OF FUTURE

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[Article by Ghassan Bayram: "The Lebanese Differed over the Past: Will They Agree over the Future?"]

[Text] A day after the message President Ilyas Sarkis delivered on the anniversary of independence, specific official bodies got moving to carry out a series of contacts in which they stressed that the president in his message, did not specifically intend to say that the regime had moved on to the stage of seeking a new system for coexistence among Lebanese, now that it had finally accepted the impossibility of reviving the formula for coexistence which lasted from 1943 to the blowup of events in Lebanon in early 1975.

These official bodies were anxious to deny on President Sarkis' behalf that he had embraced the notion of the federal formula in Lebanon and had made preliminary attempts to mix views together and feel people's pulses about them. They said that the paragraph contained in the president's message in which he pointed out that it was necessary to observe certain variables which the painful events had underlined did not mean recognition that the 1943 formula had collapsed and a move to seek a new formula which would preserve Lebanon's unity in the context of its present borders, but rather that the president had intended to create imposition of an alternative in the style of interaction, not to create an alternative in the system.

Perhaps more than one cause is prompting the government at the present time not to want to seem as if it were leading a dialogue or search for the new format for a system in Lebanon before becoming confident that there is international agreement over the creation of such an alternative, and consequently that there is a minimum of Arab agreement to that.

However, none of this can cancel out evidence which has begun to indicate that the subject of a federal system in Lebanon has been laid out on the table of discussion, one way or another - regardless of whether the subject was basically laid out as a trail balloon or as a consequence of an act of faith in it.

What there is no doubt about is that talking about the presence of a tendency toward federalism has started graduating from Phalange Party sources. It would have been possible to let this statement slip by because presenting semantic titles for systems alternate to the Lebanese system which has collapsed is not a new idea - it has been going on since the events started. However, what caused people's eyes to open and

has stirred attention to the fact that the matter was serious this time was the statement issued by Mr Walid Jumblatt, in which he declared "There is no opposition to the federal formula but we will have to know what that federalism is." Thus the issue started to grow like a snowball in the consciousness of various circles until it began to be plainly obvious that the federal format, in this stage, expresses a Christian demand of which the Lebanese Phalange Party has come to appear to be the most prominent proponent.

The Lebanese newspaper AL-'AMAL, which is the organ of the Phalange Party, published a long article on this subject by Karim Baqraduni, member of the party's political bureau, in which he said "In the forties the Phalange chose Lebanon the nation, that is, the national charter, leaving the responsibility for building the state, that is, the system, up to others. It took part in the process of building the state only belatedly and in partial and sporadic form in the sixties. Just as the Phalange chose Lebanon the nation in the forties, in the eighties it became oriented toward the choice of Lebanon the nation-state; but it did not agree to return to the state of the forties which political experience and military war had caused to fail -- rather, it oriented toward choosing the form of the state, which is the unity of Lebanon the nation with a federal system of government, because this system means the establishment of a new state containing a distinctive presence for Christians and free coexistence for all Lebanese."

In concluding his article, Baqraduni said that this expected Phalange option of the eighties would depend on international agreement over the unity and Arab agreement over federal system.

His article by Karim Baqraduni was put in a pamphlet and translated into a number of languages, along with two speeches which Amin and Bashir al-Jumayyil had given, so that the pamphlet could be distributed to various foreign and Arab embassies in Lebanon, inasmuch as its contents expressed a final stand on the party's part.

The Sunnite Islamic faction in Lebanon would become more conspicuously harmed in general than any Lebanese group by any imposition of an alternative to the 1943 format which lasted until the blowup of the events.

Thus the political leaders in the Sunnite faction - despite their differences, be they traditional ones or new ones underscored by the events - seem to be adhering to a return to the format of the 1943 formula. That formula was born out of a Maronite-Sunnite understanding, even though some extremists demanded that that format be developed in a manner consolidating participation in governance, but not result in departure from the essence of the formula, which must keep the structure of the regime, participation between the Maronites and the Sunnites, followed by the remaining factions in varying percentages in terms of participation in government.

It has come to be observed and understood by all that the Sunnite Moslem leaders are earnestly striving for a Lebanese dialogue in accordance with the 1943 format, but these attempts, visible and hidden, have not yet met with a response from the Christian party, as represented by the Maronites of the Lebanese Front, which still insists on saying that negotiators among the Sunnite Moslems are lacking and that any dialogue with this Lebanese Moslem group must be preceded by an Islamic resolution which calls for the rejection and elimination of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon.

While the Maronites, at the present time, consider that the federal format is the appropriate solution to keep the distinctive Christian presence in Lebanon, and while the Sunnite Moslems consider that any alternative format to that of 1943 is unsuitable for them and perhaps could lead to a reduction in their political role, or the thwarting of this role, the Shiite Moslems, who have become the most numerous Lebanese faction, not only reject a return to the 1943 format as it was - they also reject any federal format. Thus they are not on the Sunnites' side in reviving the 1943 format or on the Maronites' side in choosing the federal format.

For further details it is necessary to summarize the atmosphere dominating the Shiite faction in general.

First, the Shiites, as the greatest Lebanese faction in terms of numbers, refuse to accept the size granted them in the 1943 formula, that is, that of a second or third class participant. Rather, they consider that their size, politically, economically and in human terms, has grown to the point where they have far outstripped the size previously granted them. They also consider that the hands of the clock cannot be turned back and that it is illogical for this size to be reduced and stultified again. Therefore they refuse to go back to the 1943 formula as it was, because, as far as they are concerned, it is like a garment which is no longer big enough to fit them.

Second, the Shiites are also against the federal formula because this formula would constitute a danger to the unity of their existence and their role would be subject to outside factors and considerations which are not in keeping with their natural growth in this formula, since federalism could not keep them united or give them a role appropriate to their size; in fact, it might give them a role similar to that any small faction might adopt.

Therefore the Shiite solution is aimed at endorsing a secular democratic system:

The Shiites, like the Sunnites, consider that there is a sort of contradiction with the Islamic religion in secularism. The Shiites' religious leader in Lebanon, Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams-al-Din, the undersecretary of the Higher Shiite Islamic Council, condemned secularism in a recent letter he issued, in which he enumerated the aspects of the contradiction between secularism and the Islamic religion.

However, through some of its prominent leaders, headed by His Eminence Shaykh Shams-al-Din, the Shiite faction has started to give birth to convictions which lead them to prefer to choose the democratic secular system as a solution to the Lebanese problem, proceeding from a comparison between the formulas which will give the Shiite faction its rights in keeping with its size and other formulas which will reduce this size and role. Specific effective Shiite bodies are now engaged in putting out a study on the secular democratic system in order to arrive at a definition of this alternative as a solution to the Lebanese problem and as a format which can rule all Lebanese factions and creeds in a single crucible.

These Shiite leaders believe that raising secularism as a system will have the effect of gaining them the support of the leftist parties which are basically calling for such a system and that thereby they might reach agreement with the Christians, who, through their leaders, have previously said that they recommend secularism -- if these Christian leaders are serious in their appeal.

Just as the federal plan has underlined these sorts of new tendencies, it has a consequence opened the door for other political groups to set forth studies, some of which try to contest the federal formula and show its bad points with respect to Lebanon, and some of which try the opposite.

The most conspicuous of the studies which have been presented for discussion is one set out by the deputy Fu'ad al-Thaini, member of the National Struggle Front headed by Mr Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Socialist Progressive Party and head of the Lebanese National Movement.

Deputy al-Tahini, who is a lawyer and jurist, stipulates that federalism cannot constitute a solution to the factional problem in Lebanon or that of Lebanon as a nation and state.

In his study, Deputy al-Tahini relies on this historic background Lebanon has gone through, including the formula of the two administrative districts authorized in 1842 which split Lebanon into a Druze district lying south of the Beirut-Damascus road and Maronite district lying north of this road, the way in which the factional dispute gained ground after that and led to the factional strife of 1844 and then to the great 1860 strife, and the way in which that led to the big powers' movement and intervention to authorize a new system of government in Lebanon, eliminating the system of the two administrative districts, reducing the size of Lebanon and turning it into a province after the areas of Beirut, Sayda, al-Biqa', Tripoli and Wadi al-Tim had been severed from it.

Deputy al-Tahini also in this study of his conducted a comparison of the Lebanese structure and the structure of other countries which at the present time are based on a federal or confederate system, showing aspects of difference, since the intermingling of the population in Lebanon and the common Christians and Moslem residential areas make it difficult to approve the federal system since factional struggles would stand out more powerfully and would shift from a general Lebanese context to the context of areas, villages and hamlets.

Dputy al-Tahini concludes by saying that the only solution to the Lebanese problem lies in the fusion of the Lebanese into one Lebanese crucible and that that will be achieved only by establishing political life on new bases proceeding from the abrogation of the existing parties, most of which are factional, the codification of new legislation for parties by virtue of which permits will be granted only to three parties representing the right, the left and the center, and the codification of legislation for a parliamentary elections law according to which permission to run as candidates will be given only to party members. Through this party practice, the problem of factionalism will gradually be eliminated and substituted by a national fusion.

This contradiction and difference which has started to appear over the formula for the Lebanon of the future, with the beginning of the presentation of the federal formula as an alternative to the 1943 formula, raises the following question, now that the Lebanese have failed to reach an understanding on reviving the system under which they lived for 36 years, because of foreign factors and influence or because of a weakness within it: will they also fail to reach understanding on an alternative formula? And, if they do fail in this subsequent stage, what will the result be?

11887

CSO: 4802

LATEST INCIDENTS IN ZAHLAH REVIEWED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 29 Dec 80 - 4 Jan 81 pp 6, 7

[Article: "The Events of Zahlah - Start of a Scheme or a 'War of Positions?'"]

[Text] It was not easy for observers in Beirut to determine the real reasons behind the events of Zahlah. The skirmishes which took place in the Bride of the al-Biq'a' at the start of the week between the Syrian forces operating in the "deterrence" [forces] and the "Lebanese forces" were not just clashes resulting from an individual dispute or clashes like those going on every day in the commercial markets of Beirut. This is because the town of Zahlah reflects a unique state of affairs. It is an area inhabited by an overwhelming majority of Christians and surrounded by villages and towns most of whose inhabitants belong to Islamic factions. It was distinguished by a special role during the 2 years' war and it was the first town the Syrians entered in the context of the "initiative."

In Zahlah, up to today, the Lebanese Front Party exercises an influential role and its presence has not been affected as in other Lebanese areas remote from Mount Lebanon such as the south, the north and the far Biqa'.

Perhaps more important than all this is the fact that Zahlah is considered a cross-roads for persons coming into the Biqa' or leaving it and has strategic importance as it is connected to numerous areas in Mount Lebanon.

Thus the degree of fear among officials and politicians alike increased as a consequence of the outbreak of clashes which isolated the town for 4 consecutive days because of the blockade erected around it and the shelling it faced from various directions.

Contacts between Beirut and Damascus were speeded up in order to arrive at a peaceful rapid resolution to the fighting, and contacts were made with a number of countries with effective influence in such matters.

While the efforts yielded positive results and it was possible to have Zahlah avoid a real catastrophe, nothing now indicates that the town is venturing on a real peace, and its inhabitants fear that the cessation of fighting last Wednesday is a temporary truce awaiting a new time for a blowup.

A Return to the Scheme

The people of Zahlah raise the town's fears in the course of talk about the armed forces surrounding the town. There are the Palestinians and their allies from the

"Arab Lebanese army" and the parties of the "National Movement" who have been spread out among areas overlooking or leading into Zahlah. There is nothing to indicate that they have accepted the cease fire or are prepared to yield to the continued political or military Phalange presence in the Zahlah area.

Official circles consider that the reasons which the parties concerned have raised in the course of their talk about the outbreak of fighting in Zahlah were inadequate. This has prompted these circles to talk about the existence of some scheme aimed at causing the security situation in the country to explode, starting in the al-Biqā' and proceeding from there to the north, on grounds that a blowup of the situation in Beirut appears difficult at the present time for numerous reasons, most prominent of which is the presence of the "deterrence" and other effective parties.

Concerning the events of Zahlah, Syrian sources said that these were the outcome of provocations to which the deterrent forces were exposed and to which they were forced to respond in kind in order to preserve their morale. Regarding the Zahlah activities, Col Muhammad Ghanim, head of the Intelligence Agency of the Syrian forces, stressed that the Syrians have not intended to enter Zahlah or concentrate in the heart of its sections but that they are satisfied with a presence along its main outlets and are leaving the matter of preserving the security to the Lebanese agencies.

Phalange sources talk about a Syrian desire to enter Zahlah and take it over by perpetrating a second "Ashrafiyah" or a corresponding Damur.

The same sources say that the Syrians have facilitated the arrival of partisans of Ilyas al-Hanush (known as al-Hanash), the person formerly in charge of the Liberals' forces in 'Ayn al-Rummanah, in the town and have "used them in cooperation with the Palestinians and the National Movement in order to inflame the situation and try to strike out at the Phalange in an area which is no longer propitious for Phalange military movement for numerous reasons, most prominently its remoteness from areas of Phalange influence in the eastern sections."

In the course of their discussion, these same sources testify that because of their dense deployment and effectiveness in the al-Biqā' the "Syrian forces" could have put a limit to al-Hanash's activities from the outset, but refrained from doing so to humiliate the people of Zahlah and take over their town after its destruction.

In the Zahlah events, the "National Movement" sees a continuation of the struggle between the Phalange Party and the Liberals which began in the southern suburb then spread to Kasrawan and Jubayl and ended in the southern suburb. The parties in this movement support the role of the "deterrence" without reservation and in it see a natural continuation of its role in the whole territory of Lebanon.

Linking the al-Biqā' to the Borders

However, there is another analysis of the causes of the Zahlah events, and that is the one the political circles have cited. In the opinion of these bodies, what happened recently in Zahlah cannot be separated from the situation in the south, in light of the recent Israeli escalation and the repeated operations in which Israel has passed beyond the "red line" and bombed positions in which the "deterrent" forces are concentrated.

In this context, the same sources state that a party personality notified Syrian and Palestinian officials about the existence of a plan which it claimed the Phalange Party had carried out, calling for the creation of contacts between "free Lebanon" and the Christian areas in Jazin and al-Biqā' (of which Zahlah is a part), as a prelude to the imposition of a new state of affairs which could lead to a review of the entire geographic structure.

This personality also states that Israel will help Maj Haddad's forces launch successive attacks on the al-'Ishiyah, al-Rihan and al-Jarmaq areas in the Jazin District in order to eliminate the Palestinian presence there and establish a natural line of communication between the border villages and these locations preparatory to expanding the scope to make it broader.

The same information holds that the resistance and the "national movement" moved in a contrary direction in order to prevent the implementation of this scheme (for which confirmation is not available) and strove to divert the "Lebanese forces" in a new battle in a particular place, which was meant to be Zahlah, thus achieving two objectives, first, inflaming an area of strategic importance, as we mentioned above, and second, prompting the "Lebanese forces" to devote attention to that and turn their attention away from other steps.

Although there is nothing to confirm information on that scheme either, political sources consider that a settlement of accounts lies behind the Zahlah events, not necessarily just among Lebanese parties. There are people who describe them as analogous to the recent Tripoli events, since the security responsibility cast on the shoulders of the "deterrence" in the al-Biqā' make it difficult for Syrian forces to accept any aggravation of the security tension in an area to which they are sensitive for numerous considerations, most importantly the fact that it is the transportation road for the Syrian forces operating in Lebanon and affirms the peaceful Syrian role in Lebanon, since the al-Biqā' in general, and Zahlah in particular, have enjoyed good security since the entry of the "deterrence" after a few months of fighting.

Herein lies the Syrian leaders' desire to deal deliberately with the Zahlah events while preserving basic principles, most important of which is the failure to subject members of the armed forces or their equipment to exposure, proceeding from the premise that it is necessary to retain a reverence for the military.

In the context of Zahlah, the recent events have created a bloc within the ranks of the people and a solidarity which it has not always been possible to obtain. The people of Zahlah have felt a danger threatening to destroy their town, have ignored their previous disputes and have closed ranks to face this danger. In spite of the disturbed atmosphere which the rocket bombardment of the town has underlined, they have managed to adapt to the new atmosphere and respond to the efforts exerted through them to stop the deterioration.

Security sources say that if the Zahlah battle takes place, it will not be a short one. Rather, it will go on for weeks, since there are more than 5,000 young people under arms in the town who are trained in the best types of weapons and retain a large portion of them, not to mention the geography of Zahlah, which reflects a state of affairs which it is difficult to ignore in the field calculations of profit and loss.

Proceeding from this reality, the regime sought to deal swiftly with the events in Zahlah after it sensed a readiness of the part of the Syrians and the Phalange alike not to enter enter into a struggle which could bring suffering upon the town and its inhabitants and would not produce quick decisive results. Above and beyond that, the government has wanted to avoid the occurrence of a second Ashrafiyah or another Damur, proceeding from its conviction that it is necessary that the country avoid new security shocks, since the daily ones are enough for it.

Whatever the interpretations might be, the situation in Zahlah still causes officials anxiety, since they see a weak spot in the political and security situation alike there which could be exploited in a negative sense at any moment to obtain specific gains or authorize fraudulent acts in order to attain desired positions. Thus the regime is striving for a serious remedy to the Zahlah situation lest its "turbulence" lead to broad consequences which will not benefit its efforts. In addition, the Phalange Party is for its part trying to move in various directions, locally and internationally, to put pressure to freeze the situation as regards Zahlah in hopes that it will be assured of elements and resources for a confrontation.

Who will win as a consequence - wisdom or rashness?

11887

CSO: 4802

NATIONAL FUND FOR SOUTH LEBANON ESTABLISHED

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 15 Dec 80 p 16

[Article: "Junblat Announces Establishment of the National Fund to Support Resistance in South Lebanon; Libya Contributes \$10 Million"]

[Text] Under the slogan, "For the support of resistance of the South and southerners," Walid Junblat, chairman of the central political council of the National Movement, announced the formation of "the National Fund to support the resistance of South Lebanon."

This announcement was made in a press conference which Junblat held at the headquarters of the executive committee of the central political council. He read a political statement which included the objective of establishing the fund and its goals, in addition to organizations to oversee the work, from the supreme commission to the executive body and responsible officials of districts in the south.

In the political statement, Junblat emphasized, among other things, that the National Movement's initiative to create the fund does not relieve the Lebanese government of its responsibilities, and that any plan to support the south's resistance will still fall short of fulfilling all the resistance's requirements. Junblatt declared that all the money available in the fund, or which is subsequently received, will be earmarked for the south.

Junblat then announced the names of the supervisory organizations' members. They include politicians, economists, trade unionists, cultural and religious personalities and activists in the south. He also disclosed that the fund received its first assistance of \$10 million from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyyah.

At the conclusion of the conference, AL-SIYASAH met with Dr Kamel Minha, responsible for determining the authorities [to serve] on the fund. I put a question to him about the fund's missions and how it will work. He replied: "It was a pressing and necessary step in light of what the south is being subjected to by Israel and its agent, Sa'd Haddad, and the paralysis which exists due to the absence of government. It is natural for the National Movement to take the initiative to create the fund in order to achieve possibilities of assistance with respect to the daily burdens, which the southerners confront, as a result of Zionist attacks, and in order to develop means of resistance against expansionist Israeli ambitions. Therefore, we consider that the South's battle is the Arab nations' battle against the plot, and consequently, it is the duty of organizations to participate not only on the material level, but also morally and politically, in order to bolster the southerners' resistance."

"I think that attention to the emigrants is a primary consideration, as well as attention to the peoples of the south inside the occupied territory, and to aid them in remaining on their land, as an obstacle to Israeli expansion into Lebanese territory."

Behind the Fund's Creation

It is well-known that the idea of creating the national fund was broached several months ago inside the National Movement organizations. The basic purpose was to increase the confidence of Arab and Lebanese parties that the money, which would be given to support the south's resistance, would be under the supervision of a responsible organization, composed of National Movement executive leaders and national personalities active in the south.

On the other hand, the fund's creation comes as a reaction to the Lebanese authorities' negligence toward increasingly dangerous living and security conditions in the south, and the inability of the "Council of the South," which is an official organization formed several years ago, to effectively assume its responsibilities in this arena, after it was turned into a fertile area for a great number of southern political movements.

7005

CSO: 4802

RETIREMENT REGULATIONS REVIEWED

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 27 Dec 80 p 6

[Article: Draft Bill to Amend End-of-Service Age System; Equality of Women with Men in Benefits"]

[Text] The board of the National Fund for Social Security has decided to review the draft law pertaining to amending the rules of the end-of-service system, especially with respect to raising the age at which being subject to the system is completed, from 60 to 64. This decision occurred as a result of discussions which the board of directors had at their recent session, where representatives of the General Workers Federation demanded the use of age 65 as a maximum for paying indemnity, in keeping with the federation's constant demand.

The draft bill proposes raising the retirement age from 60 to 64, so that the insured would receive supplementary indemnity equal to a half month for each year following the first 20 years.

Therefore, indemnity could be paid at the maximum of its value of 20 months for the first 20 years, and equivalent to a month and a half for each following year, up to attaining the age of 64.

Liquidation of indemnity will be valid with completion of the 64th year. The draft also proposed equality between women and men with respect to conditions of benefiting from indemnity upon attaining a standard age. The current law allows a woman to benefit from indemnity at 55, and a man at 60.

The following is the text of the draft law:

Article I. Subsection e of paragraph (1) of article 50 of the social security law is amended as follows:

Article 50:

e. The insured, whether male or female, shall have attained 60 years of age, and to the limit of his attaining 64 years of age.

Article II. Subsection b of paragraph (1) of article 51 of the social security law shall be amended as follows:

b. The insured, having attained 60 years of age, and to the limit of attaining 64, shall be entitled to receive supplementary indemnity equal to half a month for each of the service years following the first 20 years. Such supplementary indemnity shall be due only over the period during which contributions shall have been due by the employer to the Fund.

Article III. 1. Paragraph (3) of article 54 of the social security law is amended as follows:

3. a. In those cases specified in subsections a, b, and d of paragraph (1), and in paragraph (2) of article 50, indemnity shall be liquidated in accordance with a written request submitted by the insured, or his rightful claimant, to the director general of the fund.

b. Liquidation of indemnity shall be valid when the full 64 years of age is attained. Value of the indemnity shall only be paid in accordance with a written request from the insured or his rightful claimant.

c. A loan paid by virtue of paragraph (1) of this article shall be deducted from the account of the liquidated indemnity. The insured, or his rightful claimant, shall only be paid the remaining balance of his account, as prescribed by the rules of article 64, paragraph (2), subsection d.

d. A three-month time limit, from the date of liquidation request, or the attainment of legal age, shall be set to liquidate the indemnity.

e. The rules of subsection a, c and d of this paragraph are applicable to liquidation of indemnity in the cases noted in article 52.

2. Paragraph (5) of article 54 of the social security law is hereby abrogated.

Article IV. Paragraph (1) of article 73 of the social security law is amended as follows:

1.a. While maintaining the rules of article 9 pertaining to compulsory subjection of categories other than workmen since the first age, contributions for labor accident and occupational disease insurance, family allowances system, and the end-of-service indemnity system, are all the employer's responsibility.

b. When the worker suffers a reduction in wages during his employment, by the employer himself, the employer's contribution is calculated on the basis of the last highest wages which he received before the reduction.

c. The insured loses his entitlement in relation to the branch of end-of-service indemnity, and his obligation to make contributions to that branch ceases, when his end-of-service indemnity is liquidated after he legally attains the age of 60 or at his request.

d. The insured loses his entitlement to benefit from supplementary indemnity, if his end-of-service indemnity is collected before he reaches 60, and he continues to work or returns to it. The employer's obligation to pay contributions to the end-of-service indemnity fund remains in force until liquidation of the insured's indemnity, after he attains 60 years of age or at his request.

Article V. All provisions contrary to this law's regulations are hereby revoked.

Article VI. The law is effective immediately after publication in the official gazette.

7005

CSO: 4802

ISRAEL'S SEIZURE OF AL-WAZZANI SPRINGHEAD DISCUSSED

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 25 Nov 80 p 13

[Interview with Deputy 'Ali al-'Abdallah: "'Ali al-'Abdallah to AL-WATAN: Enemy Has Occupied al-Wazzani and Has His Other Eye on al-Litani; Defense Trenches That Were Built Have Turned Into Fish Ponds and Diversion of Jordan River Tributaries Did Not Survive More Than Few Days"]

[Text] Beirut--AL-QUDS PRESS--Arab wealth, especially Arab water resources, have formed the focal point of the Zionist entity's dreams and the basis for his expansionist settlement schemes. This is said not only based on the Zionist plan itself, which has seized on paper [sic] the occupied Palestinian territories and the adjacent Arab territories with all their natural resources, but also because of the impossibility of survival in the Arab territories of a settlement entity which possesses no elements of survival other than its Zionist claims, even though it possesses all the weapons of usurpation, expansion, settlement and aggression. The history of this entity since 1948 underlines its aggressive nature which has constituted and continues to constitute the only outlet for the entity from its intrinsic dilemma which was born with the birth of this entity and which has continued to deteriorate to the present.

The occupation authorities have plundered the water resources in the West Bank and have seized all the projects which the Arab people built by the sweat of their sons' brows. These authorities have recently started carrying out an enormous water project that provides for digging a canal between the Mediterranean Sea and the Dead Sea. They have also been trying to reach for the Nile River water through the bilateral treaty with the Egyptian regime. Moreover, these authorities sought in the past and continue to seek at present to carry out their reserve plans to seize the Arab water resources on the eastern front, the Golan area and southern Lebanon.

Since he seized the Syrian Golan area, the enemy has been implementing these plans which were completed in the March 1978 aggression against southern Lebanon when this enemy started to seize and annex the two areas [sic], focusing on the border areas--the heights which contain an enormous water reserve in the tributaries and upper sources of the Jordan River in Syria and Lebanon. In addition to the bill being discussed in the Zionist Knesset to annex the Syrian Golan area and to apply Zionist laws to it, the enemy more

than a year ago began preparations for seizing the border area of southern Lebanon, thus realizing gradual expansion in this area, which culminated recently with the enemy's seizure of al-Wazzani area that contains the most important tributaries of the Jordan River (al-Wazzani springhead).

To clarify the significance of al-Wazzani with details and figures, AL-WATAN has interviewed 'Ali al-'Abdallah, a member of the Lebanese parliament, who initiated the project which went into implementation on al-Wazzani springhead in 1962 and then came to a halt 4 years later as a result of Zionist attacks because the Zionist entity was preparing to seize the springhead from that time. Following is the text of the interview:

[Question] In the middle of last October, the Zionist enemy annexed the al-Maysat-al-Wazzani area. Could you describe this area and appraise its water significance?

[Answer] First and foremost, I would like to remind you that most of al-Wazzani-al-Maysat area is my private property. It is a big area containing more than 3,000 dunums of cultivable lands. Lebanese farmers have worked in this area since the early 1960's. These farmers increased in number after implementation of the al-Wazzani project and al-Maysat turned into an agricultural town. This is what motivated the state to set up a municipality there, and this municipality continued to carry out its regular functions until matters developed against the area's interest.

Most Important Tributaries of Jordan River

As for al-Wazzani springhead, it is one of the most important tributaries of the Jordan River, the same as al-Laddan and Baniyas tributaries in Syria. In addition to containing an enormous water reserve that allows it to run at the same level throughout the year and to produce the same quantity of water both summer and winter, al-Wazzani is the main springhead that supplies the Jordan River with water during the summer because al-Hasbani River dries up in this season. This springhead is in a high valley separating the Lebanese-Syrian borders and is located at a distance of less than 5 kilometers from the Palestinian border.

Public Property

[Question] Can we consider the springhead your private property, considering that you own the lands adjacent to it?

[Answer] Of course not. The springhead and its course form a Lebanese river which is public property and which falls within the responsibilities of the state of Lebanon. Regrettably, this important springhead went unexploited for long years and the state did not give it adequate attention. Because of my ownership of vast areas of land around it, I had to take the initiative and many people, including the engineers who supervised the project, encouraged me to do so. By the way, the lands of al-Maysat-al-Wazzani, in addition to being large in area, are fertile, rich and suitable for the successful cultivation of all kinds of crops.

[Question] When did you start implementation?

[Answer] I was not able to begin implementing the project before the start of 1962. Engineer Salim Lahhud, an ex-minister of foreign affairs, supervised the project. Work on the project continued for 6 months before it was ready for operation. Though the project was carried out by a private initiative, we received no encouragement or assistance from the state, even though the state could have--and we would have supported it--exploited the project to supply the entire area with the irrigation water it needs. In such a case, we would definitely have benefited. But the state's failure to protect the border area, including al-Wazzani area, contributed to a large degree to bringing the project to a halt 2 years after it was carried out, i.e., in 1964.

Fishing in Defense Lines

[Question] We would like you to go into the details of this point.

[Answer] This is a long-standing issue for us and it has continued to be our main problem to the present, now that the enemy has been able to seize everything. As for the details that you want, the most important are: In 1964, the Arab summit conference held in Alexandria took up the task of looking into the implementation of the project to divert the tributaries of the Jordan River. Work in the diversion project started in an area south of the Lebanese town of al-Mariyah on al-Hasbani River--an area located nearly 6 kilometers north of al-Maysat-al-Wazzani. On the other hand, Lt Gen 'Ali 'Ali 'Amir, then commander of the Unified Arab Command, visited the area to take charge of matters pertaining to bolstering the defenses of the conversion project as decided by the Arab Defense Council. It was decided to set up two defense lines, the first south of Marj'uyun plan, at a distance of a few kilometers from the Zionist settlement of Matullah and the second in al-Maysat-al-Wazzani area. The excavation works in these two trenches [defense lines] were carried out and the Lebanese army was to take responsibility for defending them militarily. Only a few months had passed when work in the diversion project came to a halt after Zionist aircraft bombed the workers and the installations they had built. The project then turned into ruins. What is really sad and painful is that the project was shelved finally and that the defense preparations were no more than a diversion. This is regrettable. What is more, during the winter a few months later the defense trenches I have mentioned to you turned into ponds in which fish multiplied. This was the only benefit reaped by the area's residents who turned into fishermen, fishing in the defense lines against the enemy.

Need for Joint Coordination

[Question] Now that the enemy has seized al-Wazzani, why isn't this issue brought up, as it should be, in the Chamber of Deputies, state institutions, the Arab League and the United Nations?

[Answer] Since the Zionist aggression of 1978, it has no longer been possible to fragment the problem of the south. The enemy is planning to expand in the entire area of the south. Though he has annexed al-Wazzani area recently,

his other eye is on al-Litani River. This fact underlines the need for national and Arab confrontation against the Zionist scheme in the south as a whole. This does not nullify the responsibility of the Lebanese state but rather underlines this responsibility and makes it more urgent. But as we all know, the issue has gone beyond its narrow limits and has become fatefully tied to the issue of the Arab-Zionist conflict. This is why it is important and necessary to have joint Lebanese-Arab coordination to counter the Zionist enemy's aggressions and expansionist schemes.

B494

CSO: 4802

OIL COSTS ANALYZED, REPAIR OF REFINING UNITS NECESSARY

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 22 Dec 80 p 7

[Article: "\$562 Million Oil Bill for 1980"]

[Text] Oil statistics, submitted to the world reserve organization, indicated that the costs of fuel for the Lebanese consumer market amounted to \$562 million in 1980. This amount was divided between \$287 million for 11 million barrels of crude oil for the refinery in Tripoli, \$155 million worth of crude oil for the MEDRECO refinery, and \$120 million for approximately 300,000 tons of benzine.

Oil prices, between 1979 and 1980, increased on the average of \$1.4 for each \$1. Therefore, the cost of a barrel purchased for the Tripoli refinery rose from \$18.59 to \$26.026, and for the MEDRECO refinery from \$18.49 to \$25.88.

It is expected that the cost of a barrel of crude oil will rise on an average of \$2 over the amounts imported in the last quarter of the year, i.e., to the same extent that Saudi Arabia raised the price. Therefore, Lebanon's costs will be approximately \$570 million.

There is still the question of importing benzine, which will cost the Independent Fuel Fund \$120 million or less this year, depending on the price of imported benzine. In this regard, those knowledgeable about the oil situation ask why don't the two refineries operating in Lebanon produce the market's total benzine needs? During the October 1973 war, the quantities of benzine produced daily in the Tripoli refinery was about 1,800,000 tons. This was to aid Syria after its refineries were damaged. Today, the northern refinery produces nearly 1,100,000 tons daily. This amount is under its capacity by some 700,000 tons. The reason for this is a breakdown in the refining units. Oil experts believe that repairing these defects would raise benzine production in the Tripoli refinery from 18 to 33 percent of the total quantities produced.

Domestic production would then be able to match consumption and possibly result in exports.

This is the appendix of the report submitted to the Council of World Reserves:

Oil Imports

1. 1980

Tripoli refinery

11 million barrels \times 18.59 \times 1.4 = \$287 million

Crude oil for Zahrani refinery

6 million barrels \times 18.49 \times 1.4 = \$155 million

For the purchase of 300,000 tons of oil

derivatives, at an average of \$400 per ton = \$120 million

Total \$562 million

2. In the fourth quarter of 1979, Lebanon required the following amounts:

2.75 million barrels of crude oil for the Tripoli refinery

2,750,000 million barrels \times 18.59 = \$51,700,000

1.5 million barrels of crude oil for the Zahrani refinery

1,500,000 \times 18.40 = \$27,600,000

Total \$78,800,000 [sic]

7005

CSO: 4802

WHEAT PROGRAM FOR 1981 ANNOUNCED

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 22 Dec 80 p 7

[Article: "Supply Program for Wheat; 450,000 Tons to Cover 15 Months"]

[Text] The Ministry of Economy and Trade - Office of Grains and Sugar Beets - sent a letter to the cabinet, containing the wheat supply program for 1981.

In light of previous years' statistics, the letter estimated that domestic consumption for next year would require about 450,000 tons of wheat, based on 30,000 tons per month and a 3 month reserve supply.

Based on the wheat plan for domestic bread production, the quantities required for purchase are distributed, according to type, as follows:

40 percent hard wheat, i.e., 180,000 tons

40 percent medium wheat, i.e., 180,000 tons

20 percent soft wheat, i.e., 90,000 tons

Stocks on hand at the end of the current year are estimated to be 65,000 tons, divided as follows: 17,000 tons of the hard type, 42,000 tons of medium, and 6,000 tons of soft.

The stocks which must be obtained are 163,000 tons of hard, 138,000 tons of medium, and 86,000 tons of soft, i.e., a total of 385,000 tons.

Since the contract concluded with the Canadian wheat council guaranteed the purchase of 150,000 tons of hard wheat, the amounts needed to be imported, in accordance with immediate bids to be tendered, are 235,000 tons (13,000 hard, 138,000 medium, and 84,000 soft).

The ministry proposed to the cabinet that it approve the importing of those quantities, within the limits authorized in the Office of Grains' budget, provided that recourse could be made to treasury loans, if need be, in accordance with statute number 4797, dated 22 February 1966.

The 1980 Program

The supply program for 1980 had to purchase 316,000 tons of wheat, so that, along with the stock on hand from 1979, Lebanon's supply would last a full year, and so that there would be a reserve supply sufficient for 3 months. However, the fact is that there is a need to buy 35,000 tons of medium strength wheat, in order to satisfy consumption until the end of the year, to increase the reserve, and for emergencies.

This need surfaced in that only 306,000 tons of the original amount noted (316,000) was purchased, and the monthly allotment of flour was increased over the rate that was authorized.

The grain office concluded a deal last week for 35,000 tons, and asked the cabinet for a treasury loan, valued at 40 million Lebanese pounds, in order to cover the credit for this deal.

7005

CSO: 4602

GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS REVIEWS STATE OF ECONOMY

Valletta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 10 Jan 81 pp 3, 13, 16

[Text] The President of the Provisional Chadian Government of National Unity, Goukouni Ouedei attended the opening session of the General People's Congress.

The Congress Secretary welcomed President Ouedei and his accompanying delegation and affirmed the depth of historic ties between the Libyan and Chadian people.

President Goukouni Ouedei expressed joy for being able, along with his accompanying delegation, to attend the 6th session of the General People's Congress.

After President Ouedei's speech, the congress then turned to discussion on the continuation of the execution of the development and ordinary budgets for 1980.

The assistant secretary then listed the following comments made by basic congresses on this item:

--172 congresses, 99.4 percent of the total, revised the 1980 development budget and called for the swift finalization of lagging projects.

--One conference, 0.6 percent of the total vote, had no recommendation on the item.

--169 congresses, 97.69 percent of the total vote revised the 1980 ordinary budget.

--4 congresses, 2.31 per cent of the vote had no recommendations.

The Secretary of the General People's Congress said that last year's development and ordinary budgets were part of the five year plan which ended last December 31.

In reference to the internal regulations of basic people's congresses, he said any congress, whether basic, municipality or general, should present these regulations for approval by the General People's Congress.

The Basic People's Congress also discussed an approved agenda. The internal regulations of the General People's Congress are currently being debated by the congress itself.

The following Basic People's Congresses commented on the first article concerning the revision of the resolutions and recommendations of the Basic People's Congresses made at its third ordinary session of 1979, and the second article regarding the development and ordinary budgets: Insaïd, Imayer, Tawarga, Qasr Khyan, Zwana, Misalata, Al-Jamil, Tanzour, Jedeida, Sbeira, Beni Walid, Brak Centre, Souk Al Khamis, Khams, Hon Al-Gara Parsongha and Al-Shati."

The secretaries of the People's Committees for Electricity in Al Zawiya municipality and the General People's Committee of Tripoli municipality, the People's Committee for housing in Al-Jafra, the People's Committee for Teaching in Marzaq municipality commented on the first and second items of the agenda.

The secretaries of the Basic People's Congresses and committees conveyed the observations of their congresses on the proposed development plan, other projects being implemented and those that are planned for the future.

Those who spoke included the secretary of the Basic People's Congress in Zalla, Secretary of the People's Committee for Housing and the municipality Secretary of the People's Committee for Education in the municipality of Jafra, Secretary of the Basic People's Congresses in Ras Ubeida, Al Shati, Soug Al-Ahd, Ghdamis, Unamra, and the Secretary of the People's Committee in the municipality of Khams.

A statement issued by the People's Congresses in the municipalities of the Eastern Sahara and read out, condemned the provocations by Sadat against the Libyan Arab tribes in the Eastern Sahara. The statement deplored the manner with which Sadat has so readily fallen in the arms of imperialism and is ready to transform Egyptian territory into American bases and nuclear wasteland in the service of U.S. and imperialist interests. The statement declared: "instead of designating the area for new projects, the Eastern Sahara is being planted with explosives and filled with tanks and troops."

The statement expressed confidence that the Eastern Sahara is bound to return to its original state as a free territory working for comprehensive Arab unity.

"It will be liberated from all forms of aggression and exploitation exercised by the Egyptian regime."

The General People's Congress Secretary said decisions on various subjects are the responsibility of popular leaderships in all municipalities. He said the general rule is that all municipality problems are dealt with by people's committees on municipality level. There are, however, some problems which can only be dealt with by the general people's committee.

The secretary of the General People's Committee then delivered a speech in which he referred to stoppages or delays in some projects pointed to by the

secretaries of some specialised congresses and committees. He said the reason behind those delays is the enormous nature of projects within the five year plan. The secretary said the total value of projects under implementation is currently put at more than 7,000 million Libyan dinars and that because of the vastness of such expenditure, some delays or stoppages are imminent.

The General People's Committee secretary said another reason for delays might have been the changing nature of the five year plan which ended last December 31.

Yet another reason could have been the disparity between the vastness of planned projects and the lack of administrative cadres capable of implementing these projects. He said: "such obstacles led us to award some giant projects to international companies from friendly countries." Even so, the secretary admitted, demand has always outstripped supply.

In addition to the above reasons, he said there are known administrative reasons. Steps, he added, have been taken by people's committees to remedy this situation.

He said the developments witnessed in the Jamahiriya last year in the implementation of projects reflects to a large extent the improvements implemented by people's committees, especially at municipality level. These improvements have bettered the implementation of projects by 90 per cent more than projected for during that period. He said if spending is taken as an indicator for implementation land (this has always been a good indicator), we have spent 2,500 million Libyan dinars, 33 per cent of projected spending called for by the 5-year economic plan.

The Secretary of the General People's Congress for Planning reviewed the most important achievements during the transformation plan of 1976-80. He pointed out that since its eruption in 1969 the great el Fateh Revolution has pursued a development strategy aimed at decreasing the dependence of the national economy on oil and diversifying the economy to involve the agricultural and industrial revolutions. Energy resources have been capitalised upon in an attempt to achieved optimum results in development. He added that the strategy has also aimed at minimising social and economic differences amongst citizens and various regions in the country.

This was followed by the transformation plan of 1976-80 which we are studying today and which has accomplished a great deal of its objectives. Actual growth in the national economy, including all sectors, has reached 7 per cent per annum. This rate has increased by about 19 per cent in the non-oil industry. This is one of the highest rates attained during this period by all comparisons, whether with the industrialised nations or with nations following similar plans of economic developments. This rate is made up of the average rates of the various sectors, like those of agriculture, industry and other public services."

The secretary of planning showed the rates of development attained in certain fields.

"This strategy is aimed at increasing the productive capacity of the nation by increasing training programmes which would enable us to establish a solid and varied economic infrastructure. The three-year plan of 1973-75 was an important step in starting the basis of this ambitious economic transformation in view of the commendable developments achieved. This was largely due to the much exerted efforts and investments which have exceeded 2,300 million Libyan dinars during the three-year period alone. [words missing] other than oil to have exceeded the rate charted for them in 1975-80 plan.

"Average growth in public services reached 17.5 per cent annually as compared with the expected 8.8 per cent. In health services the rate of development reached an annual 17 per cent increase in contrast to a projected 12 per cent.

"In education the rate of development was on schedule reaching the projected annual increase of 14 per cent.

"Furthermore some industrial sectors recorded high rates of development. For example, manufacturing recorded 21 per cent annual increase, electricity 20 per cent, construction 5 per cent and transport and communications 7 per cent. On the other hand, the agricultural sector recorded a low increase of 3.6 per cent compared to a projected annual increase of 15.8 per cent. This low figure has been attributed to unfavourable weather conditions throughout the five-year plan and to the time factor required for giant agricultural projects to reach the production stage.

"The contribution of the following industries to gross national product were as follows: manufacturing from 3.8 per cent in 1975 to 6.1 percent in 1980, public services from 15 per cent in 1975 to 10 per cent in 1980, education 8.5 per cent in 1980, construction from 25 per cent in 1975 to 28 per cent in 1980, and agriculture from 4.8 per cent in 1975 to 3.5 per cent in 1980."

He said that in accordance with the Third Universal Theory which stresses development, special importance has been given to raising the masses' material standard of living (food, clothing and shelter) and cultural and social standards on the other hand.

The great economic and social accomplishment realised by the national economy during the previous five-year plan, considerably influenced the development of individual income. Personal income rose from 1,360 Libyan Dinars in 1975 to 3,000 dinars in 1980, an aggregate 17 per cent increase during the period.

By this, individual income would have reached 10 thousand dollars per annum, one of the highest in the world.

The planning secretary said investment during the five year plan was put at 7,600 million Libyan dinars, 86 per cent of the total allotted funds of 8,813 million dinars.

He added that the agricultural sector was given particular importance in the development plan with 1,817 million dinars allotted and 1,064 million dinars spent, 88 per cent of the total spending in agriculture has led to the

reclamation of 91,000 hectares of irrigated land, 800 thousand hectares of rain-fed, and 515 thousand hectares of pastures distributed amongst 2,634 farms in the Jaffara plain, farms in the Jebel Akhdar region, 2,300 farms in the Slowl Khudhur region, 108 farms in the Kafra and Sarir region, and 555 farms in the Fezzan region. Furthermore, several dams have been constructed such as the Wadi Ka'Amm, Bani Sour and Wadi Al-Rabi' dams. Further dams are now under construction in Wadi Houn, Wadi Jarif, Labda, Soug Al Khamis, Wadi Zarra and others.

Furthermore, 196,000 hectares and 233 million tree seedlings have been planted. A further 17 million fruit-tree seedlings and 500 thousand palm tree seedlings have been planted. An additional 66 thousand hectares of irrigated land are currently being reclaimed, as well as 355 thousand hectares of rain-fed land and 1.5 million hectares of pasture land. As for achievements in agriculture, wheat production rose from 75 thousands in 1975 to 141 thousands tons in 1980, covering 37 per cent of local consumption. Fruit production rose from 38 thousand tons in 1975 to 163 thousands in 1980, covering 85 per cent of local requirements.

Meat production rose from 44 thousand tons in 1975 to 59 thousand tons in 1980, covering 46 per cent of local demand.

Milk production increased from 87 thousand tons in 1975 to 110 thousand tons in 1980, satisfying 38 per cent of local demand.

Self-sufficiency in egg production was maintained with production increasing from 187 million eggs in 1975 to 285 million in 1980.

Several contracts were signed in 1980 for the construction of 11 dairy production centres with a production capacity of 138 million eggs per annum and 15 million tons of meat in various municipalities throughout the Jamahiriya.

CSO: 4820

LIBYA

BRIEFS

OIL AGREEMENT WITH FRANCE--Paris--The major French oil company Elf Aquitaine and a Libyan oil company NOC signed a contract which will give France 5 licences for oil prospecting and production, sharing the product with Libya. Elf Aquitaine was in fact negotiating this contract since the end of November 80, when Chad was in full crisis. This might explain the absence of French reaction when Libya interfered in the conflict. Libyan Premier Abdul Salam Jalloud stated recently that his country was ready to sign with French oil companies a long-term oil supply agreement. The contract between Elf Aquitaine and NOC proves that relations between Paris and Tripoli are not as bad as expected after the events in Chad. Libya is the 7th oil exporter in the world and supplies only 2 per cent of French needs. But with the Irani-Iraqi war, 60 per cent of France's oil supply shipped through the Gulf is in permanent threat. This is the reason why France is looking for new oil suppliers, Libya now, and maybe Algeria tomorrow.--KUNA [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 9 Jan 81 p 5]

TRIPOLI ECONOMIST TO PAKISTAN--On personal invitation from the President of Pakistan, General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq to Pakistani professionals abroad, Arab Development Institute expert Dr Mazhar Ali Khan Malik went to Pakistan to advise Pakistan's newest engineering university, Mehran Engineering University, during November and December 1980. Dr Mazhar's services were specially requested by Pakistan Government from the Arab Development Institute. Dr Mazhar Ali has received international recognition for his research on "Engineering Education for Developing Countries." Although a Pakistani originally, Dr Mazhar did this work as a member of the Arab Development Institute for Gar Younis University. He has a doctorate in Industrial Engineering from New York University and extensive experience in Asia, Africa, Europe and America. He has published over a hundred research papers and technical articles in leading world journals, and has given dozen of seminars around the world. Currently the chairman of Industrial Engineering at the Arab Development Institute, Dr Mazhar Ali is a member of many societies and professional institutes. He is nominated to WHO'S WHO IN ENGINEERING, AMERICAN MEN OF SCIENCE and WHO'S WHO IN THE WORLD. In Jamahiriya, Dr Mazhar is the president of ACADEME OF PAKISTAN SCIENTISTS & PROFESSIONAL. [Text] [Valletta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 27 Dec 80 p 12]

COKE PLANT TO OPEN--The Minister of Heavy Industries has signed a contract with an international company for the construction of a coke plant in the "Al Niqat Al-Khams" region. The plant includes several units, including a coke carbonification units with an annual capacity of 170,000 tons. [Text] [Valletta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 3 Jan 81 p 5]

FRENCH PT BOAT PROGRAM--On 14 January the Normandy Engineering Constructions Company in Cherbourg discreetly launched a fifth fast missile patrol boat intended for Libya. It is a 310-ton ship, armed with four otomat surface-to-surface missile launchers and three guns. In March 1977 Libya ordered 10 such patrol boats from the private Cherbourg shipyard at a cost assessed at FR3 billion. The first three ships are currently undergoing trials in Lorient, the fourth is being fitted in Cherbourg, and the fifth has just been launched. A Libyan mission staying in Cherbourg includes 60 sailors and weapons technicians who are undergoing training. The patrol boats undergoing trials have Libyan trainees on board together with French seamen and shipyard personnel. After the contract was signed it was stated that the Libyan naval program would be spread out over a long period, owing mainly to the time taken to train crews and technicians and the difficulties involved in that training. Furthermore, deliveries to Tripoli have not yet started. [Text] [LD191015 Paris LE MONDE in French 16 Jan 81 p 4]

CSO: 4800

PRIME MINISTER DISCUSSES GOVERNMENT'S AIMS, ACTIONS

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 17 Dec 80 pp 1, 3, 8

[Interview with Prime Minister Sid'Ahmed O. Bneijara, in Nouakchott on 16 December]

[Text] Prime Minister Sid'Ahmed Ould Bneijara, chief of the first civilian government designated by the Military Committee since 10 July 1978, said yesterday [16 December] in the course of an exclusive interview granted to CHAAB that the present period must be taken advantage of in order to achieve two objectives in conformity with the directions of the CMSN [Military Committee for National Salvation], contained in the declaration of 12 December 1980. "The first objective will be the consolidation of the results already obtained in the areas of national independence, social peace, and juridical reforms which have been placed into effect and which constitute a profound aspiration of our people, and also in the area of economic reform. The second objective will be, properly speaking, the preparation of the transition, which I would like to see painless and orderly, from a system of military government to a system of constitutional, democratic government." The prime minister appealed to all Mauritaniens to "rise above their superficial contradictions" to contribute loyally and effectively to the success of the process of democratization.

[Question] Mr Prime Minister, you have just been charged by the CMSN with a major mission, that is, the preparation of conditions favorable to the establishment of democratic institutions. Can you tell us how you see the "democratic process"?

[Answer] The democratic process consists in permitting the people to choose their system of government freely. In the first phase it is implemented by putting into concrete deeds the historic decision of the CMSN to establish a civilian government. The essential action of this government, which I have wanted to be representative of the different currents of opinion while preserving the achievements of the actions of the CMSN, will be to create favorable conditions for the installation of a normal, constitutional life. Thus, the draft constitution prepared by the CMSN will be subject to a broad national debate before being submitted for the approval of the people through a referendum.

[Question] You speak of the establishment of democratic institutions. Does that signify that Mauritania will be oriented toward a multiparty system? What do you envisage proposing to the people of Mauritania in this sense?

[Answer] From our point of view the establishment of democratic institutions presupposes that the citizens will freely exercise their choice between different programs and different political bodies. Democracy, in sum, signifies essentially the government of the people, by the people, and for the people. Hence, it will be for the people to provide themselves with juridical and political instruments likely to give them sufficient guarantees against arbitrary action and to banish definitively from our social and political system the specter of oppression and dictatorship.

[Question] Mauritania is presently going through a transitional period. What is it moving toward?

[Answer] It is a period which must be used to advantage with a view to achieving two objectives in conformity with the directions of the CMSN contained in the declaration of 12 December 1980. The first objective will be the consolidation of the results already obtained in the areas of national independence--peace, social and juridical reforms--and in the area of economic reform. The second objective will be to prepare a painless transition from a system of military government to a system of constitutional government and at the same time to bring together the energies of the nation for a new stimulus to the economy in a climate of continuing effort but also of serenity and of social peace, a condition which is indispensable to the establishment of democracy.

[Question] The CMSN controls the action of the government. Can you say, Mr Prime Minister, what is the margin for maneuver which your government has and what is the main line of its program of action?

[Answer] The government which I preside over, in terms of the constitution, has broad powers to achieve the objectives defined by the CMSN. The action of my government, which is set within the framework of the general orientations defined by the CMSN, will be characterized simultaneously by firmness in economic and administrative management and by an internal policy based on the national consensus and peace, in an atmosphere of order and security. In the external field my government intends to carry out a policy founded on a sincere wish to maintain good neighborly relations of cooperation and mutual confidence.

[Question] In the last few days there has been much talk of a national coalition government having to prepare the establishment of democratic institutions. Is it in this spirit that the new government has been constituted? Do you have a program to propose to the active forces of the country?

[Answer] As I just told you, the government I preside over is broadly representative of the existing currents of opinion in our country. However, it must be noted that the criteria which determined the choice of ministers were essentially competence, moral and intellectual integrity, and patriotic devotion. Therefore, it is not a matter of a national coalition in the classic sense but above all a desire to express and a consensus while at the same time possessing the competence necessary for this phase, which, as I said, will be essentially a phase of effort.

[Question] Peace has been achieved, economic reform is well under way. Is this enough to guarantee the success of your government?

[Answer] No economic or political reform can be undertaken except in an atmosphere of peace, of serenity, and of stability. My government will try hard to preserve this achievement, but it remains convinced that the path leading to democracy is strewn with traps. The best guarantee for attaining the objective of democracy will consist of providing proof of our political maturity and civic sense. I am convinced that our people will know how to draw out of our rich patrimony the necessary energy to insure the success of the government. In any case, my government will spare no effort to do its duty appropriately.

[Question] To govern is to foresee developments, it is said. In case of serious difficulties would you request the return of the military officers?

[Answer] First, I must immediately make clear to you that the CMSN remains charged with the orientation and control of the activity of the government. The government and the CMSN, in this transitional phase, constitute a single and unique system of leadership which will be sufficiently vigilant to face up to difficulties which you seem to fear. In principle such difficulties have no reason to come up, given the continuity and interdependence of the action of the CMSN and the government.

[Question] Without wishing to anticipate the future, could we know, Mr Prime Minister, approximately how long this transitional period will last?

[Answer] My government is charged with preparing the process of installation of democratic institutions. The duration of the period will be a function of the time necessary for the establishment of the institutions provided for by the constitution which has just been drafted by the CMSN.

[Question] The draft constitution is going to be submitted to public debate. How is that going to be done and when?

[Answer] The modalities and the date for the beginning of public debate will be determined in cooperation with the CMSN at an opportune time.

[Question] Mr Prime Minister, you are the first civilian chief of government since 10 July 1978. What does that mean to you?

[Answer] In assuming power on 10 July 1978 the national armed forces assigned to themselves, among other things, the establishment of democratic freedoms. It is therefore in accord with this commitment that the CMSN has decided to put in place a civilian government. To be the chief of this government constitutes for me a very great privilege, while the mission is also a heavy responsibility. However, its vital importance for my people gives me the courage and determination to succeed.

[Question] Mr Prime Minister, have you an appeal to make to the people of Mauritania?

[Answer] First of all, I would like to state that the daily action of my government will essentially tend toward the preservation of the interests of every citizen of Mauritania in terms of his personal security, his property, and his ideas. However, I am convinced that the contribution of each Mauritanian citizen will be of such nature as to facilitate the action of my government, as defined by the CMSN in the framework of the process of democratization. In effect, the historic decision of the CMSN to install democracy in our country constitutes at the same time a challenge and a wager on the future. I am persuaded that our people, with patriotic traditions that go back more than a thousand years, will know how to accept the challenge and win the wager. My appeal therefore will be to express first my faith, my confidence in the moral and civic sense of our people, to reassure them, and to ask them, across all their component elements and their social classes, to rise above their contradictions and temporary and superficial cleavages, in order to transform elements of weakness into elements that complement each other in an enriching way, in order to provide a guarantee of success in achieving the objective of unity, national independence, liberty, justice, and progress.

5170

CSO: 4400

'SPIEGEL' INTERVIEW WITH MOROCCO'S KING HASSAN

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 2 Feb 81 pp 122-128

(Interview with Moroccan King Hassan in a tent on the royal golf course in Marrakesh by Heinz P. Lohfeldt and Adel S. Elias of DER SPIEGEL on the war in the Sahara and peace in the Middle East: "'I Was Never a Godfather of Camp David'")

[Text] King Hassan II of Morocco is waging the longest war in recent Arab history on the western flank of the Arab world. And just as in the east, in the conflict between Iran and Iraq, in the west too Muslims are fighting Muslims. The Moroccan Army is fighting against the guerrillas of the leftist Polisario Liberation Front which since 1975 has been trying to obtain control over the onetime Spanish Western Sahara and to establish a "Saharan Arab Democratic Republic" there. The Polisario is being supported in its struggle primarily by Algeria and Libya, Morocco's rivals for predominance in the Maghreb.

For his part, Hassan claims the Western Sahara (which with its 266,000 square kilometers, is larger than the FRG but is inhabited by not quite 140,000 people) as traditionally Moroccan territory and so far has resisted all demands for independence and self-determination for the Saharans. This nationalist stand by the king is welcomed by almost all Moroccans and, in the bargain, has successfully diverted attention from the economic distress of the kingdom and the autocratic governing style of Hassan, who is reserving all government decisions for himself.

The word of the ruler, who has sat on his throne now for almost 20 years, managing to survive two coup attempts (in 1971 and 1972), is law in Morocco even though officially there is a cabinet, a parliament and even limited freedom for all parties.

Hassan, 51 years old, is not only the secular ruler over a people of 21 million; as "emir of all faithful," considering himself to be among the successors of the Prophet, he is also the supreme clerical head of his people.

SPIEGEL: Your Majesty, for more than 5 years now, you have waged a very expensive war, with a great many casualties, against the Polisario. One thing you have

apparently achieved by that: the Moroccan people as one support you. At the same time, however, the country is bleeding to death, with the economic situation deteriorating daily. Have you actually gained anything then?

Hassan: To start with, I have gained the certainty that my country is very well off.

SPIEGEL: In what way?

Hassan: After all, we began the Sahara war in 1975, at a time when the whole world was in an economic crisis, when oil prices were rising and the price of phosphate...

SPIEGEL: ...one of your most important sources of foreign currency...

Hassan: ...dropped steeply. And not only did we begin the war, but we kept it up, and now we are about to win it. If Morocco were not a healthy country, we would never have been able simultaneously to go on with the war, rearm and employ and train new personnel, thus continuing to fulfill our development plans, whether in the field of agriculture or industry or in social respects. I have gained all that.

SPIEGEL: And how much longer can Morocco afford this war, which is swallowing more than 1 million dollars a day, with inflation and unemployment rising constantly at the same time?

Hassan: First of all, the war does not cost a million a day.

SPIEGEL: How much does it cost?

Hassan: I will tell you what it costs: About 200,000 dollars a day, roughly. Now, with the dollar having risen in value, perhaps 280,000 dollars a day. Besides, it is the Moroccan people who have the decisive say. If they want to end the war, I will do so, for after all I am only the servant of my people. But as long the people want the war to continue, it will continue. And I do not think that the people want to end it.

SPIEGEL: Despite the fact that the price of food is rising 40 percent, and despite the fact that 40 percent of your budget goes for defense? In 1982 Morocco's foreign currency income will be just enough to pay the interest on its debts.

Hassan: You know, I have never been a big fiscal administrator. I deal with economics, not with finance. If you want to discuss this with my finance minister, he will give you the information.

SPIEGEL: Recently you stated: "War is waged only to reach a point when one can negotiate; war is not waged for the sake of war." Does that mean that you want to follow the UN mandate and begin direct negotiations with the Polisario?

Hassan: Let us wait with the question of whom to negotiate with until the war is over. I do not have any priorities. In any case I do not think that the Polisario is the right partner for negotiations, because after all it represents only a tiny part of the Saharan people...

SPIEGEL: ...of the inhabitants of the Sahara which was Spanish until 1975.

Hassan: I think it is rather a question of national reconciliation, for let me repeat what I said in 1975: The members of the Polisario are pure Saharans, but only after the very last province has been integrated will I be able to turn to the entire complement of the Saharans who belong to the Polisario.

Let me repeat here solemnly and officially that the king of Morocco, the emir of the faithful, the successor of the Prophet, guarantees them a pardon and will forget all that has happened. But that cannot be an issue for negotiations; there can be no negotiations with Moroccans. Those who have gone astray will be forgiven. I will simply regard them as people gone astray when one day they wish to be taken into Moroccan society again.

SPIEGEL: Is there not a danger that you will become isolated by then? For example, the Polisario now lacks just five votes to become an official member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Hassan: After everything which has contributed to destabilization in Africa, it is not Morocco that is becoming isolated: it is Mr Qadhafi who is becoming more and more isolated. If at this moment, as I am talking to you, there were a summit conference of the OAU or a meeting at the foreign-minister level, it is not Morocco which would be condemned for having failed to observe the decisions of the United Nations and the OAU, but another African country--Libya.

SPIEGEL: Because of what Qadhafi has done in Chad?

Hassan: Not only because of that. But one thing is sure: Morocco will not remain isolated. For, after all, quite a number of my neighbors or my friends by now have come to realize what I have always said: the Sahara affair is not a war for a few thousand square kilometers of land--for Morocco it is primarily a question of survival. This is evident now more than ever because the events in the eastern Mediterranean area and in Chad demonstrate the fact that the Sahara war must not only be waged, but must be won.

SPIEGEL: Is it in fact possible to win a military victory?

Hassan: We are about to. If you want to see for yourselves, a helicopter and an airplane will be at your disposal after this. You will be able to form your own impression on the spot. I will send my photographer along, and you can photograph whatever you please...

SPIEGEL: ...and whatever can be seen--that is, only Moroccan troops but not guerrillas underground. Why was it that you did not manage to shut off the border with Algeria so hermetically as to make it impossible for the units of the Polisario to advance into Morocco and into the former Spanish Sahara?

Hassan: I am sure you will strike that question as soon as you have observed the terrain. Of course we could have shelled the aggressor, and blockaded him, but that would have led to war with Algeria.

SPIEGEL: A lot of your countrymen in fact called for just that, and you yourself threatened with retaliatory blows against Algerian territory.

Hassan: A lot of people wondered why we did not let it come to such a war. Nor was it at all easy to resist their patriotic enthusiasm. But I must say that the spectacle between Iraq and Iran we are now witnessing on television does confirm us in our belief that the Algerians and the Moroccans should thank God for not allowing themselves to become involved in a war against one another.

SPIEGEL: Is not a great deal of this also due to the fact that since the time when, after the coup attempts in 1971 and 1972, you disbanded your general staff and yourself assumed the supreme command, there have no longer been any competent strategists at the head of your army?

Hassan: I think that what happened in 1971 and 1972 was a blessing of God, for we went through a tornado. Though this tornado was violent, it also cleaned up everything and cleared the air. With the instigators of two attempts, the Royal Army would not have been in a position to fight on the Golan Heights and on the Sinai Peninsula or to complete the "green march"...

SPIEGEL: ...which in 1975 was to induce Spain to release the Western Sahara.

Hassan: Yes. And with them too we would now not be able to win a war in the Sahara. God freed the Royal Army of its bastards. And he allowed Morocco to keep its best officers. That is the way things are.

SPIEGEL: But the general staff...

Hassan: Such strategists as you are talking about never commanded more than a trumpet in the French Army--to add this parenthetically, as it were.

SPIEGEL: In Morocco there is very seldom any talk about war casualties, the dead and wounded. On the other hand, there are reports according to which each side has lost about 10,000 men. How many casualties have there actually been?

Hassan: I do not have the exact figures in my head. But I will be glad to get them for you. And let me tell you something else. While Hassan II has not got many good qualities, he puts great store by those he has, and among those he has talked with the world over and among his own people he is known as a man who tells the truth. Whereas Morocco issues information, the Polisario Liberation Front makes propaganda. So when we say that there have been 10 dead, there have been 10 and not 15. When we say that there were 20 dead on the opposite side, then there were 20 and not 10.

SPIEGEL: The press of your country generally calls the Polisario fighters mercenaries. Why in fact mercenaries, and in whose service?

Hassan: They are mercenaries because they are not fighting for themselves but for others. They are mercenaries because the Polisario consists less and less of Saharans and more and more of people from Mali, Niger and Chad--people fleeing the famine in the Sahel area.

SPIEGEL: "For others" this presumably means Algeria and Libya, as you have stated repeatedly. Do you have concrete evidence of that?

Hassan: You know, many journalists have seen on the spot cases marked "Tripoli" and "Libya." Now we know that Libya is not an industrialized country, that Libya does not produce any arms, and no ammunition either. Seeing the sophisticated weapons systems the Polisario uses in fighting, one knows: A veritable Niagara of dollars is being spent here, and a hail of steel is pouring down on us. Surely one cannot afford such things except with funds from Libya. Nor does Libya make any secret of its aid.

SPIEGEL: What kind of assistance does Algeria render except providing shelter to the Polisario, for example in Tinduf?

Hassan: Do you really have no subject other than the Sahara? If so, we may be talking about it all day.

SPIEGEL: We do have some other questions. But why and how does Algeria assist the Polisario?

Hassan: We have a saying passed on to us by the Prophet which says: Seek to say only good things about the dead.

SPIEGEL: That was already current among the ancient Romans. But when you speak of the dead, you evidently mean former Algerian President Boumedienne.

Hassan: Yes; the Polisario was looked after by Boumedienne himself. That was a political matter.

SPIEGEL: But did the Algerian attitude not change considerably after Boumedienne's death?

Hassan: This question, you ought to ask the other side.

SPIEGEL: At least in the West, the impression has strengthened that under its new president, Chadli, Algeria is taking a considerably more liberal stand.

Hassan: In the meantime the Algerians have become increasingly aware of the fact that the Polisario is the enemy of Algeria as well as of Morocco. Over the long term it is a conspiracy against Morocco and Algeria.

SPIEGEL: There are reports and rumors that you are already negotiating with Algeria. Is that true?

Hassan: No.

SPIEGEL: Bonn Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has just paid you a visit, as has British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington. Bonn Foreign Minister Genscher in turn went to Algeria. Can the European Community or individual European countries do anything to speed up the peace process in the Middle East and in the Sahara?

Hassan: In my opinion, the Middle East is more important, and I believe the European Community definitely can do something. Incidentally, it has already confirmed that by its statement about an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and the rights of the Palestinian people.

It must, however, be taken into account (and I have said so all along) that it is impossible to conclude a peace in the Middle East without Russia. Only the Europeans can make the United States forgo Camp David and include the USSR in the peace efforts in the Middle East. It is an illusion to believe that a tripartite solution between Egypt, Israel and the United States can lead to a lasting peace.

SPIEGEL: Among the so-called moderate Arabs, you have long been regarded as a sponsor of the treaties of Camp David and also as a secret ally of President Sadat...

Hassan: To start with, this is not a "moderate" but a reasonable country. If we are to become enraged, however, we can do so just as well as the rest. We can have a tantrum as well as the next one. But when Morocco is in a tantrum, things become dangerous.

And besides: I was never a godfather of Camp David--either in the Italian or in the legal sense. When President Sadat went to Jerusalem, I--unlike the other heads of state--knew nothing at all about it beforehand. That is the way it was. Yet a historic opportunity such as the trip to Jerusalem could not be allowed to pass unheeded--without, however, immediately guaranteeing its success. I was perhaps the only Arab head of state who congratulated President Sadat on it, for surely it was a courageous thing to do.

Moreover, I think that one must take advantage of every opportunity for negotiations. If they are not immediately successful, one must try again. And if the Israelis really want to conclude a just and fair peace, we will be the first to help them and are ready to assume risks. But, just as back in 1973, we will also be among the first to fight against them if they want everything to start all over again.

SPIEGEL: Just how do you want to help the Israelis?

Hassan: One moment, please; I have not finished with Camp David. When President Sadat was returning from Camp David, he asked my permission to land here en route. He gave me a comprehensive report about the Camp David decisions, defining them as a framework treaty settling the bilateral relations between Egypt and Israel.

This settlement, he explained to us, in no way however ruled out a just solution of the question of the Golan Heights, Jerusalem and the Palestinians. Then he said he wanted to give a press conference. I replied: Mr President, if you tell me what you are going to say at the press conference, I will get it ready. This is how things remained between President Sadat and me.

Then it turned out, however, that the treaties permitted a dual interpretation, that they were full of ambiguities and points that were not clear, so that it was possible for one as well as the other to be right. I realized that either President Sadat had deceived me or he had been deceived. Anyway, I could not concur any longer.

I can tell you one thing: If I had been the initiator of Camp David, the treaties would have turned out better. But unfortunately that is not the case.

SPIEGEL: Now it is being asserted, however, that Israel's Moshe Dayan and Hasan Tohami, President Sadat's representative, met here in Morocco in September 1977. And it has also been reported that in October 1976 the then Israeli prime minister, Rabin, spend 3 days in Rabat at your invitation. If that is so, it surely would be reason enough to describe you as one of the sponsors of Camp David.

Hassan: President Saddam Hussein of Iraq too has asked me: Is it true that Moshe Dayan and Hasan Tohami met at your place? I answered him as follows: Look, either the two wanted to meet, and why would they then come to an Arab country? They could go to the Bahamas or some other place. Or it was intended to force them to meet. So what power can Morocco exercise to get the two to one place or the other to make sure that they meet? Surely this does not make any sense.

Secondly, I know that many leading Israelis wanted to come to Morocco. I made it known that they were most welcome. There is only one thing I cannot permit as king--tourism. I therefore stated: If you come with a solid plan, with serious proposals, please do, but if you want to come only as tourists, you had better stay home.

SPIEGEL: Would you in fact be prepared to mediate between Israel and the other Arab countries?

Hassan: No. Not because I am afraid to, but because I think that a mediator's role must be based on certain geographic prerequisites. Though I am an Arab, I have no sixth sense; I do not have the tactical intuition, a feeling for the atmosphere that prevails 6,000 kilometers from here. I could, for instance, mediate between Spain and Senegal or Algeria, for this is my area, this is where I was born, this is where I know my way around. One really must be born in the area in which one wants to mediate.

SPIEGEL: So Henry Kissinger is out of the question as well?

Hassan: He is. While he is Jewish, he was not born there. It has to be someone who was born there and speaks Arabic. Such a mediator would be in a better position to understand the conditions.

SPIEGEL: In November 1978 you stated at the National Press Club in Washington that the Arab call for a boycott against Egypt was more of an intellectual pose than a practical measure, and until April 1979 you did at least maintain diplomatic relations with Cairo. Why did you sever them? Under pressure from Saudi Arabia, which funds the Moroccan budget?

Hassan: Well, really... You know, we Moroccans are not Europeans. We do not change our opinion because of a dollar per barrel of oil. And the point that we should take a different stand has never come up, because neither our budget nor our oil is being paid for us. I can show you our oil invoices; we pay the same price as your country.

SPIEGEL: Why was it in fact impossible for the--as you put it--reasonable Arab countries unconditionally to support President Sadat's peace initiative? Surely this would have lent far more weight to his position in the negotiations with Israel.

Hassan: We could not do so. Personally, I think President Sadat should have proceeded differently. If my country were occupied, I would propose a conference of Arab countries, telling them: We are all affected, because there must not be a separate peace; but as long we do not do something, we will not achieve peace, and I want to free my country; relieve me of my obligations so as to give me the freedom to free my country. Then everything would have been clear--everyone for himself, at least for 10 years. But one cannot at the same time want to maintain solidarity and go it alone. That is a contradiction--we are all agreed on that. And when we Arabs are agreed on something, there is no point in your trying to convince us that we differ.

SPIEGEL: You are the chairman of the Jerusalem committee of the Muslim Arab states. How do you think the problem of Jerusalem should be solved?

Hassan: Morocco does not claim that it alone has the philosophers' stone for solving the problem of Jerusalem. I have asked for time to consider the question and am in constant contact with a number of my partners, and in any case we have already reached some decisions. We want to take the geographic circumstances into account (what happens in Morocco is not the same as what happens in Qatar), the constraints that result from proximity and the possibilities of each individual to commit himself.

SPIEGEL: You have proclaimed a holy war over Jerusalem. What does that mean--a military solution, employment of Muslim volunteers?

Hassan: Jihad does not mean war; jihad means mobilization. So when a country proclaims jihad, it must mobilize all its forces--intellectual, financial, human, the military, persons engaged in the arts, the mass media. It is a mobilization of all available energies with the aim of reaching a result corresponding to the holy mission. Jihad is proclaimed not for any kind of aim but for a holy cause, but it is not specifically or exclusively a war. On the other hand, it does not necessarily rule out war either.

SPIEGEL: Last year you called on President Sadat in a letter to do everything possible to solve the problem of Jerusalem. Was that a first step to make Sadat, an outcast in the Arab world, presentable again?

Hassan: Yes, it was. After all, there is hardly any reasonable Arab, a single one, who wants an Arab world without Egypt.

SPIEGEL: Not Qadhdhafi either?

Hassan: I was once asked whether Qadhdhafi, if he had the atom bomb, would drop it on Cairo. I replied: No. Egypt remains the great friend as far as Qadhdhafi is concerned.

When I addressed my message to Sadat, I did not call on him to retract his signature or to tear up the Camp David treaties; I simply called on him to officially break off negotiations since Israel had integrated Jerusalem on a permanent basis.

SPIEGEL: Did you really expect him to do so?

Hassan: I hoped with all my heart that he would.

SPIEGEL: How do you judge the prospects for peace in the Middle East at present?

Hassan: If I were in Israel's place, I would have the choice between two alternatives, but I would have to act quickly. For example, Israel has atom bombs, about 15 of them. Either I go ahead and drop an atom bomb on each Arab capital--and do so at once--or I behave like a responsible country--also at once.

For in a couple of years everyone will have an atom bomb. Let no one think that the Arabs will remain technologically backward. Thousands and thousands of Palestinians, Kuwaiti and Saudi scientists go to the United States every year and then return as highly qualified scientists. In a couple of years our technological level will be very, very high.

Technology plus petroleum plus dollars--no one should have any trouble imagining the potential of that combination. I therefore say: If I were Israel, [I would] either drop an atom bomb on each Arab capital or at once make serious efforts for peace. For in a couple of years everything will have changed.

SPIEGEL: Do you see any signs of such serious efforts?

Hassan: The Israelis just do not want to. As for Begin, one cannot speak of negotiations anyway, or of peace.

SPIEGEL: There will soon be new elections in Israel. Do you think that prospects would be better with another Israeli politician?

Hassan: If Begin falls, I would be very upset, for of all Israelis he defends Arabs' policy best. The stupidities he commits benefit us. He is doing us an enormous service throughout the world.

SPIEGEL: And how do you see your own future, the future of the Maghreb--with economically and militarily superior neighbors like Libya and Algeria? About a year ago you predicted that there would be an end to the Sahara war on your conditions in 1980. We are now in 1981. Do you dare make another prediction?

Hassan: In making a prediction for 12 months ahead, one surely is allowed to err by 1 month. Instead of end of December 1980, it will now be end of January 1981.

SPIEGEL: And then? Are you not afraid that for instance Iranian developments, assumption of power by Islam, might also occur in Morocco?

Hassan: No, for I am convinced that certain Shi'ites, including those under Khomeyni, have weakened Islam. It is a group that is blind, isolated, sectarian. These Shi'ites do not represent the Islam that was able to bring the world of science, an intellectual flourishing, to Europe, Spain and Morocco.

One may therefore expect the 800 million Muslims, most of whom live in the Third World, one day to get tired of letting themselves be manipulated. To think that what has happened in Iran will be repeated in Morocco is a pure hypothesis, in my opinion. One cannot prevent anyone from imagining such a thing, but it is nevertheless not imaginable. It is impossible and unimaginable.

SPIEGEL: Thank you for this interview, Your Majesty.

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CSO: 4403

ASSEMBLY CRITICIZES GOVERNMENT'S LEGISLATIVE, COMMUNICATION POLICIES

Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 10 Dec 80 p 3, 16

[Article by Fu'ad Ayyub: "Sharp Criticism Directed by National Assembly Members to Policy of Ministry of Communications; Question Recurring Throughout Session: Is (Emirtel) Commercial Organization of Public Organization Serving Union's Citizens; Minister of Finance: State Budget Paid by Two Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai; Before 1980, Abu Dhabi Alone Shouldered Budget"]

[Excerpt] The general impression was that this session would be completely calm and would end within an hour or a little more. But this impression was not correct and the exact opposite became evident as of the first moments of the session.

As of the first moments in which Turaym 'Imran Turaym, the [National] Assembly speaker, opened the session, an ordinary review of the first item on the agenda started. This item was on the laws issued in the absence of the assembly and the speaker asked if there were any comments on these laws. At that moment, more than one assembly member asked to speak. The discussion was started by member Muhammad Rahmah al-'Amiri who said: There is no doubt that the laws issued in the absence of the assembly seek to serve the country's and the citizens' public interest. Article 110 of the constitution makes it possible to issue such laws in the assembly's absence. However, there is a paragraph in the article which limits this right with the phrase "should the need arise," meaning in cases of necessity and extreme importance. I do not believe that such maximum necessity was present for the issuance of these laws in the assembly's absence. We must have a role in discussing these laws and in expressing our opinions on them.

Member Salih al-Shal dwelt on this issue with greater detail and explanation, saying: I agree with what al-'Amiri has said and I believe that it is extremely important that the National Assembly take part in discussing such laws before they are issued, especially the press and publication law, the Central Bank law and the Petroleum Organization law. The bill to set up the Central Bank came as a proposal from this assembly, as did the bill submitted by the assembly to the government to set up the Public Petroleum Organization. These laws were issued during the assembly's vacation (4 months) whereas there are other laws which have not been issued. The matter is one of consultation between us. The National Assembly and Council of Ministers are two faces of the same coin. The freedom of expression is being subjected to restrictions in the press and publication law and we all know the consequences of censorship on broadcasting and on the press. We learn our news

from the Kuwaiti press. Besides, what is urgent about issuing the Central Bank law? The assembly was in session in April, May and June, so why is the law issued in August when the assembly is on vacation? If urgency is the reason for its issuance, then the law is not put into force yet!

Member Khalifah Yusuf wanted to tone down the sharp discussion and so he proposed the formation of a committee comprised of assembly members to discuss the laws issued in the assembly's absence and to amend whatever provisions it deems necessary to amend. He said: The law is not a revealed Koran. We should not discuss something that is not within our jurisdiction.

Hamad Bushihab, the assembly deputy speaker, seconded the proposal for formation of the committee but expressed the view that the committee should focus its attention on discussing whether there was an urgent need to issue the laws during the assembly's vacation or not. Explaining his view, Bushihab said: What governs this matter is the implementation or non-implementation of these laws. The Central Bank law has not been implemented yet. So what was so urgent about issuing it only 2 weeks after the assembly's vacation started? He also said: Do we have to read these laws in the press like the rest of the people? We do not oppose the government and we seek to help it. Laws issued after they are discussed in the Council of Ministers, in the National Assembly and in the UAE Supreme Council gain strength in the international lobbies and at the internal level. The issuance of such laws by one authority makes them subject to criticism.

Member Salih al-Shal rejected the proposal for the formation of a committee to discuss the laws issued and demanded that a closed session be held to discuss the matter in its entirety, in addition to discussing the assembly's policy in its new session, saying: This is the assembly's final year under the provisional constitution.

Member Ahmad Ghubash said: The government exploited the assembly's vacation and issued the press and publication law which restricts the freedom of expression and the Central Bank law which should have been presented to the assembly before its issuance.

Member Sultan Khalifah demanded that a frank discussion be held with the government on the issuance of laws in the assembly's absence.

Shaykh 'Abd-al-Jabbar al-Majid objected to the long summer vacation given to the assembly and wondered why it is so long. The assembly speaker replied that this vacation is stipulated by the constitution.

Speaker Turaym added: The law [bill] to set up the Central Bank was present during the previous session and when this matter was discussed with the minister of commerce, he said: I have learned that the law has been presented for the signature of the higher political authorities. The law was not submitted to the assembly even when it was in session.

Turaym also said: As for the point brought up by member Muhammad al-'Amiri on whether the issuance of these laws in the assembly's absence was dictated by an urgent need or by the desire not to have the laws brought up and discussed in the assembly, this is a constitutional point. It is the right of the government to

issue laws in the absence of the assembly. But the question is: Was there an urgent need for the issuance of these laws? The laws have not been implemented yet and this confirms that there was no need.

After a long discussion, some members proposed that the issue be postponed and be added to the new works that develop. The Proposal was put to vote and won the approval of the assembly members.

Reply of Minister of Electricity

The assembly then moved to the question addressed by Muhammad Rahmah al-'Amiri to the minister of electricity and water regarding the electricity services and regarding what has been done to unify these services throughout the state. Humayd al-'Uways, the minister of electricity and water, said in reply: There is no doubt that you appreciate the ministry's continuous and ceaseless endeavor and efforts to unify the electricity and water departments and to put them under [its] direct supervision in order to strengthen the union's entity and to save vast funds that are lost in the scattered organizations. The Ministry exerts serious efforts to annex all the electricity plants to the federal entity. It is not incapable of providing the engineers and technicians needed for this purpose. But because of circumstances beyond its control, the ministry has not succeeded yet. The ministry has drawn up a comprehensive plan to link all the plants with each other but this plan is still pending. If the National Assembly exerts efforts to help the ministry in this regard, then we welcome such efforts which should start now.

In accordance with the [assembly's] bylaws, a query is conducted by the questioner and the questioned. Therefore, Muhammad al-'Amiri said in comment: Article 120 of the constitution gives the federal Ministry of Electricity the power to supervise the water and electricity plants. Nine years have passed since the union was established and we are still hearing these statements about circumstances. We want to know the reason for the delay in handing over these plants to the federal entity.

Minister al-'Uways: The ministry's takeover of the electricity plants is left to the wish of the individual emirates. Some of the emirates have actually applied for handing over their plants to the federal ministry and the matter is presented to the Supreme Council to make the decision on taking over these plants.

Sharp Criticism for (Emirtel)

The discussion then turned to the government's policy in the sphere of communications. Most of the members directed strong criticism to the Emirates Communications Organization and demanded that the fees for [telephone] communications between the emirates be abolished or reduced into token fees so that the citizen may feel politically that he lives in a single state. A lengthy discussion took place on this and other issues with Muhammad Sa'id al-Mulla, the minister of communications, who attended the session to answer the members' queries.

The discussion was initiated by member Muhammad al-Musa who said: The Emirates Communications Organization is a service agency connected with the people's essential needs. Exploiting this agency for profit is unacceptable because the

government owns a large share of the organization's stock. The organization realized a profit of 200 million dirhams last year and the government's share of this profit is more than two thirds. These are profits which the government makes from the ordinary citizen even though it doesn't need such profits. I demand that the government's share be allocated for subsidizing the local calls made by the ordinary citizen. Moreover, we have heard about a plan to nationalize [tawtin] and Arabize it but have felt nothing of the sort so far. Had the organization paid attention to this matter, it would have realized a lot because it can send citizens on scholarships for training abroad. We can also set up training facilities locally with the aim of nationalizing [tawtin] and Arabizing the organization. Moreover, our airports are exploited by all countries while we fail to reap any benefit from them because we have no national airline.

Hamad Bushihab picked up the thread to say: When the British company was here, we did not have such troubles with the telephones. People are now seething with complaint. One citizen pays 10,000 dirhams and another 6,000 dirhams for his telephone. This is tyranny and exploitation. Moreover, what is the ministry's philosophy regarding Arabization of the technical jobs? What do we say to a national agency that does not help the citizens? They say that foreign labor is cheap and that a foreign worker is paid 300-400 dirhams [sic]. But the agencies are affected by workers who do not have adequate experience. We ask the state to put the organization in the service of the citizen and that it establish a national policy. We also demand that the communication fees and subscriptions be reduced.

Member Muhammad al-'Amiri joins his voice to that of Bushihab and demands that internal telephone call fees and nationalization of the organization be reconsidered.

Al-'Amiri is supported by member 'Abdallah Amin who says: The citizen spends as much on his telephone as he spends on his family and it is a burden to him to pay 2,000-3,000 dirhams monthly in fees for telephone calls. It is required that the fees for internal calls between the emirates be abolished or that, at least, token fees be charged for such calls. Amin also demanded that efforts be made to make available our services between the emirates, especially the remote ones.

Sayf Sultan said: The eastern area suffers from telephone breakdowns and there is no line linking Dubai with the eastern area. Um al-Qaiwayn in particular suffers from telephone breakdowns. The fees for supplying a home with a telephone line was about 600 dirhams whereas it has now risen to nearly 1,050 dirhams. What is the reason for this increase? Is this also due to the increase in oil prices?

Sayf then proposed the establishment of an airline for internal trips to link the emirates with one another, especially the emirates separated from each other by long distances.

Minister of Communication Answers Criticism

Muhammad Sa'id al-Mulla, the minister of communications, then took the floor to answer all the critical remarks made by the members, saying: Insofar as the government's communications policy is concerned, we have drawn up our plan on the basis of supplying all parts of the state with telephone communications by the year 1985. We are implementing this plan. We have made progress in some aspects

and there has been delays in other aspects. But the general result is not bad. This year, we took over the telephone organization in Ra's al-Khaimah. This is a good federal accomplishment. In the past, communications depended on scattered organizations whereas we now have a single organization that serves all the citizens.

As for the profits realized, I say that this organization is not commercial in the full sense of the word. But this does not mean that it is an exploitative organization. It does not exploit the people. If its prices were compared with those of any other organization, there would be no place for the comparison. Last year's profits are not exactly 200 million dirhams. Insofar as management of the organization is concerned, brother 'Ali al-'Uways left the ministry to become an independent director of the organization. He is accountable to the Board of Directors and to an executive committee that meets weekly. The Board of Directors will be formed of 4 citizens and 6 government officials, part of whom will come from the Ministry of Communications and the other part from the Ministry of Finance. As for training the citizens, we welcome such training. But our work is hard and the organization is busy day and night, whether in the postal service or in (Emirtel). As for nationalization [al-tawtin], all branches of the organization will be managed by citizens by the end of this year.

Regarding the national airline, we studied this issue sometime ago and presented it to the Council of Ministers. However, the Council of Ministers did not approve the project and recommended that the Gulf Airline be strengthened. In the light of this, we have decided to give the Gulf Airline 2 years to stand on its own feet and then we will set up our national organization, even though the delay will cost us tens of millions of dirhams. The longer we delay setting up the organization, the higher the prices of aircraft will go. What is important is that we did all this but then stopped because Abu Dhabi has invested large funds in the Gulf Airline and because the government has asked that this airline be supported.

Discussing Reduction of Internal Telephone Call Fees

The minister then returned to the Emirtel issue, saying: Insofar as internal communication fees are concerned, we reduced them by 20 percent once before but nobody felt the reduction. As for a government subsidy for the telephones, this is wrong because this organization is not a 100 percent government organization but a commercial organization in which the government is in partnership with the citizens. However, we will study the question of reducing internal telephone call fees.

As for the issue of the airports and of the ports, the Supreme Council has given us the power to take charge of their control towers. But if we do so, they will constitute a burden to us because they are the part of the airports that incurs losses.

At this point, a debate developed between the minister and Speaker Turaym 'Imran Turaym. It was the minister's opinion that the ministry should not take over an agency that loses constantly whereas the assembly speaker's opinion was that the political goal should govern this process. The speaker also proposed that internal communications between the emirates be free of charge so that the political goal of the minister opposed this proposal on the grounds that this would create big

pressure on the lines, thus entangling communication between the emirates and causing complaint to rise loud because of busy lines. The minister added: These communication fees can be reduced gradually.

Salih al-Shal interrupted the debate to say: The Supreme Council has empowered the ministry to take over the airports existing in the state but the ministry has failed to do so for economic reasons. How can this be?

The minister answered: From the security aspect, the airports are under our control. But what is the meaning (sense) of having 4 airports in the state and then of asking us to take them over?

Salih al-Shal answered: But the airports are a political issue and a law must be drawn up to put the airports under the control of the state and must be presented to the Supreme Council.

The assembly then moved to the question addressed to Hamdan ibn Rashid, the minister of finance and industry, on the contribution of the various emirates to the state's federal budget. This question had been postponed at the outset of the session because no answer had been received from the ministry in this regard. But then the minister came to the session.

Answering the question, the minister said: The state's general budget amounts to 15,767,200 [sic] dirhams of which 15,228,778 dirhams have been paid. As for the percentages, I cannot determine them because we are not familiarized with Abu Dhabi's or Dubai's oil revenues. All that can be said is that Abu Dhabi has paid nearly 73 percent and Dubai about 25 percent. But we have no complete information on Abu Dhabi's or Dubai's oil revenues. I cannot determine now the surplus or reserve in the budget because most of the budget spending is none this month.

Commenting on the minister's words, Muhammad al-'Amir, who had submitted the question, said: We know that His Highness Shaykh Zayid has allocated 50 percent of Abu Dhabi's revenues for the union. A decree to this effect was issued in 1975. This was followed by a similar decree issued by His Highness Shaykh Rashid ibn Sa'id. This is a sound step that is in the public interest and that seeks to bolster the national economy and to create a reserve in the state for development.

The minister said in comment: We did not receive Shaykh Zayid's decree on the 50 percent in 1975 but in 1980. However, Abu Dhabi shouldered before that the union's entire budget from A to Z.

The session ended with a recommendation to the government concerning the policy of the Ministry of Communications. The assembly will hold its coming session next Tuesday to discuss its policy in the coming phase and the issue of termination of the permanent [presumably meaning provisional] constitution by the end of 1981 and the measures required in this regard.

FINANCING ACTIVITIES BY ABU DHABI FUND IN 1980 REVIEWED

Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 9 Dec 80 p 11

[Article by Mughazi Shu'ayr: "Abu Dhabi Fund Participates in 15 German [sic] Projects This Year"]

[Text] The Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development is conducting studies on financing 4 new projects at the beginning of the new year, including two projects in Morocco, one in Somalia and one in Bangladesh, within the framework of implementing the UAE policy of advancing loans and economic aid to the Arab, Asian and African countries to enhance their development and bolster their economies.

This has been stated by Nasir al-Nuways, the fund's general director, who has added: The fund is scheduled to conclude this month 3 new loan agreements, including a loan to the Yemen Arab Republic for 37 million dirhams to finance the project to link Zamar and Ta'izz electricity, a loan to the Republic of Niger for 30 million dirhams to finance an electricity plant in (Sumi Shar) area, and a third loan for 4 million dirhams to finance an airport project in (Lesotho). The Abu Dhabi Fund will thus conclude his activities for this year after having advanced technical aid, contributions and loans valued at 1.2 billion dirhams, of which 400 millions came from the fund's capital and 800 millions for projects in which the government has participated and which are managed by the fund on behalf of the government.

Twelve Projects in 10 States

Nasir al-Nuways has reviewed the various projects in which the fund has participated (or has managed on behalf of the government) from the beginning of last January and until the present, saying: These projects have totaled 12 projects in Arab, African and Asian countries, including the Khartoum new airport project in Sudan and the Juba sugar project in Somalia in whose financing the government has participated. As for the 10 other projects, the Abu Dhabi Fund participates in financing them. These projects include the phosphate fertilizers project in Jordan, al-Mansurah electricity plant and Nashitun Port in the Democratic Yemen, the southern heights project in the Yemen Arab Republic, (al-Jarjul) agricultural project in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, the (Bissau-Comoret) highway and the peanut processing plant in Guinea-Bissau, the project for the third phase of (Pandom) airport in Gambia, the project to develop fish resources in Cape-Verde Islands and the project for the petrochemical complex in Izmir, Turkey.

in reply to a question on the interest rate charged by the fund for the various loans it advances, Nasir al-Nuways said: It depends on the type of project. If the project yields high profits, then a higher interest rate is charged for the loan and vice versa. Consideration is also given to the special economic circumstances of each separate country. Generally, the interest rate demanded by the fund does not exceed three to four percent on very soft terms in comparison to the terms of the other financial establishments. This is done on the premise of the message which the fund performs, namely that of assisting fraternal and friendly countries.

Encouraging Arab Investments

At the conclusion of his statement, the director general of the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development called for encouraging Arab investments in the Arab countries by solving the problems experienced by the Arab investor. He said: These issues are connected with the laws, the commercial aspects and the redtape that stand a stumbling block in the face of having the Arab investor invest his monies in the Arab countries. The investment symposium conducted in Tunis last month shed light on these problems which were discussed with utter frankness. Tunisia expressed its readiness to eliminate the difficulties of investment in its territories and has opened the opportunity for investment in the agricultural and real estate spheres whereas investment was confined in the past to the tourism and industry sectors. Having already participated in the northern (Soussa) project (by 34 percent) and in the phosphate and nitrogenous fertilizers project (by 40 percent), we are now conducting studies on participation in other joint projects in the agricultural and real estate sectors in Tunisia within the framework of bolstering joint economic cooperation between UAE and the Arab countries.

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CSO: 4802

MINISTRY UNDERLINES 1980 AGRICULTURAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Abu Dhabi AL-WAHDAH in Arabic 24 Nov 80 p 9

[Article by Yasir Hilal: "Important Horizontal and Vertical Agricultural Development in Emirates; Increase of 13 Percent in Crops; Value of 1979-80 agricultural Production Is 680 Million Dirhams"]

[Text] Dubai--The total local food production in the 1979-80 agricultural season amounted to nearly 269,000 tons of agricultural crops and meat, dairy and fish products. The total value of this production has been estimated at 680 million dirhams. A growth rate of 13 percent over the preceding season has been thus realized. This information is contained in a report prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, pointing out that vegetable production occupied top place with 83,000 tons.

Fish production amounted to nearly 64,000 tons. The appropriations allocated in the ministry's budget amounted to 253 million dirhams, of which 170 millions were allocated for the ministry's projects as follows:

Twelve million dirhams for production projects, 57 millions for plans to complete the infrastructure projects, 21 millions for service center projects and 80 millions for subsidy plans, agricultural loans and fishing loans. In the sphere of agriculture, the report points out that the area of cultivable land has grown to nearly 23,000 hectares, i.e. by nine percent over last year, that the number of farms has reached 10,397 farms and that improved cultivation in plastic [green] houses has been expanded, raising the number of such houses to 218 houses in private farms compared to 62 houses last year, in addition to 60 houses constructed in the experimental farms. In 1980, the ministry devoted special attention to securing and distributing production requirements, such as seed and fertilizer. It is to be noted in this regard that a large number of the state's farmers experienced numerous difficulties last year as a result of the unavailability of seeds or of the low quality of the seeds, when available. This is why the ministry laid down the technical and executive bases for quality control specifications and for compelling the suppliers to state the expiration date on the packages they deliver to the farmers.

In the sphere of implementing the agricultural loans, for which nearly 36 million dirhams were allocated, bids to supply 1,900 diesel and electrically operated [water] pumps and 900 sprinkler units were analyzed and a contract for 50,000 rolls of fence wire was concluded [sentence as published].

Water and Soil

The report adds that in order to protect the water resources from the fate to which they are being exposed (loss) and in addition to the establishment of the Higher Water Authority, a number of projects serving this objective have been implemented, such as the construction of earthen and rock dams on some valleys and, re-digging and repairing a number of wells. This is in addition to efforts to implement the central irrigation project which employs modern means of irrigation that save 70 percent of the water used in the conventional methods of irrigation.

In the sphere of livestock resources, the number of veterinary centers has risen to 17 fully-equipped clinics, in addition to 7 mobile clinics. The ministry has also begun a rational implementation of the agricultural and veterinary quarantine laws, a central control unit for the quarantines throughout the state has been set up and checks were carried out in the centers located on the land borders and in the ports on nearly 455,000 heads of livestock, 6,050 tons of meats and nearly 140,000 tons of vegetables and fruits.

Plan for 1981

The preliminary estimates for the projects to be implemented by the ministry next year have amounted to nearly 805 million dirhams, of which 87 millions (are under implementation). These projects total 17 new projects for protected [greenhouse] cultivation, for the production of seeds, poultry, artificial insemination, cold storage facilities for fish, marketing farmers' production, modern irrigation in the state farms and other production projects. This is in addition to continued expansion of the services offered to the farmers, including the construction of 8 agricultural centers and 3 veterinary clinics. As for the fish resources, the plan calls for replacing 3 workshops for the maintenance of fishing equipment and the construction of 8 modern workshops. As for the completion projects, the appropriations allocated for them amount to nearly 119 million dirhams. Insofar as the subsidies and agricultural and fishing loans are concerned, the appropriations have amounted to 244 million dirhams.

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EDUCATION, HEALTH STATISTICS--A report by the Ministry of Planning on education in the UAE says that the number of students rose in 1980 to 124,000 students compared to 44,000 in 1972 and that the number of teachers rose in 1980 to 8,000 teachers compared to 2,300 in 1972. The number of schools was 147 in 1972 and rose to 322 schools for the various stages in 1980. Regarding adult education and the eradication of illiteracy, the number of those enrolled in 1980 amounted to 140,000 students. As for university education, the number of students at the UAE University reached 1,768 students in 1980 and the number of students sent on scholarships abroad amounted to 2,300 students. In the health services sector, the report says that there were 14 hospitals in 1972 and that the number rose to 25 hospitals in 1980 and that the number of hospital beds was nearly 1,000 beds in 1972 and that it rose to 4,000 beds in 1980. As for public clinics, there were 14 such clinics in 1972 and the number rose to 77 clinics in 1980. The number of childcare centers rose to eight in 1980 whereas there were no such centers in 1972. The number of school health clinics rose to 11 in 1980. A total of 1,450 physicians work in the UAE at present whereas only 220 were working in it in 1972. [Text] [Abu Dhabi AL-WAHDAH in Arabic 6 Dec 80 p 4] 8494

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